Perspectives on Ohio Bingo Regulation: An Historical Analysis and Proposals for Change by Ravenscraft, Patricia & Reilly, Elizabeth
The University of Akron
IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Law Review Akron Law Journals
August 2015
Perspectives on Ohio Bingo Regulation: An
Historical Analysis and Proposals for Change
Patricia Ravenscraft
Elizabeth Reilly
Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview
Part of the Gaming Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the
institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Akron Law Review by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please
contact mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ravenscraft, Patricia and Reilly, Elizabeth (1977) "Perspectives on Ohio Bingo Regulation: An Historical Analysis
and Proposals for Change," Akron Law Review: Vol. 10 : Iss. 4 , Article 5.
Available at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss4/5
AKRON LAW REVIEW
PERSPECTIVES ON OHIO BINGO REGULATION:
AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS AND PROPOSALS
FOR CHANGE
I. THE HISTORY OF BINGO IN OHIO
A. Pre-Constitutional Gambling Regulation
B. The Constitutional Meaning of "Lotteries"
C. The Statutory Scheme for Lotteries and Other Schemes of
Chance: Post-1851
D. Filling the Legislative Void Through Municipal Regulation
E. Charitable Bingo Operations Prior to 1975
HI. OHIO BINGO LEGISLATION
A. The Statutory Scheme: Chapter 2915
B. Senate Bill 398
C. Analysis of the Problems with Senate Bill 398
1. Excepted Schemes and Games of Chance
2. Bingo Licensing Difficulties
3. Proceeds
D. Analysis of Current Chapter 2915
1. Eliminating Loopholes
2. Additional Provisions
3. Remaining Problems with the Conduct of Bingo
It. COMPARATIVE LEGISLATION: BINGO REGULATION IN OTHER STATES
A. Organizations Eligible to Conduct Bingo
B. Licensing Procedures
C. Control over Proceeds
D. Record-Keeping
IV. SUGGESTED LEGISLATIVE STRATEGIES
A. Office of Bingo Control
B. Licensing Lessors, Suppliers, and Game Operators
C. Permits for Charitable Organizations
D. Amusement Bingo and Festivals
E. Reporting Requirements
[Vol. 10:4
1
Ravenscraft and Reilly: Perspectives on Ohio Bingo Regulations
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1977
Spring, 1977]
INTRODUCTION
O NE NEED not do extensive research into the historical background of
bingo or lottery regulation in the State of Ohio before becoming aware
that the current state of confusion in the law is not without precedent.
Particularly in the large metropolitan centers, regulating and policing schemes
and games of chance have presented a perennial problem.' With the advent
of constitutionally authorized charitable bingo in November of 1975,'
several legislative regulatory schemes were enacted. Each eventually gave
rise to a more serious proliferation of problems in enforcing the legislative
limitations. The critical proportions of the bingo problem were reflected
in Amended House Bill 1547, enacted on December 6, 1976 as an emer-
gency measure. As explained in section three of that bill:
This act is hereby declared to be an emergency measure necessary for
the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety. The
reason for this necessity is that its enactment into law at the earliest
possible time will clarify the rights and obligations of charitable
organizations conducting bingo games... and enable certain charitable
organizations to use the proceeds of bingo games for those beneficial
charitable activities that have in the past been sustained by their
support .... I
Unfortunately, the new law failed to eliminate most of the difficulties in
regulating bingo. Loopholes enabling proceeds to be spent for noncharitable
' E.g., Morman v. Youngstown, No. 74-90 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 5, 1975); Nadlin v. Starick,
24 Ohio Op. 2d 272, 194 N.E.2d 81 (C.P. Montgomery County 1963) (Dayton); Zepp v. Colum-
bus, 50 Ohio Op. 47, 112 N.E.2d 46 (C.P. Franklin County 1951); Loder v. Canton, 65
Ohio L. Abs. 517, 111 N.E.2d 793 (C.P. Stark County 1951); Kraus v. Cleveland, 42 Ohio
Op. 490, 94 N.E.2d 814 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1950), aff'd, 89 Ohio App. 504, 96
N.E.2d 814 (1950), appeal dismissed, 155 Ohio St. 98, 97 N.E.2d 549 (1951); State
ex rel. Gabalac v. The New Universal Congregation of Living Souls, No. 76-9-1960 (C.P.
Summit County filed Sept. 1976) (Akron); State ex rel. Campbell v. Charities Unlimited,
Inc., No. 75-1-278 (C.P. Summit County filed Jan. 31, 1975) (Akron).
In the relatively small and/or rural Ohio counties, not only has no bingo litigation
been reported, but it appears that little bingo activity occurs. The few organizations con-
ducting bingo in the counties from which the writers received responses to inquiries
directed to all 88 Prosecuting Attorneys are licensed and primarily church sponsored. Letter
from James R. Scott, Guernsey County Prosecuting Attorney, February 16, 1977 (four
licensed religious organizations; no problems or complaints); Letter from Lucien C. Young,
Jr., Noble County Prosecuting Attorney, February 15, 1977 (no bingo, but Roman Catho-
lic Church with application pending); Letter from Russel J. McMaster, Paulding County
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, February 17, 1977 (no bingo problems); Letter from Elmer
Spencer, Adams County Prosecuting Attorney, February 15, 1977 (no knowledge of any
bingo in the county); Letter from the Honorable Henry E. Shaw, Judge of the Delaware
County Court of Common Pleas, February 14, 1977 (no bingo litigation); Letter from the
Honorable Harry Sargeant, Jr., Judge of the Fremont Municipal Court, former Sandusky
County Prosecuting Attorney, February 14, 1977 (no problems or cases).
2 OMO CONST. Art. XV, § 6 was amended, effective November 5, 1975, pursuant to the adop-
tion H.J.R. 10016 by the electorate in the general election. The vote tally was yes: 1,388,606;
no: 1,195,660.
3 Am. Sub. H.B. No. 1547, § 3, 111th General Assembly (1976).
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purposes remained and were capitalized upon. The legislative scheme con-
tinued to prove incapable of achieving the purported legislative goals.
It is the purpose of this comment to facilitate the enactment and enforce-
ment of comprehensive, workable bingo legislation for the State of Ohio. To
this end, Part I of this comment will explore the history of bingo regulation
in Ohio, and gambling legislation as it relates to bingo, to illuminate the
policy behind the present law. In Part II, the writers present an analysis of
the recent, and frequent, amendments to Chapter 2915 of the Ohio Revised
Code as they relate to legalized bingo, followed by a critical appraisal of the
effectiveness of the current statutes in regulating bingo. Part III discusses com-
parable legislation in nine other major states. This legislation will be con-
trasted with Ohio law to identify similar problems and to evoke drafting ideas
which may help close many existing loopholes in the law. Finally, in Part IV,
the writers suggest drafting strategies and proposals for rewriting significant
portions of the bingo law.
The writers make no value judgments on the social or moral efficacy
of legalized bingo. All suggestions herein are directed to drafting legislation
which achieves the public policy goals chosen by the people of Ohio and
their elected representatives. It is hoped that the suggestions offered will be
useful in the legislative process of adopting a comprehensive bingo law; the
authors shall endeavor to present all theoretical and practical considerations
so that the proposals proffered will reflect the wide range of legislative
choices open to the people of Ohio. The goal is to place bingo in the back-
ground, operating smoothly in accord with a fair legislative scheme, absent
controversy.
I. THE HISTORY OF BINGO IN OIUo
If, from the tangled body of law surrounding bingo in Ohio, one factor
can be singled out as crucial, that factor would be Article XV, section six
of the Ohio Constitution of 1851. That provision, for almost one and a quar-
ter centuries, read:
Lotteries, and the sale of lottery tickets, for any purpose whatever, shall
forever be prohibited in this State.
At first glance it may be difficult to apprehend the applicability of this pro-
vision to bingo. However, as will be more fully demonstrated," the courts in
Ohio have consistently held bingo to be a lottery,' subject to constitutional
prohibition.
4 See text accompanying notes 52-77 infra.
5 See cases cited note 71 infra.
[Vol. 10:4
3
Ravenscraft and Reilly: Perspectives on Ohio Bingo Regulations
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1977
A. Pre-Constitutional Gambling Regulation
Ohio's first anti-gambling provisions were passed on February 14, 1805
under the title "An act, for the prevention of certain immoral practices."
Every "species, kind or way of gambling at hazard or chance, under any
pretense whatever, for money or any other article of value, and betting
thereon," were prohibited.6 In 1807 the General Assembly of Ohio passed
the first law denominating the conduct of a lottery as an offense.' That law
provided that no lottery could be conducted unless authorized by a special
act of the legislature. Failure to obtain authorization was a criminal offense.
The Act was a strong prohibition of all private lotteries.8 Strengthening the
state's anti-gambling stance, an 1814 act prohibited the use of gaming tables
and equipment, and certain forms of gambling which partook of a "game"
aspect.9
With general prohibitions of games of chance now on record, as well
as the qualified anti-lottery statute, the General Assembly endeavored to
complete the list of criminal activities by adding the prohibition against the
operation of all schemes of chance" in 1831 .11 In the intervening period from
1807, the legislature had passed a number of special acts authorizing lotteries
to raise funds for such purposes as constructing bridges, dams, and build-
ings. 2 Thus, at the time of the Constitutional Convention of 1851 all
6 3 Ohio Laws 218 ch. XLIII § 3 (1805). Violators were fined ten dollars.
7 5 Ohio Laws 91 ch. XXIX (1807).
s Sections 1 & 3 of the Act provided:
[N]o person or persons shall, without a special act of the legislature, within this state, open
set on foot, carry on, promote, draw or make publicly or privately, any lottery, game or
device of chance of any nature or kind whatsoever .... ; and that every person, who shall
offend in the premises against the true intent and meaning of this act, and shall thereof be
convicted in the court of common pleas . . . shall be fined in a sum not exceeding five
thousand dollars .... That the grand juries ... make strict enquiry and present every person
who shall offend against the provisions of this act ...
9 14 Ohio Laws 63, 72 (1816). For a summary of early gambling legislation, see State v.
Simonian, 77 Ohio App. 201, 66 N.E.2d 260 (1945).
10 As will be more fully discussed in the text accompanying notes 48-54 infra, games of
chance were treated as examples of gambling in an individual fashion by means of apparatus
generally associated with the playing of a game. Schemes of chance, on the other hand,
classified the type of gambling which occurred in group-oriented activities, such as policy
and raffles, in which participants "competed" with one another for the chance to win a
prize. Current definitions are codified in Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2915.01(D) (E) (Page
Supp. 1976); the vague differentiations contained therein are characteristic of the decades
of confusion surrounding the proper classification of individual gambling activities.
11 29 Ohio Laws 144, 152 §§ 43, 44 (1831). There were two acts involved: one, a compre-
hensive listing of crimes, the second, dealing with lotteries and schemes of chance, a
listing of offenses. Section 43 prohibited the setting on foot, promoting, or like activity, of
any lottery or scheme of chance. Section 44 denominated the sale of lottery tickets or any
share in a scheme of chance as a punishable offense, but specifically exempted the drawing
or sale of lottery tickets when authorized by the state.
12 In State v. Simonian, 77 Ohio App. at 209-10, 66 N.E.2d at 263-64, the court lists several
such statutes.
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gambling, whether games or schemes of chance, was illegal in Ohio, except
those lotteries legislatively authorized to fund special projects.
B. The Constitutional Meaning of "Lotteries"
Responding to existing legislation which reflected an almost unequivo-
cally negative attitude toward both the promotion of and participation in
gambling, the representatives to the Constitutional Convention of 1851 chose
to incorporate an absolute prohibition of all lotteries within the Constitution.
Far from expressing approbation toward gambling other than lotteries, the
convention appears to have merely eliminated legislatively sanctioned lot-
teries,1" the one remaining form of hazard and chance still permitted in Ohio.
The criminalization of the other manifestations of the gambling spirit was
accepted as sanction enough, making an express declaration of unconstitu-
tionality unnecessary.1"
With the adoption of Article XV, section six of the 1851 Constitution,
the people of Ohio expressed an exceptionally strenuous objection to lotteries,
providing that they "forever be prohibited". This unusual wording, with the
implications outlined above, bore weight in formulating a public policy
toward games and other schemes of chance. .Relying on the intent of the
provision, courts in Ohio treated the Constitution as broadly prohibiting
lotteries in the generic sense, thus extending the threat of unconstitutionality
to other games and schemes of chance.
Gambling, deemed an immoral activity by the General Assembly, was
considered contrary to public policy even prior to 1851. All forms were
13 See text accompanying note 12 supra.
14 Although no contemporary source reflects the accuracy of this interpretation, the court,
in State v. Simonian, reached a similar conclusion:
It will be seen, therefore, that up to this time (1830-1851) while such forms of gaming orgambling as are mentioned in Section 13066, General Code, were the subject of constant
and repeated legislation, providing punishment .. ., the public policy of the state included
approval of lotteries and schemes of chance enterprises now covered by Section 13064,General Code. It is interesting also to note that when the people of the state adopted theConstitution of 1851, nothing therein was said of gaming or gambling as such, or in the
amendments to that Constitution later adopted. The prohibition of the Constitution is
against lotteries and the sale of lottery tickets only.
The adverse attitudes of the Legislature, even before the creation of the state, towardthe employment of gambling machines or devices was so pronounced, and their use so
adverse to the policy of the state, that it apparently was thought unnecessary to write anyprohibition thereof into the Constitution. It was only because the Legislature had seen fit
to employ the scheme of a lottery for public and private purposes that the people consideredit necessary to prohibit lotteries in the Constitution.
77 Ohio App. at 211, 66 N.E.2d at 264.
For those with access, the record of the 1851 Convention debates refers to the adoption
of the anti-lottery provision: I Debates 164, 263; 2 Debates 318, 569, 633, 664, 854, 864, 870.
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classified as equally harmful to the public good.1 5 The Constitution flatly
prohibited direct or indirect approval."6 The gambling instinct was classified
as an evil in and of itself; therefore, any device or scheme which served to
arouse it was equatable with a lottery for the purposes of applying the public
policy expressed in the Constitution." The "immoral" element of gambling
was considered to be the risking of money by the gamblers,"8 or at least the
giving of some consideration, for the chance to win a greater return.'" By
defining lottery in such a way as to make it any chance to risk something of
value, almost all forms of gambling could be treated as lotteries. Although
the courts seldom relied solely on the constitution in anti-gambling litigation,
they did repeatedly invoke it as evidencing a strong public policy, while at
the same time holding the conduct to be statutorily proscribed.20
In light of the probable restricted meaning of the word "lottery" as used
in the 1851 Constitution, judicial extension of the concept to other forms
of gaming and scheming by chance is somewhat surprising. The courts, how-
ever, may not be straining the application if the background intent of the
drafters is accepted as being hostile to all risks based upon chance-taking.
The development of the judicial definition of "lottery" is helpful in gaining
an understanding of the checkered history of bingo in Ohio.
In Stevens v. Cincinnati Times-Star Co.,"' the Ohio Supreme Court
promulgated a definition of lottery: a scheme held out to the public in
which participation depended upon payment of a pecuniary consideration
and in which lot or chance determined who won a prize with value superior
to that risked to enter the scheme. The three elements, to recur in all subse-
quent definitions of lottery, were thus established: consideration to play,
success by chance, and a prize of value. Note that the Stevens Court spoke
15 Nadlin v. Starick, 24 Ohio Op. 2d 272, 273, 194 N.E.2d 81, 83 (C.P. Montgomery County
1963). See also Harriman Inst. of Social Research, Inc. v. Carrie Tingly Crippled Children's
Hosp., 43 N.M. 1, 84 P.2d 1088 (1938), where the court equates professional and charitable
gambling because they have the same (adverse) social results.
16 Columbus v. Barr, 160 Ohio St. 209, 212, 115 N.E.2d 391, 393 (1953).
1 7 Kraus v. Cleveland, 12 Ohio Op. 206 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1938).
is [1958] OHio ATT'Y GEN. Op., No. 2291, at 384.
19 See Kroger v. Cook, 24 Ohio St. 2d 170, 265 N.E.2d 780 (1970).
2 0 See, e.g., Stillmaker v. Department of Liquor Control, 18 Ohio St. 2d 200, 249 N.E.2d
61 (1969); Westerhaus v. Cincinnati, 165 Ohio St. 327, 135 N.E.2d 318 (1956), affg 71
Ohio L. Abs. 353, 127 N.E.2d 412 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955); Snyder v. Alliance, 41 Ohio
App. 48, 179 N.E. 426 (1931); State v. Smith, 83 Ohio L. Abs. 426, 165 N.E.2d 481 (C.P.
Summit County 1960); Kraus v. Cleveland, 12 Ohio Op. 206 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1938);
Mills Operating Co. v. Village of Toronto, 20 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 525, 28 Ohio Dec. 316 (C.P.
Jefferson County 1918); Gevaras v. Cleveland, 8 Ohio Op. 178 (Cleveland Mun. Ct. 1937).
2172 Ohio St. 112, 73 N.E. 1058 (1905).
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of a scheme held out to the public as well.22 These latter factors were
eliminated from the broad definition of lottery, but were retained to dis-
tinguish schemes from games of chance.23 Later courts concentrated both
on extending the reach of the constitutional policy to other gambling activi-
ties exhibiting the three elements and on defining the content of each element
itself.
In Troy Amusement Co. v. Attenweiler,2" a theater conducted a "bank
night". Patrons signed sheets from which names would be picked at random,
with money prizes for the winners. This scheme was held to be a lottery;
the three elements of consideration, chance, and prize were present. The
vice was discerned in the dominating element of chance, which pervaded
the entire scheme. The questionable consideration given - chances were
free, but the scheme was promotional - was not considered crucial. This
growing emphasis on chance and deemphasis on consideration is noteworthy,
since it later provided the rationale for extending the scope of constitutionally
prohibited lotteries to cover activities with far less connection to the traditional
and common understanding of such schemes.2"
By 1951 the courts were struggling to maintain a reasonable approach
to the classification of gaming activities as lotteries, while at the same time
keeping the broadest definition possible operative. In Wishing Well Club v.
Akron,2" the court, citing Stevens, reiterated the three determinative factors
in identifying an activity as a lottery: consideration, prize, and chance.
Presumably, whenever these elements can be found, a lottery exists despite
the presence of other factors such as skill. The court buttressed its decision
by noting:
22 Stevens involved a newspaper guessing scheme. Although not comparable to the lotteries
specially authorized prior to 1851, see text accompanying notes 7-12 supra, such a scheme
could fit into a more generic concept of lottery as the distribution of numerous "chances"
to win a single prize. Similarly, in Troy Amusement Co. v. Attenweiler, 64 Ohio App. 105,
28 N.E.2d 207 (1940), the court used a broad classification to declare a "bank night"
scheme unconstitutional.
The similarities to lotteries represented by the Stevens and Troy schemes do not make
their classification, as unconstitutional, unwarranted. Other courts, however, e.g., Westerhaus
v. Cincinnati, 165 Ohio St. 327, 135 N.E.2d 318 (1956), suggested that even pinball ma-
chines, which exhibited price, chance, and prize, might be constitutionally infirm. The court
avoided making this decision by resorting to clear statutory prohibitions of such gaming
devices. See also Kraus v. Cleveland, 12 Ohio Op. 206 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1938).
23 See text accompanying notes 47-51 infra.
24 64 Ohio App. 105, 28 N.E.2d 207 (1940).
25 Relying on the presence of chance, the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas in
Kraus v. Cleveland, 12 Ohio Op. 206 (1938) reached the determination that pinballs and
slot machines, already proscribed by statutes, were probably prohibited by the Constitution
as well.
26 66 Ohio L. Abs. 406, 112 N.E.2d 41 (C.P. Summit County 1951).
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The Constitution of Ohio uses the word "lottery" in no restricted or
qualified sense. It expressly provides that "lotteries, and the sale of
lottery tickets, for any purpose whatever, shall forever be prohibited."
These words constitute an exceptionally strong and unambiguous dec-
laration of public policy.2"
Accepting the unrestricted definition language, the court in Zepp v. Colum-
bus 8 found that the "sweeping" and "potent declaration... of public policy
with reference to lotteries""9 required that all activities involving chance be
prohibited. The court recognized, however, that "all lotteries are gambling
or schemes of chance but all gambling is not necessarily a lottery.""0 Pre-
sumably, gambling where no element of chance, but only skill, is involved
would be constitutional, not fitting within the definition of lottery. On the
other hand, the mere presence of any element of chance to determine a winner
could transform an activity into a lottery.3 1
In effectuating Article XV, section six, the courts reiterated, often
with vehemence, the policy of outlawing unsavory activities as harmful to
the public welfare. The legal climate for any game or scheme of chance
was, not surprisingly, hostile. This judicial hostility was reemphasized
throughout the 1960's and 1970's. State v. Lisbon Sales Book Co. 2 spoke
of activities "in the nature of lotteries" being forbidden, adopting the broad
reading by now familiar in the state. As late as 1975, the Attorney General
of the State reinforced the broad construction of "lottery" for purposes of
the Constitution. " Construing "lottery" in its generic sense, the court in
State ex rel Campbell v. Charities Unlimited,5 held that:
The fact that the Ohio Constitution refers only to lotteries does not
mean that other forms of gambling are not prohibited. Any game that
has the elements of consideration, chance and prize, . . . is in contra-
vention of the Constitution."
Seemingly, such sweeping classifications would have sufficed to elimi-
nate the "immoral" and "evil" practices of hazarding money for a chance
to win. However, the necessity of establishing the elements of chance, con-
27 Id. at 410, 112 N.E.2d at 43.
28 50 Ohio Op. 47, 112 N.E.2d 46 (C.P. Franklin County 1951).
29 Id. at 49, 112 N.E.2d at 49.
30 Id. at 50, 112 N.E.2d at 49.
31 See Westerhaus v. Cincinnati, 165 Ohio St. 327, 135 N.E.2d 318 (1956).
32 176 Ohio St. 482, 200 N.E.2d 590 (1964).
3 See, e.g., Kroger v. Cook, 24 Ohio St. 2d 170, 265 N.E.2d 780 (1970), aff'g on other
grounds, 17 Ohio App. 2d 41, 244 N.E.2d 790 (1968); Nadlin v. Starick, 24 Ohio Op. 2d
272, 194 N.E.2d 81 (C.P. Montgomery County 1963).
34 [1975] OHio Arr'y GEN. Op., No. 005, at 2-16.
25 No. 75-1-278 (C.P. Summit County filed Jan. 31, 1975).
36 Id at 5.
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sideration, and prize threatened not to cover all possible schemes in which
chance could rear its ugly head. To meet this problem, the courts in Ohio
redefined those three elements in an extremely broad manner. Few activities
escaped being declared unlawful.
The element of consideration was weakened into near non-existence.
In 1923, the court in Bader v. Cincinnati37 held that the concept of consid-
eration in contract law was more stringent than in the area of lottery. There-
fore, the distribution of tickets by a restaurant owner to customers without
extra charge and to others gratis was distribution for consideration: his
restaurant was patronized. Similarly, grocery store promotional schemes
for which no purchase was necessary to acquire a chance to win were held
to be lotteries. The promotion itself benefited the stores enough to be con-
sidered price,"8 and a portion of the purchase price supported the game.39
Prize was delineated more finely in gambling device litigation, in which
it was a crucial element as well, to include any return, from free games0 to
extra amusement.' If necessary, such a definition could be used by analogy
in lottery cases.
The element of chance necessary to make an activity a lottery was
originally required to be predominant or substantial. " By 1941, the absence
of skill as a predominant factor was crucial in finding sufficient chance to
constitute a lottery. The injection of an element of skill in determining a
winner could not defeat the chance factor," if chance controlled the out-
come.44 It cannot be assumed, however, that slight chance would suffice; the
requirement of significance was still applicable, 5 although diluted.
Thus, lotteries for constitutional purposes were defined as broadly as nec-
essary to cover schemes held out to a group of persons who, by participation,
3T 1 Ohio L. Abs. 835 (C.P. Hamilton County 1923).
38Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Cook, 15 Ohio Misc. 181, 240 N.E.2d 114 (C.P.
Franklin County 1968), alf'd sub. nom., Kroger v. Cook, 24 Ohio St. 2d 170, 265 N.E.2d 780
(1970).
39 Id. at 186, 240 N.E.2d at 118-19.4 0 Westerhaus v. Cincinnati, 165 Ohio St. 327, 135 N.E.2d 318 (1956), alfg 71 Ohio L.
Abs. 353, 127 N.E.2d 412 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955); State v. Smith, 83 Ohio L. Abs. 426, 165
N.E.2d 481 (C.P. Summit County 1960); Gevaras v. Cleveland, 8 Ohio Op. 178 (Cleveland
Mun. Ct. 1937).
41 Stillmaker v. Department of Liquor Control, 18 Ohio St. 2d 200, 249 N.E.2d 61 (1969).
Cf. State v. Krauss, 114 Ohio St. 342, 151 N.E. 183 (1926), where a slot machine which
also dispensed mints indicated before purchase the number of tokens it would dispense. The
court held that the prohibition of replay removed the element of chance and profit.
42 Akron v. Stojanovic, 24 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 479 (Akron Mun. Ct. 1923).
43 State ex rel Sergi v. Youngstown, 68 Ohio App. 254, 40 N.E.2d 477 (1941), appeal dis-
missed, 138 Ohio St. 123, 32 N.E.2d 852 (1941).
44 What Are Games of Chance and Lotteries?, 4 0mo ST. LJ. 237, 238-239 (1938).
45 See Fisher v. State, 14 Ohio App. 355 (1921).
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conferred some benefit upon a promoter in order to win anything of value
through the operation of an element of chance. Bingo, meeting this require-
ment, was denominated a scheme of chance and thus a lottery repugnant to
the Constitution.
C. The Statutory Scheme for Lotteries and Other Schemes of Chance:
Post-1851
The statutory provisions which were effective prior to the adoption of
the 1851 Constitution continued in effect thereafter. The crimes of gambling
and gaming remained separately codified from the offenses of conducting
lotteries or schemes of chance until 1910, when the General Code of Ohio
placed lottery and gaming offenses under the same chapter: "Gambling". 8
The provisions of the General Code relating to games and schemes of chance,
public gaming and like offenses, were contained in sections 13054 through
13081. The most important sections relating to bingo were section 13064,
which prohibited the promotion of lotteries and schemes of chance, and
section 13066, outlawing the exhibition of gambling devices for gain. Section
13064, in relevant part, read:
Whoever establishes, opens, sets on foot, carries on, promotes, makes,
draws, or acts as "backer" or "vendor" for or on account of a lottery or
scheme of chance,.., shall be fined.., and imprisoned ....
Thus, the operation of a bingo game, a lottery or scheme of chance, rendered
the person so involved criminally liable. Similarly, section 13066 exacted
criminal penalties from
Whoever keeps or exhibits for gain or to win or gain money or other
property, a gambling table, or faro or keno bank, or a gambling device
or machine, or keeps or exhibits a billiard table for the purposes of
gambling or allowing it to be so used ....
While in this form, the statutes were relatively effective in exacting criminal
penalties from those who conducted schemes or games of chance which met
the definition of returning a prize determined by chance for a consideration
given to participate.
The distinction between schemes and games established for statutory
purposes was based on the suggestion made in Stevens v. Cincinnati Times-
Star Co. that lotteries and schemes involved public participation.4 7 Games
of chance, on the other hand, usually involved operation of a device, by a
46 State v. Simonian, 77 Ohio App. 201, 212-13, 66 N.E.2d 260, 265 (1945).
47 72 Ohio St. 112, 117, 73 N.E. 1058, 1060 (1905). Accord, State v. Simonian, 77 Ohio App.
201, 213, 66 N.E.2d 260, 265 (1945) ("A lottery or a scheme of chance, at least usually,
involves participation by the public or a number of persons.").
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person who pitted the results of his ability or luck against the device itself,
or the exhibition of such devices. 8
The first time this distinction became important, other than for technical
reasons of proper indictments, was after September 21, 1943. Effective on
that date, General Code section 13064, relating to the promotion and con-
ducting of lotteries or schemes of chance, was amended by adding the
words "for his own profit" after "whoever". Thus, anyone promoting a
lottery or scheme of chance with no benefit inuring to himself therefrom
could not be charge with criminal activity. Despite claims to the contrary,
this exemption was held not to extend beyond the particular code section
in which it appeared; promoting games of chance was criminal even if not
inuring to one's own profit. 9 Coupled with the judicial interpretation of
exhibiting gaming devices "for gain" to the effect that the gain involved
need not flow to the exhibitor, but could flow to the user or another and
fall under the statutory prohibition,5" the results were somewhat anomalous.
Those schemes most clearly prohibited by Article XV, section six-lotteries-
could be conducted not-for-profit without risk of criminal sanction; those
games brought within the purview of the constitutional prohibition only by
applying generic definitions as to consideration, prize, and chance were
completely criminalized.5 1
Bingo had been fortunate enough to have earned the classification of
lottery and scheme, rather than game, of chance.52 By decriminalizing non-
profit schemes, charitable bingo received the favored status it continues to
enjoy. Between 1943 and 1975 charitable bingo was unconstitutional, but
also noncriminal. No sanctions were exacted for promoting it. Prior to the
1943 Amendment to the General Code, the only schemes of chance allowed
within the State of Ohio were those in which the element of consideration
or prize was missing, thereby removing the activity from the realm of lottery
and gambling." Thus, it is not surprising that the removal of criminal sanc-
tions from activities which fulfilled the definition of lottery as construed for
constitutional purposes resulted in challenges to the constitutionality of
amended section 13064.
48 77 Ohio App. at 213, 66 N.E.2d at 265.
49 Id.
50 See Westerhaus v. Cincinnati, 71 Ohio L. Abs. 353, 127 N.E.2d 413 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955),
afrd, 165 Ohio St. 327, 135 N.E.2d 318 (1956); State v. Simonian, 77 Ohio App. 201, 66N.E.2d 260 (1945); Kraus v. Cleveland, 42 Ohio Op. 490 (C.P. 1938); Akron v. Stojanovic,
24 Ohio, N.P. (n.s.) 479 (Akron Mun. Ct. 1923).
51 Cf. State v. Schwember, 154 Or. 533, 60 P.2d 938 (1936), where the court distinguisheslotteries from ordinary forms of gaming on the basis of its broad public effect on all classes
of people, as contrasted to the confinement of gaming to few persons and places.
52 See, e.g., Kraus v. Cleveland, 89 Ohio App. 504, 96 N.E.2d 314 (1950).
53 See State v. Devroux, 14 Ohio Op. 283 (Cleveland Mun. Ct. 1939).
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The first test case arose in Mahoning County and was decided on July
6, 1944, less than one year after the effective date of the amendment. In
Disabled Veteran's Chapter No. 2 v. O'Neill,5" plaintiff alleged that it
had for some years been conducting a bingo game for the general public,
the proceeds of which were turned over to charity and charitable organiza-
tions. No money from the game inured to the profit of either the veterans'
organization or its members. Plaintiff's members who were conducting a bingo
session were arrested by Youngstown police pursuant to a municipal ordi-
nance which denominated the operation of any lottery or scheme of chance as
illegal. The court refused to enjoin the defendant police presumably because
the ordinance criminalized activities exempted from criminality by section
13064.11 The court held that the decriminalization of not-for-profit lotteries
conflicted with the absolute prohibition of lotteries in Article XV, section
six, and was therefore unconstitutional to the extent of the amendment's
effect.5" This decision was not appealed.
A second attack on the constitutionality of section 13064 was raised
in State v. Lloyd"7 by a criminal defendant, who claimed that because the
statute did not punish not-for-profit lottery operators, it conferred special priv-
ileges and immunities upon some lotteries. In rejecting this assertion, the
court held that a separate code section"8 outlawed the "numbers" game in
which defendant engaged, and this separable provision could not be tainted
by any possible unconstitutionality of section 13064. Defendant's contention
that the General Assembly enacted the legislation "for the purpose of permit-
ting charities, fraternal organizations and religious institutions to conduct
harmless amusements, such as small raffles, wheels and bingo games, etc., in
which there is an element of chance"59 was also rejected. Because legislative
acts are presumed constitutional, and no explicit authorization to conduct
lotteries and schemes of chance was contained in section 13064, such authori-
zations would not be read into the act in order to declare it unconstitutional.
Failure to provide penalties was not necessarily unconstitutional. As the issue
need not be decided to dispose of the case, the court refused to render a
definitive statement on constitutionality.
Such a definitive statement was made by the Ohio Supreme Court in
54 43 Ohio L. Abs. 479 (C.P. Mahoning County 1944).
55 Id. at 480. Contemporary newspaper accounts alleged that the "for his own profit" amend-
ment was designed to legalize charitable bingo, already operated throughout the state by
churches and other organizations. Gang Tactics Are Feared In Big Bingo Racket, Akron
Beacon Journal, Nov. 17, 1945, at 1.
5G 43 Ohio L. Abs. at 480.
57 30 Ohio Op. 441 (Cincinnati Mun. Ct. 1944).
58 120 Ohio Laws 663, 664 § 13064-1 (1944).
59 30 Ohio Op. at 443.
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1948. In State v. Parker,6" the defendant claimed that since he operated a
bingo hall not-for-profit, he could not be charged with a violation of the
statute criminalizing schemes of chance. The Supreme Court agreed, holding
that the state's failure to prove a profit-making venture was fatal to its cause.
In addition, the court explained that Article XV, section six was not self-
executing, but required legislation in order to assess penalties for a violation.
As long as the statute merely executed Article XV, section six by prescribing
penalties for certain violations thereof (i.e., those lotteries conducted for
one's own profit), it did not conflict and was thus constitutional. The legis-
lature need not fully execute the provisions of the Constitution; any partial
execution consistent with the prohibition did not violate the Constitution.
The nonself-executing language of Parker spawned several misconcep-
tions and resulted in attempted regulation of lotteries such as bingo, under
the rationale that such lotteries were not unlawful, but permissible.6 Some
courts accepted the proposition that if no statute prohibited the lottery, it
could exist legally, and law enforcement officials were powerless to eliminate
the game.62
However, the position which eventually gained general acceptance was
first taken by the courts which decided Kraus v. Cleveland.6 Faced with
the argument that a municipality could regulate bingo for charitable purposes
because no prohibition against lotteries or schemes of chance not conducted
for one's own profit existed in Ohio, the Cuyahoga County Court of Common
Pleas rejoined that the absence of criminal penalties did not change the effect
of the constitutional invalidity of all lotteries. Bingo was held to be a lottery;
its conduct for charitable purposes was forbidden, although not criminal.
The Court of Appeals distinguished the nonself-executing aspect of Article
XV, section six from that aspect which was self-executing.6" Although in the
absence of statute no penalties for lotteries existed in Ohio, the Constitution
was self-executing to the extent that it declared a mandatory public policy
against, and prohibition of, all lotteries. Thus, any attempt to regulate lotteries
60 150 Ohio St. 22, 80 N.E.2d 490 (1948).
61 Such claims were advanced, usually unsuccessfully, in many reported cases. See, e.g., VFW
v. Sweeney, 64 Ohio L. Abs. 277, 111 N.E.2d 699 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1952). In Disabled
Veteran's Ch. No. 2 v. O'Neill, 43 Ohio L. Abs. 479, 480 (C.P. Mahoning County 1944), the
court inferred authorization from Section 13064 by deciding that the statute conflicted with
the Constitution.
62 E.g. Jamestown Lion's Club v. Smith, 45 Ohio Op. 157, 100 N.E.2d 540 (C.P. Greene
County 1951). The Court held that statutory penalties for lotteries conducted for one's own
profit were ineffective to set constitutional prohibitions against charitable bingo into opera-
tion.
63 42 Ohio Op. 490, 94 N.E.2d 814 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1950), alf'd, 89 Ohio App. 504,
96 N.E.2d 314 (1950), appeal dismissed, 155 Ohio St. 98, 97 N.E.2d 549 (1951).
64 89 Ohio App. at 509, 510, 96 N.E.2d at 317.
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necessarily involved allowing them to exist and was unconstitutional. As
stated by the court:
Neither the legislature of the state nor the council of a municipal cor-
poration has the power to authorize, for any purpose, charitable or
otherwise, the right to conduct a lottery or sell lottery tickets in direct
conflict of such constitutional provision. Such an act or ordinance would
be unconstitutional and void. 5
Consequently, lotteries for profit were unconstitutional and subject to criminal
sanctions; lotteries not-for-profit were simply unconstitutional.
D. Filling the Legislative Void Through Municipal Regulation
The lack of an effective mechanism with which to control not-for-profit
schemes of chance 6 led several municipal corporations to enact ordinances
which established criminal penalties for the promotion of all profit and non-
profit lotteries. These ordinances were invariably attacked as being void,
the argument being that in the attempt to punish not-for-profit lotteries they
conflicted with the general laws of Ohio, contrary to the Ohio Constitution.
67
Assuming that such ordinances could be given effect, the court in
Gutches v. Columbus68 refused to render a declaratory judgment on the legal-
ity of plaintiffs bingo games which raised funds for charitable purposes. No
determination that the plaintiff was free from state -criminal proceedings
would aid in deciding whether or not the sheriff could lawfully arrest him
for violating a Columbus ordinance. The same result was reached in Zepp v.
Columbus,69 where the court intimated that bingo, as a lottery, was prima
facie unconstitutional, but declined to declare that bingo was valid or invalid
if conducted for charitable purposes.
Those courts which reached the substantive issue of a municipality's
power to pass ordinances which penalized the promotion of lotteries whether
or not the proceeds inured to the promoter's own profit were almost unani-
mous in the decision that such ordinances did not conflict with General Code
section 13064. In Wishing Well Club v. Akron,"0 the Summit County Court
65 Id. at 511, 96 N.E.2d at 317.
66 The state attempted to regulate the bingo games which proliferated after the not-for-profit
exemption by levying a 3 percent amusement tax. This effort was suspended in 1947 when
doubts of constitutionality were raised. Bingo Take, Akron Beacon Journal, Dec. 26, 1948,
at A-6. With state abdication, the cities adopted taxing and regulatory ordinances in an attempt
to control the multi-million dollar bingo business. Constitution Tested, Akron Beacon Journal,
Oct. 19, 1950, at 6; Civic Justice Group Eyes Bingo Ordinance, Akron Beacon Journal (edi-
torial), July 26, 1948, at 1 (discusses the Akron licensing and fee scheme, which eventually
generated over $70,000 annually).
67 See OIo CONST. Art. XVIII, §3.
68 65 Ohio L. Abs. 604, 111 N.E.2d 764 (C.P. Franklin County 1951).
69 50 Ohio Op. at 49, 112 N.E.2d at 48.
70 66 Ohio L. Abs. 406, 112 N.E.2d 41 (C.P. Summit County 1951).
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of Common Pleas noted that bingo was a lottery;7" its nonprofit status could
not change its essential character. The fact that the General Assembly had
not prescribed criminal penalties for nonprofit lotteries did not preclude a
municipality from so doing. No permission or legalization of nonprofit
schemes of chance could exist in light of the Article XV, section six prohibi-
tion; therefore, no conflict could be found when an ordinance went one step
further than the statute in executing the constitutional provision." The Su-
preme Court adopted this position in Columbus v. Barr,7" noting that except-
ing certain unconstitutional activities from the operation of the criminal law
did not, and could not, implicitly legalize those activities. The constitutional
provision precluded the legislature from either directly or indirectly legalizing
lotteries. Thus, section 13064 did not permit charitable lotteries, and conse-
quently no municipal proscription of such lotteries could be in conflict with
that statute.
Other municipalities attempted to regulate charitable bingo, which they
regarded as permissible. The Cleveland ordinance which gave rise to Kraus v.
Cleveland created a comprehensive scheme for licensing and regulating the
operation of bingo games. All games were required to be licensed; the granting
of licenses was restricted to those organizations which contributed the proceeds
of the games to charitable purposes. After prescribing the form of application,
the ordinance also provided that a public hearing before an appointed com-
missioner would be held to determine if the applicant met the character,
location, building, and other standards set in the ordinance. Once licensed,
the games were subject to supervision by the commissioner; to that end hours
and regulations were imposed and a report of gross income, expenses, and
money actually given to the charitable beneficiary was required."
This ordinance, when challenged as unconstitutional, was defended by
the city as necessary to prevent racketeers from conducting bingo without
inspection and control and to determine whether the proceeds did or did not
inure to the promoter's profit. The ordinance was asserted to be necessary
71 Id. at 410, 112 N.E.2d at 44. Accord, Kraus v. Cleveland, 89 Ohio App. 504, 96 N.E.2d314 (1950); Nadlin v. Starick, 24 Ohio Op. 2d 272, 194 N.E.2d 81 (C.P. Montgomery County1963); VFW v. Sweeney, 64 Ohio L. Abs. 277, 111 N.E.2d 699 (C.P. Cuyahoga County1952); Zepp v. Columbus, 50 Ohio Op. 47 112 N.E.2d 46 (C.P. Franklin County 1951);Loder v. Canton, 65 Ohio L. Abs. 517, 111 N.E.2d 793 (C.P. Stark County 1951); DisabledAmerican Veterans Ch. No. 2 v. O'Neill, 43 Ohio L. Abs. 479 (C.P. Mahoning County
1944).
72 Accord, Loder v. Canton, 65 Ohio L. Abs. 517, 111 N.E.2d 793 (C.P. Stark County 1951);
contra, Dayton Gymnastic Club v. Board of Liquor Control, 68 Ohio L. Abs. 153, 121N.E.2d 569 (C.P. Franklin County 1951) (holding that the Board could not suspend the club'sliquor license for conducting charitable bingo, for its rule conflicted with the general lawin not allowing an activity which section 13064 allowed).
73 160 Ohio St. 209, 115 N.E.2d 391 (1953).
74 CLEVELAND ORDINANCES §§ 2925-11-2925-19, as quoted in Kraus v. Cleveland, 89 OhioApp. at 507-08, 96 N.E.2d at 316.
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in light of the statutory exemption in General Code section 13064. As noted
above, the city was unsuccessful in sustaining the validity of its regulatory
scheme. Similarly, Dayton's attempt to regulate charitable bingo on an in-
formal basis was struck down as an unconstitutional legalization of an activity
clearly in contravention of public policy.75 Bingo not-for-profit could not be
prosecuted (in the absence of a broader city ordinance); neither could existing
games be regulated.
After 1953, the state of the law regarding charitable bingo can be sum-
marized as:
1. Such bingo was in violation of Article XV, section six of the Ohio
Constitution, since it was a lottery.
2. Such bingo was not in violation of the state criminal law proscribing
the promotion of lotteries for one's own profit."6
3. Municipal ordinances penalizing charitable bingo as a crime were
valid and operative.
4. The attempts of municipal corporations to authorize and regulate
the conducting of charitable bingo were unconstitutional and void.7
E. Charitable Bingo Operations Prior to 1975
The amount of litigation makes it clear that the constitutional prohibition
of bingo was unsuccessful in keeping bingo operations out of the state." The
75 See Nadlin v. Starick, 24 Ohio Op. 2d 272, 194 N.E.2d 81 (C.P. Montgomery County
1963).
76 Cf. State v. Drayzga, 86 Ohio L. Abs. 268, 173 N.E.2d 722 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961); State
v. Polozzi, 55 Ohio Misc. 34, 336 N.E.2d 471 (Akron Mun. Ct. 1975), which dismissed
indictments charging violations of the anti-lottery statute for failure to allege that defendants
operated the lotteries for their own profit.
77 When Kraus v. Cleveland invalidated Cleveland's licensing and regulatory scheme, other
municipalities, such as Akron, were forced to abandon their own regulatory schemes. See note
68 supra. Local authorities then closed down all bingo operations as unconstitutional, or
allowed them to continue without possibility of policing them. See Reports, Akron Beacon
Journal, Feb. 7, 1951, at 1; Mar. 19, 1951, at 1; Apr. 19, 1951, at 27; Apr. 25, 1951, at 10.
78 Even before section 13064 removed criminal penalties from non-profit bingo games, games
flourished in certain areas. Akron was the home of one hundred bingo games, two of which
were sufficiently profitable to be the targets of professional racketeers for "skimming off".
Akron Beacon Journal, Aug. 12, 1938, at 1. The Akron Law Department's policy of allow-
ing churches and clubs to conduct bingo with impunity was probably somewhat responsible
for this proliferation. Id., Aug. 22, 1938, at 11. However, the absence of regulations allowed
professional gamblers to be involved in the games and to earn good money from operating
them. Id., Mar. 6, 1939, at 1. By September 1943, when the new amendment went into effect,
bingo games were estimated as mulcting one half million dollars from Akron residents an-
nually. Id., Sep. 19, 1943, at A-1. After the amendment, bingo was estimated to gross $3,500,-
000 annually in the Akron area alone. Id., Dec. 26, 1948, at A-6. Only four to five percent
was donated to charity; no state agency kept control over operations. Id., June 28, 1944, at
13; Nov. 13, 1945, at 1. Hundreds of games operated under the guise of charities without
fear of being closed down unless all games were prohibited. Id., Feb. 7, 1951, at 1. When
the General Assembly examined a regulatory scheme in 1949, evidence that big operators
controlled bingo and kept all but 2 percent from charity was presented. Id., Feb. 8, 1949, at
1. "Shady characters" were constantly alleged to be in control of bingo in the state, by
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Kraus Court took note that in the six years in which the licensing ordinance
operated, forty parlors were licensed for play.79 Although one court expressed
approval of charitable bingo as a public good rather than public harm,8"
others opined that the same objectionable features which made bingo for
profit against public policy inhered in bingo not-for-profit as well. Most
courts, when presented with the opportunity, excoriated so-called "charitable"
bingo as partaking of all the evil features of the business of gambling. In
fact, the inescapable inference is that often "charitable" bingo was the busi-
ness of gambling."'
The Common Pleas Court in Kraus v. Cleveland pointed out that the
proceeds which eventually went to charity were a "minute fractional dole"
of the total income from the bingo games. The court continued:
And in the face of the testimony that, in all probability, false reports
are being made to the city, it is apparent that instead of controlling
conduct of the operators to keep out racketeers, the ordinance is breed-ing and protecting vultures who operate a nefarious swindle in the
shadow of legal protection and beneath a cloak of sweet charity. 3
Dealing with more concrete facts, the Court of Appeals noted that out of an
annual gross income of over four million dollars, less than three percent was
eventually applied to charity. "
Similar objections were registered by the Common Pleas judge whodecided Wishing Well Club v. Akron."' The Wishing Well Club was incor-
porated as nonprofit; its purpose was "aiding in community growth or devel-
opment or of charitable, philanthropic or benevolent instrumentalities con-ducive to public welfare."" Although the corporate records did not reveal
that the corporation had retained any income for itself from the bingo pro-
virtue of the section 13064 loophole which allowed not-for-profit bingo to be free of criminal
sanctions. Id., Feb. 8, 1951, at 6. The public supported the continuation of bingo, objectingto its total prohibition as the Constitution commanded. Id., Mar. 19, 1951, at 1; Apr. 25,1951, at 10.
79 89 Ohio App. at 506, 96 N.E.2d at 315.
80 Jamestown Lions Club v. Smith, 45 Ohio Op. 157, 100 N.E.2d 540 (C.P. Greene County1951). Cf. Dayton Gymnastics Club v. Board of Liquor Control, 68 Ohio L. Abs. 153, 121N.E.2d 569 (C.P. Franklin County 1953), where the court refused to allow license suspension,perhaps partially because the club had devoted over $30,000 of its profits to underprivileged
children.81E.g., Nadlin v. Starick, 24 Ohio Op. 2d 272, 194 N.E.2d 81 (C.P. Montgomery County
1963).
82 The writers query whether the inability to regulate non-criminal games did not contribute
to this precise problem, which, it appears, is still with us.
83 42 Ohio Op. at 493, 94 N.E.2d at 819.
84 89 Ohio App. at 505, 96 N.E.2d at 315.
85 66 Ohio L. Abs. at 412, 112 N.E.2d at 45.
86 Id. at 407, 112 N.E.2d at 42.
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ceeds, the gross profits of $654,020.15 garnered between January 31, 1949
and March 31, 1951 resulted in a net donation of $2775.79 to charity."7
The court indicated that like figures were not unusual among bingo operators.
[In] the various cases in which this Court has had a judicial question to
determine in connection with Bingo operations, I have observed that
the annual gross income of the corporation conducting the games has
ranged from approximately a quarter of a million to a half a million
dollars, and that only token donations have been made to charity. These
so-called corporations, not for profit, wear a cloak of fraud ... Behind
these self-styled "charitable corporations" stand the real parties in
interest - commercialized gamblers, taking huge sums of money for
their own benefit .... The corrupting influences that come from these
operations must be obvious to every good citizen. 8
The situation did not improve, despite the apparent freeing of law
enforcement officers to close down only profit seeking bingo games. In 1963,
the court in Nadlin v. Starick justified its unfriendly reception of the city
managers' proposal to regulate charitable bingo with the observation that
such games had not earned themselves a sympathetic reception. Their activi-
ties gave little or no credence to the claim that sound public policy could
favor their operation while forbidding bingo for profit. One representative
bingo operation had two years' gross receipts exceeding $300,000.00. From
that, annual salaries of over $25,000.00 were paid, annual hall rental
amounted to $42,000.00, and approximately $3,000.00, or one percent, was
given to charity. 9
From the foregoing examples, it is obvious that local officials and
judges were concerned with the operation of bingo for personal profit under
the guise of charitable fund-raising. Some gauge of general public concern
is offered by an examination of several attempts to amend the Constitution
as it related to lotteries.
In 1937, an amendment to Article XV, section six was proposed by
initiative petition to allow the state to conduct a lottery. ° However, such
a proposal was not adopted until 1972, when the electorate approved amend-
ing the Constitution to read:
Lotteries, and the sale of lottery tickets for any purpose whatever, shall
forever be prohibited in this state, except that the General Assembly
may authorize an agency of the State to conduct lotteries, to sell rights
to participate therein, and to award prizes by chance to participants, pro-
87 Id. The court notes that a $10,000 annual salary each was paid to a full-time and a part-
time employee. No other accounting is mentioned.
88 Id. at 412, 112 N.E.2d at 45.
89 24 Ohio Op. at 2d at 275, 194 N.E.2d at 84-85.
90 [1937] Omo Arr'y GEN. Op. No. 790.
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vided the entire net proceeds of any such lottery are paid into the general
revenue fund of the state.
The Attorney General interpreted the passing of this amendment as indicating
a change of attitude toward lotteries, that change being one of restricted
approval."'
One proffered amendment sought to remove the difficulties of the non
self-executed constitutional prohibition against lotteries not-for-profit by
amending the constitution to read:
Lotteries, and the sale of lottery tickets, for personal profit, shall forever
be prohibited in this state.9"
This attempt, which would have legitimized regulation of charitable lotteries,
failed of passage.
In 1974 when the legislature reorganized the Criminal Code, Chapter
2915 dealing with gambling was likewise rewritten. All schemes and games
of chance were subjected to the same treatment. The exclusion of not-for-
profit activities was continued, and included schemes or games designed to
produce income solely for charitable purposes and those from which no money
was received at all."3 Thereby, the questions of proper classification of an
activity as scheme or game were rendered moot for almost all purposes."4
Charitable bingo thus was still accorded its legislative loophole, as was bingo
for amusement only. However, no regulation could be effected. The demand
for a constitutional amendment authorizing charitable bingo and its regula-
tion resulted in the November 5, 1975 amendment adopted by the electorate.95
The amendment to Article XV, section 6 stipulated:
[T]he General Assembly may authorize and regulate the operation of
bingo to be conducted by charitable organizations for charitable
purposes.
After this final amendment, one court declared that the constitutional amend-
ments adopted by an "overwhelming vote of the people" indicated a change
in public attitude and policy toward all gambling, but especially toward state
lotteries and charitable bingo, which were given "an imprimatur of respecta-
bility."9
91 [1974] OHmo ATr'y GEN. Op. No. 57.
92 [1958] OHIo A'rr'y GEN. Op. No. 3042.
93 OHio REV. CODE ANN. §2915.02 (Page 1975).
94 Id. §2915.01 (E). For an indication of legislative intent, see committee comments follow-
ing section 2915.02.
95 The final tally was Yes: 1,388,606; No: 1,195,660. The amendment passed in only twenty-four of Ohio's eighty-eight counties; most metropolitan areas and northeastern Ohio counties
voted in favor of the amendment. Akron Beacon Journal, Nov. 5, 1975, at A-11.
o6 Ryals v. Collins, 46 Ohio Misc. 25, 27, 345 N.E.2d 658, 659 (Shaker Heights Mun.
Ct. 1975).
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:4
19
Ravenscraft and Reilly: Perspectives on Ohio Bingo Regulations
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1977
Charged with the authority to legislate regulations for charitable bingo,
the General Assembly enacted Amended Substitute Senate Bill 398, which
went into effect on May 26, 1976, to promulgate licensing requirements and
define those organizations eligible for a license.
II. OHIO BINGO LEGISLATION
A. The Statutory Scheme: Chapter 2915
When the new Ohio Criminal Code was promulgated in 1974, Chapter
2915 on Gambling was restructured. Section 2915.01 established definitions
which were operative throughout the chapter. Although schemes of chancer
and games of chance98 were separately defined, generally being distinguished
as public versus individual schemes for winning a prize as determined by
chance, the group of offenses applicable to the conduct of bingo99 did
not require a determination of whether an activity was a game or scheme.
Rather, the applicable term of art which defined an offense was "scheme
or game of chance conducted for profit." This term expressly excluded any
activity which was not designed to produce income for its backer, promoter,
or operator as well as any activity "designed to produce income solely for
charitable purposes when the entire net income after deduction of necessary
expenses is applied to such purposes."' 01
The Legislative Committee Comments explain that the purpose of
these definitions was to exclude pleasure and charitable operations from
criminality. The legislature preferred to concentrate its attacks on the
business of gambling, 01 and to aid enforcement by prohibiting public
gaming.' Thus, no operation from which profits did not flow to the
personal benefit of its backers was criminalized by section 2915.02. In
effect, Chapter 2915 authorized any individual to conduct schemes or
games of chance for pleasure or to earn money applicable to charitable
purposes after the deduction of "necessary expenses." The provision was
used by professional organizations as legal authority to set up casino
gambling, and deduct from the profits the expenses of salaries to oper-
ators, consultants, and rental of facilities. The remaining moneys were turned
over to charities. Other organizations created themselves as charities."'
9T OIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2915.01(C) (Page 1975).
98 Id. § 2915.01(D).
99 Id. §§ 2915.02, 2915.03, 2915.04.
100 Id. § 2915.01(E).
101 See Committee Comments preceeding Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2915.01 (Page 1975).
102 See OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2915.04 (Page 1975).
103 Akron Beacon Journal, Mar. 6, 1975, at B-1.
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The casinos primarily appeared in Summit County, although other counties
expressed alarm that the operations were spreading to them. °
This situation led to a challenge of the 1974 law's constitutionality
in so far as it attempted to, and succeeded in, allowing organizations to
conduct gambling, to pay individuals for their labor in connection therewith,
and to turn over any remaining income to charities. Such "authorization",
it was contended, violated Ohio's specific constitutional prohibition of all
lotteries as that word had been expanded by judicial construction. When
presented with the question, the Attorney General of Ohio noted that
the express exemption of charitable and pleasure gambling was anomalous
in light of Article XV, section six of the Ohio Constitution." 5 He opined,
however, that because the state did not attempt to regulate such lotteries,
the state did not actually authorize them, and that legislation short of
authorization was constitutional. Since the determination of whether or not
a gambling operation was charitable and thus noncriminal was crucial to
the ability to prosecute offenders, the Attorney General offered the inter-
pretation that "deduction of necessary expenses" meant that any unreason-
able deduction which limited the net charitable contribution would take
the operation out of the statutory exemption. 6 Large promoter's salaries
and operational expenses would be suspect as excessive. Practical diffi-
culties and the constitutional question, however, remained unsolved.
Suit on behalf of the State of Ohio was filed by Robert Campbell,
Sheriff of Summit County, as relator, in January of 1975. The Court of
Common Pleas, after examining the broad construction of the term "lotteries"
in the Ohio Constitution, held the 1974 Criminal Code unconstitutional.
The Ohio Legislature provided an exclusion by granting permission
for gambling conducted solely for the benefit of charity after a de-
duction for necessary expenses. However, in this Court's opinion the
Assembly had no right or authority to do this, for such made an
exception to the constitutional prohibition [of lotteries] and thereby
104 Id., Apr. 3, 1975, at A-6.
105 [1975] Oio ATry. GEN. Op. No. 005.
10 61d. at 2-21, citing Summary of Technical Committee Comments to Amended Substitute
House Bill 511-The New Ohio Criminal Code (1973): "If the expenses are unreasonable
under the circumstances, they cannot be necessary." The necessity for ad hoc fact deter-
mination, which could only be made by a court upon extensive evidence, placed an obstacle
of almost insuperable proportions before enforcement authorities, who had no means ofdetermining the amenability of an operation to criminal prosecution on the basis of
statutory standards of conduct. Not surprisingly, questionable charitable games flourishedin this atmosphere. Akron Beacon Journal, Apr. 7, 1976, at F-8; Lawmakers: Casino
Gambling is Out, Akron Beacon Journal, Mar. 31, 1976, at D-1.
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attempted to regulate and qualify this constitutional amendment, which
the Legislature had no right to do.'
As a result of this decision, an effort to amend the Constitution to
permit charitable gambling gained much force. Legislative attempts to curb
abuses by regulating gambling operations were postponed until a vote on
a constitutional amendment in the November 1975 general election clarified
the status of charitable bingo. As finally presented to the electorate, the
proposed amendment granted authority over charitable bingo to the General
Assembly, rather than over charitable lotteries in general, as the House
had proposed.'
B. Senate Bill 398
Since the charitable bingo allowance in the Constitution was not
self-executing, the General Assembly began drafting legislation which would
also be capable of regulating the operations allowed to assure compliance with
the law. The law, Amended Substitute Senate Bill 398, did not take effect until
May 26, 1976. Meanwhile, the large gambling operations continued; the
amount of vested interest in gambling was evident. Two games in the
Akron area were netting an estimated $1.2 million annually."0 ' Senate
Bill 398 was Ohio's first statute to license and regulate charitable bingo
and to provide penalties for other nonauthorized gambling activities. This
statutory scheme, in which current bingo legislation has its roots, will be
analyzed in three segments: definitions, restrictions on money taken in
and paid out, and licensing and regulatory provisions over charitable bingo.
The statute classified all gambling as criminal, then exempted chari-
table bingo and charity festivals from gambling as defined in section
2915.02.10 Charitable bingo was then defined as any bingo game con-
ducted by a charitable organization which had obtained a bingo license
pursuant to statute and which devoted the proceeds of the game to charitable
purposes."' In one of the more elaborate definitional schemes, charitable
organizations were defined as tax exempt religious, educational, veteran's,
fraternal, service, nonprofit medical, volunteer rescue service, or volunteer
firemen's organizations having obtained a federal tax exemption under sections
501(c)(3), 501(c)(4), 501(c)(8), 501(c)(10), or 501(c)(19) of the
107 State ex rel. Campbell v. Charities Unlimited, Inc., No. 75-1-278, at 6-7 (C.P. Summit
County filed Jan. 31, 1975).
108 H.J.R. No. 16 (1975).
109 Akron Beacon Journal, May 4, 1976, at A-6.
110 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2915.01 (E) (Baldwin 1976). All references to S. B. 398 are
cited to Baldwin's Legislative Service. References to H. B. 1547, the current law, are cited
to Page Supp. 1976.
'I d. § 2915.01(Q).
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Internal Revenue Code."' Each of these organizations was required to
have been in existence for two years prior to applying for a license." 3
Subsections I through P of section 2915.01 defined the eligible organizations
more particularly, requiring, for instance, that religious organizations be
nonprofit and conduct regular worship,"4 and that educational organizations
operate a school, academy, college, or university." 5 Charitable purposes was
defined indirectly as donations to organizations defined in the Internal
Revenue Code subsections 509(a)(1), 509(a)(2), or 509(a)(3) when
such organization was also either a governmental unit or a 501(c)(3)
organization."'
Charitable organizations were authorized to obtain licenses and to
play bingo, which was defined elaborately in subsection R of section
2915.01," r in sessions not to exceed five continuous hours."' Bingo games
for amusement only were defined as those games in which the gross re-
ceipts1'9 were returned as prizes or otherwise redistributed, or games for
which no participant paid consideration in order to play. 2° Since the gam-
bling offenses still required that they be "conducted for profit,"'' no game
for amusement only was criminally prohibited or licensed and regulated.
Charitable bingo games, required to be licensed, were made subject
to certain monetary restrictions, violations of which constituted a criminal
gambling offense.'22 In Senate Bill 398, as in current legislation, gross re-
ceipts could be applied only to the paying of prizes, the charitable purposes
listed in the license application, the purchasing and leasing of cards and
equipment, the paying of security personnel, 22 advertising, and rental of
the premises." ' Prizes were restricted, as now, to a total of three thousand
five hundred dollars ($3,500.00) per session."' Rental of premises was
required to be "not more than is customary and reasonable" for similar
112 Id. § 2915.01(H).
211 This two year requirement was subject to a grandfather clause contained in OHIO REv.
CODE ANN. § 2915.08 (A) (2) (Baldwin 1976).
"14 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2915.01 (I) (Baldwin 1976).
"1
5 Id. § 2915.01(J).
"6 d. § 2915.01(Y).
"17 See text accompanying notes 234-37 infra.
118 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2915.01 (V) (Baldwin 1976).
"1
9 Id. § 2915.01(W).
120 Id. § 2915.12.
121 Id. §§ 2915.01 (E), 2915.02 (A)(2),(3).
"2
2 Id. § 2915.01(G).
123 Id. § 2915.01(X) defines such personnel as governmental enforcement officers or an
individual who has successfully completed Ohio's statutorily regulated peace officer training
course.
"241d. § 2915.09(A)(2).
"2
5 Id. § 2915.09(B)(5).
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premises.12 No restrictions were placed upon the amount of proceeds which
would be spent in leasing equipment (although only licensed charitable
organizations qualified as lessors),"' in paying salaries to security personnel,
or advertising, nor was any minimum for charitable donations established.
Lest anyone be confused as to allowable expenses, payments to operators,
consultants, and concessions were, and still are, explicitly prohibited." 8
The regulatory aspects of both Senate Bill 398 and the current statutory
scheme can be classified as licensing, internal regulation of operations,
record keeping, and enforcement methods. A number of the original pro-
visions remain in today's law. Licenses are a prerequisite to being able to
conduct bingo,'2 9 and must be renewed annually at a fifty dollar fee. The
application form demands information as to the charitable status of the
organization, its history, record, and associations which would establish
that status, its tax exemption under the applicable sections of the Internal
Revenue Code, a staotement of charitable purposes for the proceeds, a
statement as to any previous bingo licensing action taken toward it, and
any other necessary and reasonable information which the Attorney General
by rule might require.' Licensing procedures are laid out in the Ohio
Administrative Procedure Act.'
Then as now, games cannot be conducted by a minor. 2 Each
"session," which cannot exceed five hours of continuous play, must end
before midnight, and no organization may conduct more than two sessions
in any seven-day period."' The bingo license must be displayed conspicu-
ously on the premises where games are played."' Likewise, records must
be maintained for at least three years from the bingo session to which they
refer."' In such records, the organization must keep an itemized list of
gross receipts from each session; an itemized list, exclusive of prizes, of all
expenses, the name of the person paid, and a receipt therefor from a session;
a list of all prizes awarded during a session, with names and addresses of
winners of prizes which were worth one hundred dollars or more; an item-
ized list of charitable recipients, with names and addresses, of proceeds
1261d. § 2915.09(A)(3).
127 Id. § 2915.09(A)(1).
128 Id. H9 2915.09(B)(1),(2),(3).
129 Id. § 2915.07.
1'0 Id. § 2915.08(A)(7).
s, Id. § 2915.08(B).
132 Id. § 2915.11.
233 Id. 9H 2915.09(B)(4),(6).
134Id. § 2915.09(A) (4).
"3 Id. § 2915.10(A).
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from each session, and the number of participants in a session.' No re-
quirement or method for reporting on the items recorded has been established.
The Attorney General and any local law enforcement agency retain
the power to investigate any licensed organization, its officers, trustees,
agents, members, or employees, and to examine the accounts and records
in order to ascertain if any violation of sections 2915.07 through 2915.11
has occurred. Upon reasonable grounds to believe a violation has
occurred, local law enforcers can initiate court proceedings, provided
that written notice of such action is given to the Attorney General.13
Criminal penalties, originally provided, remain in effect.3 8
Pursuant to section 2915.02(C), 501(c)(3) organizations were au-
thorized to conduct, without criminal sanction, schemes of chance 9 of any
kind, presumably other than bingo. In addition, games of chance,' ° except
craps for money, roulette for money, and slot machines, could be conducted
by 501 (c) (3) charitable organizations at festivals conducted for four con-
secutive days or less not more than twice a year. In effect, casino gambling
was legalized for certain charitable organizations - basically religious and
educational organizations.
C. Analysis of the Problems with Senate Bill 398
After Amended Substitute Senate Bill 398 became law on May 26,
1976, problems with regulating charitable bingo persisted. Many of the
most significant loopholes were pointed out to the legislators before the bill
was passed and at this writing are being worked out by drafters of a third
charitable bingo law.'' For instance, as Senate Bill 398 was being considered,
the battle over the festivals of parish churches raged within the House of
Representatives, with many representatives suggesting that only schemes of
chance should be legalized for charitable play, and others pushing to allow
churches to conduct any kind of casino gambling they wished if confined
to festivals.
1. Excepted Schemes and Games of Chance
The final compromise, embodied in Senate Bill 398, did not give blanket
approval to gambling at any time by any organization which qualified as
a charity. However, it did allow 501 (c) (3) tax exempt organizations, pri-
"
6 Id. § 2915.10(A)(1)-(5).
137Id. § 2915.10(B).
AIsld. § 2915.09(C).
139 Id. § 2915.01(C).
140 1d. § 2915.01(D).
' ' Substitute House Bill 72 is now pending in the House Governmental Affairs Com-
mittee.
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manly religious and educational groups under the Ohio definitions, to play
any games of chance except roulette for money, craps for money, and slot
machines at semi-annual four day long festivals."' By a gross oversight,
absolutely no restriction was placed upon the permitted disposition of pro-
ceeds from nonexcepted games of chance. The 501 (c) (3) organizations
were not required to apply for licensing or subjected to any regulations. Thus,
any storefront church, incorporated and tax exempt, could conduct casino
gambling legally, and dispose of the proceeds by paying promoters and
operators the great bulk of the gross profits. Since the loose Ohio gambling
law, in effect from January 1974 until Senate Bill 398 took effect, had
spawned a number of tax exempt charities whose major purpose was to
conduct gaming, there were several questionable operations authorized to
gamble without control or supervision.
In addition to legalizing gambling for these certain organizations, the
Ohio law also permitted any scheme of chance to be played by a charitable
organization which had obtained federal tax exempt status under 501 (c)
(3).1 Again, no restrictions on times or distribution of proceeds were in-
cluded. No control mechanism was established, not even intital screening
by the Attorney General to determine if the organization was a bona fide
charity. Rather, the federal government's determination that an organization
qualified for tax exempt status was relied upon to qualify that organization
to promote schemes of chance in Ohio. No attempt to use criteria more
suited to regulating gambling in Ohio was made; the state abdicated the
responsibility for enabling organizations to conduct lotteries and other
schemes of chance to a determination of the Internal Revenue Service that
the criteria for exemption were met. Obtaining approval from the IRS did
not prove difficult; any number of organizations were effectively licensed to
conduct gambling in any manner they desired."' Certain organizations played
forms of bingo-zingo which did not strictly conform to the specific definition
contained in section 2915.01 (R)." ' Since they were then playing a scheme
of chance other than bingo, they could operate without a license, pursuant
to section 2915.02 (C). Thus, nonregulated games of near-bingo competed
with regulated games and noncharitable purposes were more easily accomp-
lished than charitable ones.
The General Assembly also exempted another form of gambling from
the operation of both criminal prohibition and licensing and regulation.
142 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2915.02 (C) (Baldwin 1976).
143 Id.
144 Interview with Susan E. Boyer, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Summit County, Jan.
14, 1977 [hereinafter cited as Boyer interview].
145 For a discussion of "bingo-zingo" and the loopholes which arose from the Ohio definition
of bingo, see text accompanying notes 234-37 inlra.
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Bingo for amusement only'.6 was defined as either free bingo, i.e., no charge
was made on the participants at all, or bingo in which all monies received
from participants were distributed as prizes. Since the section was written
in the disjunctive, the usual interpretation was that fulfilling either criterion
would remove one from illegality.
The City of Toledo Law Department, in an effort to suppress bingo
for profit, required that both criteria be met by an operation: no charge
could be made other than the amount anted to enter into a game, and the
entire ante thus collected was to be returned in prizes after each game. In
addition, amusement operators were required to keep records, open to en-
forcement officers for inspection, in order to continue their games.' 7 Only
by adding regulatory requirements and placing the burden of proving that
no profits were made on the operators did Toledo manage to control the
bingo games which the General Assembly had let loose throughout the state.
In Summit County, large operations continued conducting games under the
guise of amusement only; the inability of checking records or assessing intake
versus prize output made policing such games a virtual impossibility. Thus,
the one operation which did not even require that a charitable organization
conduct it was left to the professionals to operate without being supervised
or required to keep records proving their "free" nature." '
Under Senate Bill 398, free bingo, schemes of chance conducted by
501 (c) (3) organizations, and certain games of chance played at semi-
annual festivals of 501 (c) (3) organizations were allowed to exist without
granting to local law enforcement agencies the concomitant ability to police
them. Since the Ohio Constitution still prohibits all generic lotteries but the
state lottery and charitable bingo, it seems reasonably clear that free bingo,
festivals, and unregulated schemes are unconstitutional, and that any attempt
to regulate them may be subject to successful attack.'
2. Bingo Licensing Difficulties
A second problem generated by Senate Bill 398 was its failure to define
adequately the organizations which could qualify for bingo licenses. Unlike
most other states, 5 ' Ohio left bingo licensing to the broad rule-making dis-
146 OhIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2915.12 (Baldwin 1976).
147 Letter of Sheldon Rosen, Assistant Director of Law, City of Toledo, to Richard Cohen,
Esq., Dec. 2, 1976.
148 Boyer interview, supra note 144.
149 See, e.g., Kraus v. Cleveland, 89 Ohio App. 504, 96 N.E.2d 314 (1950); Nad-
lin v. Starick, 24 Ohio Op. 2d 272, 194 N.E.2d 81 (C.P. Montgomery County 1963).
Contra, State ex rel. Gabalac v. The New Universal Congregation of Living Souls,No. 76-9-1960 (C.P. Summit County filed Sept. 1976), holding that casino gambling
activities are not lotteries or prohibited, and can therefore be permitted by legislation.
150 See text accompanying notes 219-33, 238-60 infra.
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cretion of the Attorney General. The law did not simply grant charitable or-
ganization status to "any tax exempt religious, educational, veteran's, fra-
ternal, service, nonprofit medical, volunteer rescue service, or volunteer fire-
men's organization,"'' but defined "tax exempt" solely in terms of federal
exemptions under sections 501 (c) (3), 501 (c) (4), 501 (c) (8), 501
(c) (10), or 501 (c) (19) under the Internal Revenue Code. Two additional
requirements were that religious organizations gather in common member-
ship for regular worship"5 2 and that educational organizations operate a
school, academy, college, or university, 5 ' neither standard appearing in
subsection 501 (c) (3) itself. Despite these minor differences, the Attorney
General refused to grant licenses to qualified tax exempt organizations. Al-
though mere tax status did not suffice to meet the standards laid down in
Chapter 2915, no standards or regulations were promulgated by the At-
torney General to establish additional criteria for organizations to meet."'
Practicing attorneys applying for licenses for their clients did not know
what they were required to show in order to obtain a bingo license for their
already tax exempt group.
A related difficulty arose from the fact that the tax exempt status was
granted by the federal government when net earnings did not inure to indi-
vidual benefit, whereas the Ohio statute requires that gross earnings less
specially identified expenses be used for the charitable purpose.' Thus, an
organization need not jeopardize its federal tax exempt status by remunerat-
ing operators;1"6 nonrevocation of that status would be no guarantee of com-
pliance with Ohio law, necessitating closer policing by Ohio than at first
appeared necessary.
Federal tax exemptions to nonprofit organizations are liberally granted,
with questions resolved in favor of exemption. 7 Ohio, on the other hand,
15' Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2915.01 (H) (Baldwin 1976).
152 Id. § 2915.01 (I).
153 Id. § 2915.01 (J).
154 Interview with William J. Brown, Attorney General, State of Ohio, Mar. 23, 1977 [here-
inafter cited as Attorney General Interview]. Mr. Brown indicated that a 501 (c) exemption
did not qualify an organization for a license, but also admitted that no criteria for differ-
entiating between licensed (501) (c) organizations and nonlicensed 501 (c) organizations
had been developed. The Attorney General's office simply made ad hoc, and apparently
standardless, decisions.
155 Oo REV. CODE ANN. § 2915.09 (A) (2) (Baldwin 1976).
15 Cf. Anateus Lineal 1948, Inc. v. United States, 366 F. Supp. 118 (W.D. Ark. 1973)
(holding nontaxable the income received by a tax exempt medical research association from
the sale of pathology services to hospitals and private physicians where income producing
activity was "substantially related to tax exempt purpose." Id. at 127).
157See, e.g., Scofield v. Rio Farms, Inc., 205 F.2d 68 (5th Cir. 1953); C.F. Mueller Co. v.
Comm'r, 190 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1951); Debs Memorial Radio Fund v. Comm'r, 148 F.2d
948 (2d Cir. 1945); American Institute for Economic Research v. United States, 302 F.2d
934 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
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strictly construes its own tax exemptions against the applicant.158 Despite
such strict construction, the Ohio Supreme Court recently determined that
an "interdenominational" religious organization still could qualify as a
"church" for the purpose of a sales tax exemption, even though it had no
congregational regulations or discipline. 5 Thus, a somewhat liberal construc-
tion, even in a strictly defined area, is used for Ohio tax purposes, whereas
the bingo law has been applied strictly by the Attorney General against
exempt organizations. The resulting confusion is understandable. Adding to
the turmoil was the original law's failure to specify whether organizations
conducting bingo under the old Chapter 2915 not-for-profit exception were
entitled to continue operations pending action on licensing applications. 6 °
3. Proceeds
The third set of problems in the law were those relating to the distribu-
tion of proceeds and the regulation thereof. Although equipment could only
be leased from another charitable organization licensed to conduct bingo, 6'
no limitation on charges was created. Neither was there any regulation as
to how the lessor could spend its proceeds. Presumably, both equipment and
operators could be provided under the guise of leasing equipment for high
prices.'62 No violation of the law would have occurred, since section 2915.09
(B) (1) prohibited only the charitable organization which conducted the
game from compensating operators. Since the charitable organization which
did conduct the bingo game would be applying expenses only to the lease,
not proceeds, neither lessor nor lessee would be acting criminally. In the
absence of a duly promulgated rule forbidding such circumvention, the At-
torney General would have difficulty claiming a violation for which he could
fairly suspend or revoke a license. Since criminal statutes are to be construed
strictly against violations,' punishment by an administrator of nonforbidden
action would be arbitrary and unlawful.
158 See, e.g., In re American Legion, 20 Ohio St. 2d 121, 254 N.E.2d 21 (1969), citing In re
American Legion, 151 Ohio St. 404, 86 N.E.2d 467 (1949); Zindorff v. Otterbein Press,
138 Ohio St. 287, 34 N.E.2d 748 (1941).
159 Maumee Valley Broadcast Ass'n v. Porterfield, 29 Ohio St. 2d 95, 279 N.E.2d 863
(1972).
160 Most local prosecuting attorneys assumed such operations could not continue, according
to Assistant Summit County Prosecutor Susan E. Boyer, Boyer Interview, supra note 144.
However, in Summit County the law was read to allow continuation of bingo pending action
by the Attorney General's Office. This interpretation was rejected in State ex rel. Gabalac
v. The New Universal Congregation of Living Souls, supra note 149. The result was to
suspend operations of charities on whose applications the Attorney General had failed to
act or had not yet had an opportunity to review. The statute, which established no time
limitations within which a license was to be granted or denied, and its judicial interpretation
which allowed an operator with application pending no recourse against delay, had the
potential for abuse through arbitrary inaction.
161 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2915.09 (A) (1) (Baldwin 1976).
162 Boyer interview, supra note 144.
163 OHmo REv. CODE ANN. § 2901.04 (A) (Page 1975).
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A charity could also decide to enter into the lessor business and free
itself of the restrictions on use of proceeds while paying operators - who
could be professionals - to run other games. Such a dual corporation could
indeed be in the business of gambling with impunity. If the charity also
rented out the hall to the licensed game, it could collect any rental rate it
desired, and again not be subject to regulation of proceeds distribution."'
In fact, a charity need not even be licensed to rent premises out. Thus, an
organization could charge excessive amounts for rental, rent its hall almost
constantly for separate five hour bingo sessions, provide and pay operators
and other workers, and dispose of proceeds in any manner whatever. Even
commercial lessors were restricted to only reasonable rates of rental, while
being able to rent out to any number of charities with licenses. The money-
making potential appeared to be great. Since it was not a crime to be paid
to operate bingo, but only for the licensee to pay, operators could be paid
by others without personal liability. This arrangement would encourage
professionals to contract their services out; skimming could be relatively
easy since the charity itself could be innocently duped into relying on the
operators. Even if loss of license occurred in the improbable event of being
discovered, the real culprit would remain untouched by the law.'65 Further-
more, no limit was placed on the amount spent on advertising,166 but spend-
ing bingo receipts for consulting services was explicitly prohibited."'
A problem related to use of proceeds is that the licensee-operators were
required merely to keep records, subject to inspection by state or local of-
ficials. No reporting was mandated at all. Thus, a low-profile game operated
by an apparently bona fide charity could remain free of supervision, and
even routine audits would be entirely discretionary. With no central indexing,
or supervision by the Attorney General, it would be difficult to discern that
a certain charitable or commercial lessor was reaping huge profits from
rentals. The Attorney General has engaged solely in licensing, leaving all
enforcement and policing to local authorities.'68 The larger and more pro-
fessional the operation, the less chance that questionably legal activities
would be discovered.
164 See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2915.09 (A) (3) (Baldwin 1976).
165See, e.g., Akron Beacon Journal, Dec. 26, 1941, at A-6; Mar. 6, 1939, at 1, which
reported that professional operators were rigging games and skimming off the profits of
the church and club charitable games which they were running. In a January 1, 1977
article, a gambling expert commented on the high potential for corruption in the bingo
games he visited, noting the lack of supervision as increasing this possibility.
166 See Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2915.09 (A) (2) (Baldwin 1976).
167 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2915.09 (B) (2) (Baldwin 1976). For a discussion of Ohio's
regulation of advertising and consulting fees and a comparison of regulatory practices in other
states, see text accompanying notes 345-348 infra.
168 Attorney General interview, supra note 154.
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The definition of charitable purpose - to which all proceeds minus
legitimate expenses were to be given - was not clearly spelled out in Senate
Bill 398. By implication, the uses to which an organization described in sec-
tions 509 (a) (1-3) of the Internal Revenue Code could put its funds were
deemed charitable.' Those organizations are charities which are tax
exempt by virtue of 501 (c) (3), and which qualify as (1) an organization
to which contributions may be deducted from income taxation under Code
Section 170 (b) (1) (A); (2) an organization which receives over one-
third of its support from contributions, membership fees, and activities re-
lated to its charitable purpose, and less than one-third of its support from
investment income and unrelated business activity income after taxation;
or (3) an organization which is organized and operated exclusively to carry
out the functions of, in connection with, a number (1) or (2) organization.17 °
The requirement that only section 501 (c) (3) organizations or a govern-
mental unit utilize the bingo proceeds created the anomalous result that
licensed organizations, such as the VFW, could not use the proceeds for their
own charitable purposes, but could give the proceeds to an unqualified 501(c) (3) group like Little League Baseball. Thereby, a group excluded from
operating a bingo game subject to the statutory restrictions on disposition of
proceeds was one of the few organizations qualified to spend the proceeds
free of regulation. If used to pay salaries'71 of workers who also donated
their services to the bingo game, payment of operators could be achieved
without a criminal violation.
The General Assembly allowed certain organizations deemed suffici-
ently charitable to operate bingo, but found those same organizations non-
charitable for proceeds use. At the same time, other organizations were not
considered sufficiently charitable in nature to operate games, but were
deemed sufficiently charitable to entitle them to use proceeds in any manner
whatsoever. If, instead, the proceeds could be used by the licensee only, sub-ject to strict record-keeping and restrictions, the purpose of the legislature
might be better accomplished. At the least, confusion would be less rampant,
and therefore policing and enforcement that much easier. On the other hand,
if any organization could conduct bingo under close supervision, but was
required to use its money only for restricted purposes or donate it to another
group which was thereby required to report its distribution of the proceeds,
the charitable intent would again be better served. As long as one end of the
operation, either running the game or spending the proceeds, is exempt from
169 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2915.01 (Y) (Baldwin 1976).
170 I.R.C. § 509 (a), as amended by Pub. L. 94-81, § 3 (a), Aug. 9, 1975, 89 Stat. 418.
171 See Anateus Lineal 1948, Inc. v. United States, 366 F. Supp. 118 (W.D. Ark. 1973),
permitting a 501 (c) (3) organization to pay salaries to its employees from charitable dona-
tions without losing its tax exempt status.
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supervision and/or regulation, the perceived evils which total nonregulation
would allow to flourish still exist with impunity.
From this analysis, it is not difficult to see why prosecuting attorneys
throughout the state of Ohio have been unable effectively to police bingo
from the original law's inception. The writers will show that even now, with
the licensed bingo games fairly well restricted in terms of statutory language,
noncompliance is difficult to discern and certain crucial aspects are still left
completely unregulated. As a result, there is no assurance that all bingo
proceeds after reasonable expenses are devoted to charity.
D. Analysis of Current Chapter 2915.
The difficulties and loopholes in Senate Bill 398 were immediately
apparent, and by December 6, 1976 Amended Substitute House Bill 1547
was enacted into law.
1. Eliminating Loopholes
The new law attempted to resolve certain problems already discussed.
The proceeds, less only prize money, from nonregulated schemes of chance
conducted by a 501 (c) (3) organization were required to be used by or
given to a group described in 509 (a) (1-3) and either a governmental
unit or a 501 (c) (3) organization itself. Since few, if any, 501 (c) (3)
operators would fail to qualify to use proceeds, little of the problem was
resolved. At any rate, once given to the qualified group, the proceeds could
be used for any purpose whatsoever, including remuneration of operators.
However, where kept by the organization itself, the use of the proceeds was
reasonably well restricted, at least from paying operators and other profes-
sionals.' 2
House Bill 1547 also redefined bingo to cover any game with the crucial
characteristics, 7 ' thereby removing the problem of unlicensed "near-bingo"
operations."' The new definition is, however, preposterously detailed. 75
Proceeds problems were also dealt with. A rental of premises was re-
stricted to not more than two hundred fifty dollars per session, with the
additional requirement that commercial lessors charge customary and rea-
sonable rent.' Whereas charitable lessors remained unrestricted in the num-
172 See OHo REV. CODE ANN. § 2915.02 (C) (Page Supp. 1976).
173 Id. § 2915.01 (S).
174 Letter from Lee C. Faulke, Montgomery County Prosecuting Attorney, to the writers.
17 5 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2915.01 (S) (1) (a)-(d) - (2) (a)-(d) (Page Supp. 1976).
176 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2915.09 (A) (3) (Page Supp. 1976). Critics of the original law
scoffed at the requirement that commercial rental rates simply be "not more than is custom-
ary and reasonable for premises that are similar in location, size and quality," noting that
most locales contain few facilities adequate for bingo play, so there is little basis for price
comparison. Akron Beacon Journal, June 27, 1976, at A-1.
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ber of sessions for which they leased their hall, the commercial lessors were
limited to leasing to only two charitable organizations, thereby making a
maximum of one thousand dollars a week in rental income."' Charitable
lessors were entitled to provide operators, concessions, equipment, and any
other service; commercial lessors were not.'78
Some attempts to clarify charitable purposes for which proceeds could
be spent were included in the bill, as well as more detailed record-keeping
requirements on actual use of proceeds. The definition of "to use gross re-
ceipts for a charitable purpose" was expanded beyond the old definition179
to include other purposes in a mass of verbiage which the writers can charac-
terize only as nightmarish in complexity.
Proceeds can now be used by veteran's organizations chartered by
Congress and tax exempt under 501 (c) (19),8' for certain charitable pur-
poses only. First, those purposes which are set forth in the Ohio tax exemption
statute encompassing "[t]he relief of poverty, the improvement of health
through the alleviation of illness, disease, or injury, the operation of a home
for the aged, as defined in Section 5701.13 of the Revised Code, the promotion
of education by an institution of learning which maintains a faculty of quali-
fied instructors, teaches regular continuous courses of study, and confers
a recognized diploma upon completion of a specified curriculum, or the
promotion of education by an organization engaged in carrying on research
in, or the dissemination of scientific and technical knowledge and informa-
tion primarily for the public" are allowable.' 8' This definition of charitable pur-
pose is somewhat more restricted than the definition set up by the common law
in Ohio,'82 which was most recently recognized in Ohio Children's Society v.
Porterfield,' as being "socially admirable and serv[ing] as a positive force in
an attempt to uplift the quality of life in our complex society."'1" The Chil-
IT7 Id.
178 Id. For a discussion of the dangers inherent in leasing personnel and services, see text
accompanying notes 161-171 infra.
179 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2915.01 (Z) (Page Supp. 1976). Acceptable charitable purposes
under Senate Bill 398 which were retained in the current law are donations to organizationsholding 501 (c) (3) and 509 (a) (1), 509 (a) (2) or 509 (a) (3) tax status.IS0 Why the General Assembly did not merely say that proceeds may be used by veterans
organizations which qualify as charitable organizations for the purposes of Chapter 2915is somewhat of a mystery.
1s1 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5739.02 (B) (12) (Page Supp. 1976).
182 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Comm'r, 5 Ohio St. 2d 117, 214 N.E.2d 222 (1966)(good faith attempt to advance and benefit mankind in general); Waddell v. YWCA, 26 OhioL. Abs. 367 (Ohio Ct. App. 1937), alfd, 133 Ohio St. 601, 15 N.E.2d 140 (1938) (diffusion
of knowledge, without reference to the poor, is aid to man who seeks to improve his condi-
tion).
18326 Ohio St. 2d 30, 268 N.E.2d 585 (1971).
184 Id. at 35, 268 N.E.2d at 588.
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dren's Society Court held that the General Assembly intended the definitions
in section 5739.02 (B) (12) to be narrowly construed, and thus, the court
restricted charitable purposes to specifically delineated ones. 8' Under this
reasoning, the charitable purposes to which veteran's organizations may con-
tribute are more restricted than those to which 501 (c) (3) organizations
may contribute. Thus, broad definitions such as any beneficial or salutory
purpose would appear to control permissible uses of proceeds by those
latter organizations.
Secondly, the veterans may award scholarships to institutions described
in section 5739.02 (B) (12). Thirdly, proceeds may be donated to a gov-
ernmental agency, or used for nonprofit youth activities, the promotion of
patriotism, or disaster relief. It can be argued that these uses are contained
within the broader common law definition of charitable purpose, and thus
are prima facie lawful uses for any bingo proceeds."8 6
In a third section, proceeds may be used by or transferred to fraternal
organizations which have been in continous existence for fifteen years in
Ohio. Those organizations are required to use the funds exclusively for re-
ligious, charitable, scientific, literary or educational purposes, or to prevent
cruelty to children or animals where such contribution would qualify for
deduction under section 170 (c) of the Internal Revenue Code (a redundant
requirement since only section 170 (c) (2) organizations, which are basically
501 (c) (3) organizations as well, will qualify). This restriction would again
seem to imply that the 501 (c) (3) and 509 (a) organizations can use
their proceeds in any manner that does not violate Ohio provisions, or the
federal prohibitions of excessive individual salaries and the like.
Volunteer firemen can use the proceeds for the financial support of a
volunteer fire department or company.
In summary, volunteer firemen, fraternal organizations, and veteran's
organizations can use proceeds from bingo for specifically delineated charit-
able purposes; 501 (c) (3) organizations can still use the proceeds for any
beneficial or salutary purpose if they also fit 509 (a) (1-3) descriptions.
It is unclear what other organizations must do with their proceeds, but it
appears that transfer to any of the four groups is contemplated.
The organizations which are licensed to run bingo and also are quali-
fied to distribute proceeds, i.e., one of the four groups defined above, must
now keep a list of each purpose for which proceeds are used' in the required
185 Id.
186 Substitute House Bill 72, now pending before the Ohio House of Representatives, would
authorize nonprofit youth athletic organizations as charitable organizations to obtain licenses
for conducting bingo.
187 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2915.10 (A) (4) (Page Supp. 1976).
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records. However, those organizations which cannot dispose of proceeds
themselves but must transfer them to a designated group need not keep a
detailed list. Neither must the recipient organization account for the disposal
of the proceeds, unless the organization is a licensed 501 (c) (3)-509 (a)
(1-3), veterans', fraternal, or volunteer firemen's organization.
2. Additional Provisions
The major additions, beyond problem-solving amendments, to the bingo
law were in the nature of expanding the charitable organizations eligible to
be licensed to conduct bingo. The most significant expansion was the in-
clusion of private senior citizen's organizations which are operated exclu-
sively to provide recreational or social services to persons over fifty-five, if
such organizations were tax exempt under 501 (c) (3)."' Educational or-
ganizations are now eligible if they contribute to the support of a school
or the like. 8' Similarly, service19 and nonprofit medical organizations.. are
eligible if they contribute to the support of service or medical institutions
as well as if they operate such institutions. Chapters of national charitable
organizations are eligible too.9 2
The requirement of two years existence before eligibility for a license
was modified. Volunteer rescue and fire organizations are now exempt 9
from the requirement; fraternal organizations must have been in existence
in Ohio for five continuous years. 9 '
The new definition of bingo notwithstanding, all licensed bingo games
are still required to be played in accord with the usual method of playing
bingo.195
3. Remaining Problems with the Conduct of Bingo
Despite constitutional doubts, probable abuse, and lobbying efforts of
the Attorney General, 98 the festival loophole was left unclosed and unmodi-
fied when House Bill 1547 became the law of Ohio. Casino gambling opera-
tions continued to exist in certain Ohio cities,9 ' and in Summit County a
188 d. § 2915.01 (Q).
18 9 1d. § 2915.01 (J).
190 Id. § 2915.01 (0).
19 11 d. § 2915.01 (P).
192 Id. § 2915.08 (B).
193 Id. § 2915.01 (H).
19 4 1d. § 2915.01 (M).
'95 Id. § 2915.09 (A) (5).
196 Attorney General interview, supra note 154.
197 Boyer interview, supra note 144; interview with Louis E. Evans, Franklin County Senior
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Apr. 11, 1977 (gambling operations threatened with enforce-
ment of Section 2915.04 voluntarily ceased operation); interview with V. Lee Sinclair, Jr.,Stark County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Apr. 11, 1977.
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new scheme has appeared. Organizations have been formed for the purpose
of conducting charitable festivals for eligible organizations throughout the
state. Since there is no means of keeping cross-county records on the number
of times a charity holds a festival and since there is no restriction on where
such festivals may be held, such an organization can under present law ob-
tain commissions from twenty-six charities to run two four-day festivals each,
and can have a year-round casino gambling club, operating four days a
week,19 with no restrictions on expenses, salaries, or the like. This possibility
has understandably caused concern in law enforcement circles, since it is vir-
tually impossible to coordinate a successful prosecution when the law has
set no standards which it can be proven an operator has violated. 99
Neither was free access to operation of schemes of chance eliminated
by the new law. Instead, the use of proceeds from blatantly unconstitutional
generic lotteries was regulated to some degree,2"' although no means of de-
termining proper use of proceeds was established and no records were re-
quired to be kept.
Amusement-only bingo was similarly untouched. The practical impos-
sibility of ascertaining whether or not all the money taken in is redistributed
in prizes has precluded prosecution of questionable operations." 1 Since no
continuing record of the number of cards being played can be reasonably
kept by a police investigation, and since no financial records are required
to be kept by the game's operator, or disclosed without probable cause if
they are kept, proof that all monies are not returned has been rendered ex-
tremely difficult. The mere requirement of record-keeping would have fa-
cilitated prosecution of profitmakers. °2 In addition, grave doubts as to the
198 Defender of the Game, Akron Beacon Journal, Apr. 17, 1977, at 19 (magazine).
199 Boyer interview, supra note 144.
200 Under INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 509 (a) (2), proceeds could only amount to one-third
of the financial support of the charity. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2915.02 (C) (Page Supp.
1976).
201 Boyer interview, supra note 144.
2 02Letter from Sheldon Rosen, supra note 147. It should be noted that Substitute House
Bill 72, pending before the Ohio House of Representatives at this writing, still does not
require that festival or amusement bingo operators be licensed, nor does it make clear that
they must keep records and be subject to state and local inspections. However, the proposed
law does include new restrictions for both activities. Festivals must be conducted on
premises owned by the charitable organization or leased from a governmental unit. Proceeds
after deduction of "reasonable and necessary" expenses must go to a governmental unit
or a 501 (c) (3) organization which is also described in subsections 509 (a) (1), 509 (a) (2)
or 509 (a) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code. It is further stipulated that operators and
their assistants cannot receive any form of compensation, including tips, directly or
indirectly.
Likewise, the proposed legislation would limit amusement bingo to groups of 50
players or less. Operators would similarly be forbidden from accepting any compensation,
though their assistants would not be so restricted. No other game or scheme of chance
and no charitable bingo game could be conducted on the premises within ten hours of an
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constitutionality of these operations still exist. Charitable bingo alone was
authorized by the 1975 Amendment to Ohio's Constitution."'2 Whereas ar-
guments overlooking the Ohio Court's historical interpretation of prohibited
lotteries may sustain the constitutionality of the festival and scheme of
chance loopholes, no rationalization can make amusement bingo equivalent
to charitable bingo and thus constitutionally valid. Should the people of
Ohio desire to legalize noncharitable bingo, the constitution should be
amended to so provide.
The seemingly unbridled discretion of the Attorney General in proces-
sing license applications remains a significant problem. The licensing statute
reads in specific language:
The attorney general shall license charitable organizations to conduct
bingo games in conformance with Chapters 119 [The Ohio Administra-
tive Procedure Act] and 2915 of the Revised Code. The attorney
general shall refuse to grant a bingo license to any organization or
revoke the license of any organization that fails to meet any require-
ment of sections 2915.07 to 2915.11 of the Revised Code.0"
The statutory use of "shall" is interpreted as mandatory in nature by the Ohio
Supreme Court."' The reference to Chapter 119 of the Revised Code makes
it clear that the licensing procedures must conform to notice and hearing
requirements, as well as to the evidentiary requirements, of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act. It is also clear that the statute mandates that the At-
torney General license organizations according to the standards of Chapter
2915. In section 2915.08 (A) (7), the Attorney General is authorized to
promulgate rules which can require other necessary and reasonable infor-
mation in considering license applications. It may be inferred, then, that
compliance with more than statutory requirements may be necessary to ob-
tain a license. However, only if a rule requiring additional information is
amusement bingo game. So-called "instant bingo", in which participants purchase small
lottery-style cards which may hold winning combinations of symbols, would thereby
be banned from amusement games.
According to State Rep. Clifford Skeen, a co-sponsor, "instant bingo" is barred fromboth amusement and charitable bingo in the proposed law because it is difficult to keep
records of its proceeds. Nonetheless, he indicates that licensing would not be required for
either amusement bingo or festivals because the proposal's restrictions on the size of
amusement games and proceeds distribution of festivals would in practice limit those
activities to neighborhood or senior citizens' recreation and bona fide charities, re-
spectively. Rep. Skeen stated that it was the legislative intent of the bill to extend record-
keeping and state and local enforcement procedures to amusement bingo and festivals.
However, record and enforcement sections still refer only to charitable organizations that
conduct bingo. It appears that neither festivals nor amusement games would fall in
that category. Interview with Rep. Clifford Skeen, May 21, 1977.
203 OHIo CONST. art. XV, § 6.
404 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2915.08 (B) (Page Supp. 1976) (emphasis added).
'05 E.g., Jacob v. Curry, 42 Ohio St. 2d 45, 326 N.E.2d 672 (1975).
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promulgated pursuant to Chapter 119 procedures can the Attorney Gen-
eral utilize that information to deny a license.
The Attorney General has promulgated no rules or regulations which
add requirements for a license or more narrowly define a charitable organi-
zation beyond 501 (c) characteristics."°6 On the other hand, the Attorney
General acknowledged that licenses have been denied to organizations which
fulfill the statutory requirements set out on the face of Chapter 2915.0 The
Attorney General admitted to the writers that the substantive criteria which he
uses to differentiate between eligible and ineligible organizations include such
vague and arbitrary standards as not believing the organization is really a
charity, not liking the persons whose names appear on the application (be-
cause they are convicted felons or the like), and other unspecified reasons."°'
Surely, the factors which are indicative of a non bona fide charity could be
codified into rules so that all applicants could be aware of the pitfalls and
seek to establish their own legitimacy.
If indeed such arbitrary standards are applied and were to be promul-
gated as rules, it is questionable whether such rules would withstand con-
stitutional scrutiny."' If additional standards to those set forth in Chapter
2915 are being applied, without being promulgated as rules, then the sta-
tutory mandate to issue licenses according to only legislative or administra-
tive standards has been violated.210 The issuance of rules which incorporate
reasonable criteria would give applicant organizations proper notice of the
standards they would be held to. Should the Attorney General be unable to
set objective standards, or delineate the factors contributing to his subjective
judgment, the appearance, if not indeed the reality, of arbitrary and capri-
cious action is so serious as to contravene due process of law.
Those applicants whose licenses are denied, however, have recourse in
administrative appeal.21' Although every unfairness may not be remedied, it
must be assumed that blatantly arbitrary determinations will be reversed or
modified. Also, if substantial evidence does not support the reasons given
for denial, a Court of Common Pleas can reverse the determination.21 '
206 Attorney General interview, supra note 154.
207 Id. This statement was confirmed by several practicing attorneys who were unable to
get their 501 (c) (3) religious or educational clients licenses.
208 Id.
209 See Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 119.12 which provides in part:
The court may affirm the order of the agency complained of in the appeal if it finds,
upon consideration of the entire record and such additional evidence as the court has
admitted, that the order is supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and
is in accordance with law.
2 10 See OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2915.08 (B) (Page Supp. 1976).
211 Omio REv. CODE ANN. § 119.06 (Page 1969).
212 Id. § 119.12.
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Perhaps the more serious plight is that of the applicant whose license
application is pending for months without any action being taken on it. In
this case, the statute, in stipulating no time limit for license action, has al-
lowed the Attorney General to postpone his statutory duty to make licen-
sing decisions. Severe financial repercussions may result for the applicant
charitable organization. Without a license, bingo cannot supply funds
needed to support the charity itself and the charitable functions it performs
in the community. Indeed, one Akron attorney reported that an Ohio re-
ligious organization has been on the verge of bankruptcy waiting ten months
or longer with still no action being taken.21 Charities which operated bingo
legally prior to the enactment of Senate Bill 398 had already made bingo
funds a part of their budget, and their activities were planned in reliance on
the continued nature of that income. Thus, although the Attorney General's
conduct can be characterized as official inaction, it is, in effect, a determina-
tion which is not appealable since it is not final.
Mandamus may be sought to force the Attorney General to exercise
his discretion and to make a final, appealable decision, but such action is
difficult, nonconclusive on the merits, and may bear the risk of being an-
tagonistic. 214 At this writing, even after an order to reach a determination
had been issued to the Attorney General, one applicant had waited for more
than six weeks without receiving such a determination. 215
Some authority would indicate that at least in some cases the Attorney
General has not used his power fairly, but has instead reached arbitrary
decisions. There are reports of bona fide charities being unable to conduct
games while other so-called "storefront churches" have been able to obtain
licenses. 21' The writers make no judgment as to the good or bad faith of
the Attorney General but merely submit that in the absence of more well-
defined criteria, organizations which meet the statutory definition may be
denied licenses when knowledge of extra requirements would have enabled
them to establish their conformity to the licensor's satisfaction. Of the ap-
proximately nineteen hundred license applications received by the Attorney
General's office, only nine hundred seventy-five to nine hundred eighty have
been approved.217 With determinations being made so selectively, meaning-
213 Interview with Bruce W. Miller, Esq., Allison and Miller, Apr. 14, 1977.
214 See generally Comment, The Availability of Mandamus as a Vehicle for Administrative
Review, 9 AKRON L. REV. 713, 728-33 (1976).
215 Interview with Bruce W. Miller, Esq., supra note 213.
216 Evans interview, supra note 197.
217 Attorney General interview, supra note 154. However, on June 1, 1977, the writers inter-
viewed Bruce Rakay, Chief of the Charitable Foundation Section of the Attorney General's
office. He estimated that of 1,600 applications, 1,100 have been granted. Neither Brown
nor Rakay had statistics on what action was taken on the remaining applications.
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ful standards which rationally explain the basis for selectivity must be pro-
mulgated and applied, or the law could become a farcical exercise in whim-
sical decision-making.
Problems with distribution of proceeds also still exist under the current
version of the law. The limits of acceptable expenditures and charges for
equipment from charitable organizations are still not set out. In fact, the
danger of renting equipment at high prices and being supplied with opera-
tors "free" of charge has virtually been codified in the amendment to section
2915.09 (A) (3). The new language makes it clear that charitable organi-
zations may provide licensees with premises, operators, security personnel,
concessions and/or concessions operators, equipment, and perhaps other
services. With no limitation on equipment rental charges, large amounts of
proceeds could be paid to the lessor charity, which could then pay operators
and concessionaires for the very services the licensee is legally prohibited
from compensating. Because only two hundred fifty dollars a session may be
charged, it may be nonremunerative for a mere premises lessor to provide
incidental services, necessitating that a second licensee, who can also rent
equipment for the bingo session, be involved. However, no limits or restric-
tions on spending the rent received are imposed by the law.
Unlike the commercial lessor, the charitable lessor can effectively lease
his building and full bingo paraphernalia as many times per week as he has
lessees and hours. 18 Even with one session per day, the rent will be seven-
teen hundred and fifty dollars per week. With two five hour sessions each
day thirty five hundred dollars can be earned. Should the lessor also charge
for use of bingo equipment for each of those seven or fourteen sessions as
well, it would not be difficult to make large amounts of money, to be dis-
posed of in any way the lessor saw fit.
The anomaly of allowing some organizations to be licensed but not use
the proceeds themselves still exists; neither veterans nor fraternal organiza-
tion can do other than dispose of their proceeds to charitable, religious, edu-
cational, and the like, groups. Service organizations without 501 (c) (3)
exemptions are likewise precluded from supporting their own operations but
are required to donate all their proceeds to eligible recipients. The recipients,
unencumbered by record-keeping, reporting, or even use restrictions, can
then dispose of the proceeds without supervision. Theoretically, one charity
could obtain a license and transfer the proceeds to a 501 (c) (3)-509 (a)
"sister" organization. The second organization could then pay operators a
218 Commercial lessors may only rent their premises to two licensees per week and are
not allowed to furnish operators, security personnel, concessions, concession operators, or
other services or equipment. O-io REV. CODE ANN. § 2915.09 (A) (3) (Page Supp. 1976).
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reasonable salary without violating federal law, and use the rest of the
proceeds without restriction.
The existence of vested interests in bingo regulation in Ohio suggests
that these loopholes will be found and used to the detriment of the legislative
purpose and of the charities which carefully comply with the regulations.
The problems cannot be solved by selective enforcement or by arbitrary
licensing decisions without basis in the statutory scheme.
III COMPARATIVE LEGISLATION: BINGO REGULATION
IN OTHER STATES
Ohio's current legislation regulating charitable bingo is similar in its
basic provisions to legislation being adopted by a growing number of states
at the behest of charitable organizations seeking additional sources of
revenue.
Legislatures in California, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Michigan,
New Jersey, New York and Virginia all have sought to exempt similar or-
ganizations from prosecution under state gambling statutes, provided they
meet certain criteria, such as for licensing, allocation of proceeds, expendi-
tures, conditions of play and game operation, and fulfillment of reporting
requirements. The writers do not submit these legislative products as an
exhaustive survey of current legislation. Rather, they are submitted as rep-
resentative of different approaches to the regulation of charitable bingo and
as a viable source of legislative drafting ideas which might help solve prob-
lems of administering the Ohio laws, if incorporated therein.
A. Organizations Eligible To Conduct Bingo
A basic determination of legislatures seeking to allow regulated charit-
able bingo has been deciding which types of organizations should be author-
ized to run and profit from the games and, no less difficult, defining those
organizations in unambiguous language to facilitate administration of the
law.
It was not without difficulty that the Ohio General Assembly defined
"charitable organization" to include "any tax exempt religious, educational,
veteran's, fraternal, service, nonprofit medical, volunteer rescue service,
volunteer firemen's, or senior citizen's organization.""21 Early charitable
bingo backers in Ohio had included youth athletic leagues and senior citi-
zens' groups,22 both of which were excluded from the current law's prede-
21 9 OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2915.01 (H) (Page Supp. 1976).
220 As reported in Akron Beacon Journal, March 27, 1975, at B-1, when the House Judiciary
Committee had initial hearings on proposals to amend the Ohio Constitution to permit
charitable bingo, cards and petitions from an estimated 2,000 to 3,000 Akron area residents
were received. Prominent among them were pleas from the Goodyear Hot Stove League,
Krumroy Senior Citizens Group, and St. Bernard's Catholic Church.
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cessor, which arose from Amended Senate Bill 398. Although senior citizens
were included in the present law, Amended Substitute House Bill 1547,
youth athletic organizations were not.22' Even at this writing, there is an
effort underway to amplify Ohio "charitable organizations" to include youth
athletic organizations.2
Similar types of organizations to those currently licensed in Ohio are
authorized to play charitable bingo in other states with minor variations.
Illinois, for example, also allows labor organizations to hold licenses.2
Virginia will issue licenses to associations solely to maintain historic gar-
dens. " ' Kansas denies charitable bingo licenses to groups which deny mem-
bership to individuals based on race, color, or physical handicap.2 How-
ever, with the possible exceptions of California and Florida, which describe
eligible groups broadly rather than breaking them down into types, 26 few
of the other states examined here allow as many types of charitable groups
to conduct bingo as would Ohio under its proposed legislation.2
Perhaps more problematic for administrators of charitable bingo
221 Although the House version of the bill included youth athletic organizations, the
version which emerged from the Senate Judiciary Committee did not. Senate Judiciary
Committee Chairman David L. Headley explained the intention of narrowing: "Any group
you put into the bill automatically offers another possibility for abuse." Akron Beacon
Journal, Sept. 17, 1976, at C-6.
222 Substitute House Bill 72 incorporates these changes. Additionally, the bill expands
licensing to veterans' groups not recognized by Congress. The current statute requires that
veterans' organizations or associations must be incorporated by an act of Congress or be
an auxiliary unit of such group. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2915.01 (K) (Page Supp. 1976).
223 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 1101 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976).
224 VA. CODE § 18.2 - 335 (2) (iv) (Michie Supp. 1976).
225 KAN. STAT. § 79-4703 (c) (1976 Supp.).
226 California allows local governmental units to issue licenses to all organizations which
are exempt from paying bank and corporate tax under Section 23701d Revenue and Taxation
Code and eligible to receive charitable contributions under I.R.C. § 170(c) (2). CAL. PENAL
CODE § 326.5 (a) (West Supp. 1976). Florida simply allows play by "nonprofit or veteran's
organizations engaged in charitable, civic, community, benevolent, religious or scholastic
works or other similar activities." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 849.093 (West 1976).
227 Delaware will license volunteer fire companies, veterans' organizations, religious or chari-
table organizations, and fraternal societies complying with I.R.C. § 170 (DEL. CODE tit. 28,
§ 1102 (4) (Michie 1975); DEL. CONST. art. 2, § 17A (Michie 1975); Illinois, nonprofit
religious, charitable, labor, fraternal, educational, and veterans' organizations (ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 120, § 1101 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976); Kansas, nonprofit religious, charitable
fraternal, education or veterans' organizations, (KAN. STAT. § 79-4703 (1976 Supp.)); Michi-
gan, nonprofit religious, educational service, senior citizens, fraternal or veterans' organizations
(Mich. COMP. LAws ANN. § 432.103 (3)(61)); New Jersey, churches or religious con-
gregations and religious organizations, veterans', charitable, educational, fraternal, civic
and service, and senior citizens' organizations, volunteer first aid or rescue squads (N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 5:8-25 (West Supp. 1976); New York, religious, charitable, educational,
fraternal, civic or service, veterans' and volunteer firemen's organizations (N.Y. GEN. MUN.
§ 476 (4) (McKinney 1974)); Virginia, volunteer fire and rescue squads, war veterans'
posts, fraternal societies under the lodge system, organizations with religious, charitable,
scientific, literary, community, educational and garden-beautification purposes (VA. CODE
§ 18.2-335 (1) - (2) (Michie Supp. 1976)).
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statutes than identifying authorized types of organizations is defining exactly
which groups those categories are to include. Now considering its third
version of the charitable bingo law since the Constitutional Amendment
allowing charitable bingo was approved, effective November 5, 1975, the
Ohio General Assembly has doggedly inserted additional language to clarify,
and typically liberalize, requirements for belonging to an authorized bingo
category."' A proposal now pending to expand veterans' organizations to
include those not chartered by Congress22 would simply conform Ohio's
definition of veterans' organizations for bingo purposes to that used in other
states."'
While three of the state legislatures surveyed have attempted, like
Ohio, to define exactly what is meant by the organizations named in their
statutes,23' the others have been statutorily silent on specific definitions,
deferring instead to regulatory agencies, local governing bodies, or the
courts232 to determine whether particular license candidates are "bona fide"
representatives of the statutory categories. Five of the ten state legislatures
considered here, in listing the organizations eligible for charitable bingo
privileges, indicate by statute that these groups must be "bona fide."23 By
contrast, Ohio, despite its extensive defining of qualified organizations, has
failed to add that safeguard.
Perhaps the Ohio General Assembly's bent toward defining and re-
defining to close loopholes can best be illustrated by its efforts to define
the term "bingo" itself. While Florida and Virginia statutes do not even
attempt to define the game, and few other states surveyed employ the broad
228 See text accompanying notes 188-94 supra.
229 See note 222 supra.
230 Of legislation surveyed for this study, only Michigan's charitable bingo legislation men-
tions Congressional authorization as a qualification for veterans' organizations. There,
only branch organizations must be affiliated with congressionally authorized veterans'
groups. Organizations of veterans within the state need not be so authorized to qualifyfor a bingo license. See MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 432.103 (10) (West Supp. 1977).
231 See KAN. STAT. § 79-4701 (1976 Supp.); MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 432.103 (West
Supp. 1976); VA. CODE §§ 18.2-335 (Michie Supp. 1976).
232 The Supreme Court of Kansas, considering whether the State Secretary of Revenue
should issue a bingo license to a private club organized for pleasure and applying forlicensure as a "bona fide fraternal organization", looked to Black's Law Dictionary, Web-
ster's Third New International Dictionary, and state common law, then promulgated its
own definition of fraternal organizations to be used by the trial court on remand: "an
organization with a representative form of government [which] either.., operates under
the lodge system with a ritualistic form of work; ... is organized to promote the payment oflife, sickness, accident, or other insurance benefits to its members; or... is organized to
carry on some worthy civic or service purpose." State ex rel Sanborn v. Kalb, 218 Kan.
459, 466, 543 P.2d 872, 878 (1975).
233See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 1101 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976); KAN. STAT. § 79-4703(1976 Supp.); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 432.103 (6) (West Supp. 1977); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 5:8-25 (West Supp. 1976); N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 9 (McKinney Supp. 1976).
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but brief definition "game of chance in which prizes are awarded on the
basis of designated numbers or symbols on a card which conform to numbers
or symbols selected at random,"2 ' Ohio legislators sought to leave nothing
unsaid. The definition of bingo incorporated into the statute arising from
Senate Bill 398 is a meticulous four-part description of the game, in which
numbers of lines and spaces containing letters and numbers are detailed,
as well as the operator's function in selecting one of 75 corresponding ob-
jects from a receptacle, so that he might call the game." 5
When a slight variation called "zingo" appeared and added six objects
to the receptacle to correspond with the free space, the extremely specific
bingo definition no longer applied."' Zingo contained more than the statu-
tory 75 objects, and the objects corresponding with the free space did not
carry letter-number designations. They were simply black objects. To ex-
pand the original bingo definition to accommodate games like zingo, and
thereby forestall licensing evasion, drafters might have referred to "sub-
stantially similar games." Instead, they added an even longer addendum
describing all the ways in which the game might be varied. 37 As a result
24 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 326.5 (n) (West Supp. 1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120,
§ 1101 (6) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 432.102 (1) (West Supp.
1977); N.Y. CONST. art. 1 § 9 (2)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1976). But see KAN. STAT. § 79-4701
(a) for a detailed definition of "bingo", similar to Ohio's.
235 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2915.01 (R) (Baldwin 1976), states:
"Bingo" means a game with all of the following characteristics: (1) The participants
use bingo cards that are divided into twenty-five spaces arranged in five horizontal and
five vertical rows of spaces, with each space, except the central space, being designated
by a combination of a letter and a number and with the central space being designated
as a free space; (2) The participants cover the spaces on the bingo cards that corres-
pond to combinations of letters and numbers that are announced by a bingo game
operator; (3) A bingo game operator announces combinations of letters and numbers
that appear on objects that a bingo game operator selects by chance, either manually
or mechanically, from a receptable that contains seventy-five objects at the
beginning of each game, each object marked by a different combination of a letter
that corresponds to one of the seventy-five possible combinations of a letter and a
number that can appear on the bingo cards; (4) The winner of the bingo game
includes any participant who properly announces during the interval between the
announcements of letters and numbers as described in division (R) (3) of this section,
that a predetermined and preannounced pattern of spaces has been covered on a
bingo card being used by the participant.
236 Akron Beacon Journal, Sept. 15, 1976, at F-5.
237 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2915.01 (S) (2) (Page Supp. 1976) states:
(2) Any scheme or game other than a game as defined in division (S) (1) of this
section with the following characteristics:
(a) The participants use cards, sheets, or other devices that are divided into spaces
arranged in horizontal, vertical, or diagonal rows of spaces, with each space,
except free spaces, being designated by a single letter, number, or symbol; by a
combination of letters, numbers, or symbols; by a combination of a letter and a
number, a letter and a symbol, or a number and a symbol; or by any combination
of letters, numbers, and symbols, with some or none of the spaces being designated
as a free, complimentary, or similar space;
(b) The participants cover the spaces on the cards, sheets, or devices that corres-
pond to letters, numbers, symbols, or combinations of such that are announced by
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of this remedial, loophole-closing drafting, the Ohio General Assembly
has taken 458 words to describe the same game that legislators in California,
Illinois, Michigan, and New York have summed up in less than forty.
Despite the differences in definitional substance and drafting tech-
niques, surveyed states all specified that organizations eligible to conduct
bingo games for charitable purposes be themselves nonprofit in character.
However, Florida, New York, and Virginia statutes set no standard for
determining what is nonprofit, and Illinois simply requires that an officer
of the organization seeking a license submit a sworn statement as to its
nonprofit character.23 Ohio joins California, Delaware, and Kansas in
setting as a threshold requirement that applicants hold a specified tax status
under the Internal Revenue Code.23 In order to meet the tax exempt thres-
hold requirement under the Ohio statute, the applicant must be exempt from
federal taxation under subsection 501 (c) (3),"1° 501 (c) (4)," '4 501 (c)(8), 2 " 501 (c) (10),"I or 501 (c) (19)24 of the Internal Revenue Code.
a bingo game operator or otherwise transmitted to the participants;(c) A bingo game operator announces, or otherwise transmits to the participants,letters, numbers, symbols, or any combination of such as set forth in division (S)(2) (a) of this section that appear on objects that a bingo game operator selectsby chance that correspond to one of the possible letters, numbers, symbols, or
combinations of such that can appear on the bingo cards, sheets, or devices;(d) The winner of the bingo game is any participant who properly announces that
a predetermined and preannounced pattern of spaces has been covered on a card,
sheet, or device being used by the participant.
238 See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 1101 (1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976).
239 OHno REV. CODE ANN. § 2915.01 (H) (Page Supp. 1976).
240 I.R.C. § 501 (c) (3) exempts from federal taxation
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or
educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competi-tion (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities
or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the
net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual,
no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise
attempting, to influence legislation..., and which does not participate in, or intervenein (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign
on behalf of any candidate for public office.
241 I.R.C. § 501 (c) (4) exempts from federal taxation
Civic leagues or organizations not organized for profit but operated exclusively for thepromotion of social welfare, or local associations of employees, the membership of whichis limited to the employees of a designated person or persons in a particular municipality,
and the net earnings of which are devoted exclusively to charitable, educational, or
recreational purposes.
242 I.R.C. § 501 (c) (8) exempts from federal taxation
Fraternal beneficiary societies, orders, or associations-(A) operating under the lodge
system or for the exclusive benefit of the members of a fraternity itself operating under
the lodge system, and (B) providing for the payment of life, sick, accident, or otherbenefits to the members of such society, order, or association or their dependents.
243 I.R.C. § 501 (c) (10) exempts from federal taxation
Domestic fraternal societies, orders, or associations, operating under the lodge system -
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In addition to subsection 501 (c) (4) and 501 (c) (8) utilized in the Ohio
statute, the Kansas provision" 5 considers organizations to be nonprofit for
bingo licensing purposes if they hold tax-exempt status under subsection 501
(c) (5),216 501 (c) (6),17 and 501 (c) (7)248 of the Internal Revenue
Code. Delaware looks to eligibility under subsection 170 of the Internal
Revenue Code, governing charitable contributions generally, as prima facie
evidence that an applicant is eligible for licensing, 4 ' and California simply
stipulates25 that charitable bingo games must benefit organizations exempted
from payment of gift and corporation tax by Section 23701d of the state's
Revenue and Taxation Code and to which a contribution or gift would be
considered a charitable contribution under Section 170 (c) (2) of the In-
ternal Revenue Code. 51 State standards for tax exemption exclusively pre-
(A) the net earnings of which are devoted exclusively to religious, charitable, scientific,
literary, educational, and fraternal purposes, and
(B) which do not provide for the payment of life, sick, accident, or other benefits.
244 I.R.C. § 501 (c) (19) exempts from federal taxation
A post or organization of war veterans, or an auxiliary unit or society of, or a trust
or foundation for, any such post organization-
(A) organized in the United States or any of its possessions,
(B) at least 75 percent of the members of which are war veterans and substantially
all of the other members of which are individuals who are veterans (but not war
veterans), or are cadets, or are spouses, widows, or widowers of war veterans
or such individuals, and
(C) no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private share-
holder or individual.
2 45 KAN. STAT. § 79-4701 (g) (1976 Supp.).
246 I.R.C. § 501 (c) (5) exempts from federal taxation "labor, agricultural, or horti-
cultural organizations."
247 I.R.C. § 501 (c) (6) exempts from federal taxation
Business leagues, chambers of commerce, real-estate boards, boards of trade, or pro-
fessional football leagues (whether or not administering a pension fund for football
players), not organized for profit and no part of the net earnings of which inures
to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.
248 I.R.C. § 501 (c) (7) exempts from federal taxation: "Clubs organized and operated
exclusively for pleasure, recreation, and other nonprofitable purposes, no part of the net
earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder."
249 DEL. CODE tit. 28, § 1131 (c) (Michie 1975).
250 CAL. PENAL CODE § 326.5 (West Supp. 1976).
251 I.R.C. § 170 (c) (2) defines charitable contribution as a contribution or gift to the use
of
(2) A corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation-
(A) created or organized in the United States or in any possession thereof, or under
the law of the United States, any State, District of Columbia, or any possession of
the United States;
(B) organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or
educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports com-
petition (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities
or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals;
(C) no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder
or individual; and
(D) which is not disqualified for tax exemption under section 501 (c)(3) by reason of
attempting to influence legislation, and which does not participate in, or intervene
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empt federal ones as licensing criteria in Michigan.5 and New Jersey. 53
In addition to meeting certain tax exempt standards, it is common to
require, as does Ohio's bingo legislation, that an organization have been in
continuous existence for a specified number of years. 54 In Ohio, the require-
ment is five years for fraternal organizations, even those which are affiliates
of national or state organizations," 5' and two years for all other charitable
organizations, except for volunteer rescue or volunteer firemen's organiza-
tions, which have no durational requirement. 5 ' It is stated in the law that
the organization must have continued its existence "as such" for the required
two years, 57 presumably indicating that the charitable purposes for which
it was formed have been fulfilled for that time. The Ohio law, however,
has allowed applicant organizations time to build up their charitable-purpose
dossiers. Not until two years after the effective date of Senate Bill 398(May 26, 1976) must organizations include in their licensing applications
a statement that they have been in continuous existence in the state for the
required number of years preceding the date of application.25 None of the
other states surveyed provide such dispensation.
Concern by Ohio legislators for carefully defining which organizations
within the state may conduct which games is a reflection of the historical
condemnation of gambling as immoral,"' 9 and a popular fear in the state
in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign
on behalf of any candidate for public office.
A contribution or gift by a corporation to a trust, chest, fund, or foundation shall bedeductible by reason of this paragraph only if it is to be used within the United States
or any of its possessions exclusively for purposes specified in subparagraph (B).
252 MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 432.103 (6) (West Supp. 1976) requires bona fide religious,
educational, service, senior citizens, fraternal or veterans' organizations to have operated
continuously for five years, or hold tax exempt status under MICH. CoMp. LAws ANN. §§206.1 - 206.499 (West Supp. 1977), to qualify for a bingo license.
253 For purposes of licensing, the New Jersey Legalized Game of Chance Commission has
specified that a "qualified organization" must be incorporated or organized in New Jersey
as a religious organization or an association not for pecuniary profit. N.J. ADMIN. CODE
13:47-1.1 (1973 Supp.).
254 Florida requires three years' existence (FLA. STAT. ANN. § 849.093 (1) (West 1976));
Illinois, five, unless the organization's national affiliate has been in existence for five years,in which case the time period is two years (ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 1101 (Smith-HurdSupp. 1976), ILL. BINGO LICENSE AND TAX Rule 1 (A), (issued April, 1975); Kansas,five years, except for affiliates of national groups, which have no durational requirement(KAN. STAT. § 79-4703 (c) (1976 Supp.)); Michigan, five years, unless state tax exempt,
as discussed in note 252, supra (MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 432.103 (6) (West Supp.1977)); New York, one year (N.Y. GEN. MUN. § 476 (4) McKinney 1974)); Virginia,two years (VA. CODE § 18.2-335 (2) (Michie Supp. 1976)); California, Delaware, and
New Jersey codes specify no durational requirements.
255 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2915.01 (M) (Page Supp. 1976).
256 Id. § 2915.01 (H) (Page Supp. 1976).
257 Id.
258 Id. § 2915.08 (A) (2) (Page Supp. 1976).
259 See text accompanying notes 15-20 supra.
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currently that increasing the members of those eligible to conduct charitable
bingo will somehow open wide the door to organized crime. 6 A funda-
mental extension of statutorily defining which groups are eligible to conduct
games in the state is (1) establishing a viable licensing procedure for those
groups conducting games and, in some states, their commercial lessors and
suppliers; (2) legislating restrictions on how their money may be disbursed
for expenses and charitable purposes; and (3) devising a method of moni-
toring those expenditures.
B. Licensing Procedures
Among the ten states surveyed as to bingo procedures, three basic
forms of license control emerge: (1) licensing by local government units
solely or in conjunction with state licensing bodies; (2) licensing by spe-
cially-created state bingo commissions or standing departments within the
state government; (3) licensing by a designated individual within the state
government. California," 1 New Jersey, "2 New York,263 Virginia,26 and home
rule counties in Florida26 use the first (local government) method. Utiliz-
ing the second (commission or department) method are Delaware, through
260 Editorials in the Akron Beacon Journal have repeatedly reflected the sentiment that
"bingo must be watched closely to keep out organized crime". See Akron Beacon Journal,
Mar. 14, 1976, at A-6 (advocating shut-down of "big bingo"); Akron Beacon Journal, Apr.
15, 1976, at A-6 (recommending that expansion of bingo-eligible groups be scrutinized);
Akron Beacon Journal, July 4, 1976, at C-2 (demanding that loopholes in Amended House
Bill 1547 be sealed). Also featured in the newspaper was a report from a Holyoke, Mass.
bingo investigator who had posed as a gambler at Akron area games and found a high
chance of cheating. Akron Beacon Journal, Jan. 1, 1977, at A-7.
261 CAL. PENAL CODE § 326.5 (K) and (C) (West Supp. 1976) authorizes cities and/or
counties to issue licenses and charge license fees as well as deposit in their general funds
penalties up to $10,000 collected for violation of the section. In California, the legislature is
constitutionally authorized to allow cities and counties by ordinance to allow charitable
bingo. CAL. CONST. art. 4, § 19.
262 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:8-25 (West Supp. 1973) provides licensing by municipal governing
bodies after voters have authorized charitable bingo by local referendum. Provisions for
conduct of the election, including ballot forms and methods of resubmission and rescission
are specified in N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:8-43-49 (West 1973).
263N.Y. GEN. MUN. §§ 477, 480 (McKinney 1974) provides local option for bingo with local
licensing of bingo operators who hold an identification number from the State Bingo Control
Commission. The identification number, however, has been held by the Supreme Court of
Onondago County not to imply that applicants must undergo prescreening by the state.
Local 320 Club, Inc. v. Wackerle, 24 Misc. 2d 679, 206 N.Y.S.2d 957 (1960). New
York applicants who are turned down by local licensing officials may appeal to the state
commission, pursuant to N.Y. GEN. MUN. § 493 (McKinney 1974). By contrast, the New
Jersey Supreme Court has ruled in Allendale Field & Stream Ass'n v. Legalized Games of
Chance Comm'n, 41 N.J. 209, 195 A.2d 620 (1963) that the state's Legalized Games of
Chance Commission may refuse to issue an organization an initial registration number, there-
by precluding its opportunity for consideration by the local governing body.
264 VA. CODE § 18.2-335 (Michie Supp. 1976).
265 Florida statute provides no requirement for state or local licensing. However, in Jordan
Chapel Freevill Baptist Church v. Dade County, 334 So. 2d 661 (Fla. Ct. App. 1976), the
Third District Court of Appeals of Florida ruled that a home rule county may require that
operators and lessors of premises where bingo is to be played apply for a local permit.
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the Bingo Control Commission; 66 Illinois, through the Department of
Revenue; 7 and Michigan, through the Bureau of State Lottery.168 Only
Ohio and Kansas use the third method, delegating the licensing function
to a state officer, in Ohio, the Attorney General6 and in Kansas, the Sec-
retary of Revenue.7 ° Unlike states which utilize local licensing bodies, those
which solely utilize statewide licensing bodies do not require local voter
approval before allowing bingo within individual political subdivisions.
Rather, the state statutes have legalized charitable bingo statewide.
Ohio's decision to rely on the Attorney General instead of an existent
department or a specialized commission was not reached without opposition.
Governor James Rhodes, issuing a rare statement after he signed into
law the original charitable bingo law (Amended Senate Bill 398), expressed
reservations about the Attorney General as a licensing agent. His preference
was the State Commerce Department.7 1 Similarly, the North East Ohio
Players' Association, representing bingo players and operators, suggested
a twelve-member Bingo Control Commission to be appointed by the gov-
ernor and composed of three bingo players, three licensed charitable op-
erators, three legislators, and three at-large members.2" An argument ad-
vanced for specialized licensing bodies is that they will have the facilities
and interest to study problems of charitable bingo under existing law and
issue rules and regulations accordingly. In Delaware the Bingo Control
Commission is charged by statute with making a "continuous study and
investigation" of the operation of the bingo licensing law in Delaware and
in other states." '
There are stringent requirements for participation on New York's five-
person State Bingo Control Commission. No member, officer, or employee
is to hold any other public office or be employed by or have a pecuniary
interest in any bingo leasing or supplying firm. Neither may Commission
266 Pursuant to DEL. CODE tit. 28, § 1120 (a) (Michie 1975), the Delaware Bingo Control
Commission consists of five residents of the state appointed by the Governor with the
consent of the state Senate. No more than three can belong to the same political party.
267 ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 120, § 1101 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976) designates the Department
of Revenue not only as the licensing agent in Illinois, but also as the collector of revenue
to be generated from bingo games. Operators are required to submit ten percent of theirgross proceeds to the state, as well as post a bond or other security as required of Illinois
retailers under the state's Retailer's Occupation Tax Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 1103
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976).
268 MICH. CoMT. LAWS ANN. § 432.105 (West Supp. 1977).
269 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2915.08 (B) (Page Supp. 1976).
270 KAN. STAT. § 79-4703 (1976 Supp.) provides that the Secretary of Revenue shall issue the
license on forms provided by the Attorney General.
271 Akron Beacon Journal, May 27, 1976, at B-I, B-2.
272 Akron Beacon Journal, Mar. 31, 1976, at D-1.
273 DEL. CODE tit. 28, § 1123 (Michie 1975).
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members be officers or directors of organizations licensed to operate bingo,
nor may they be engaged in any private enterprise which could be construed
as a conflict of interest.'74 Besides reviewing the effectiveness of bingo regu-
lations binding on local licensing bodies, investigating possible bingo viola-
tions around the state and initiating prosecution, the Commission is charged
with reviewing all licenses issued by local governing bodies with power to
revoke local licenses which do not meet state qualifications.7 5
In Ohio, the Attorney General, like specialized bingo commissions, is
authorized to issue additional rules for licensure . 7  However, none have
been promulgated at this writing.1
7 7
Jurisdictions which rely on local licensing may also require some initial
state screening or provision for appeal to a state licensing body. New York,
for example, allows appeal to the State Bingo Control Commission in case
local licensing is denied. 78 New Jersey simply requires that local governing
bodies hold a hearing upon due notice to the applicant before refusing to
issue a license. 7 9 In Virginia, if applications are not acted upon within 30
days of the filing date, the licensing agency is deemed to have waived ob-
ection. 2
80
In Ohio, denial of a license by the Attorney General is subject to appeal
procedures pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act. Unsuccessful
administrative appeals can be pursued through the state courts.281
Information required on bingo license applications is essentially the
same among states surveyed as that required in Ohio, i.e., the name of the
applicant, verification of the organization's charitable character, location
where the game will be conducted, along with a copy of the rental agree-
ment if the premises are leased, notification of any previous applications,
denials, suspension, or revocations, statement of the charitable purpose for
the proceeds, and other "necessary and reasonable information" which the
attorney general may by rule require.282 As in other states surveyed, Ohio
licenses are issued annually.
Delaware simply requires the applicant's name and address, together
with "sufficent facts relating to its organization to enable the Commission
274 N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 433 (2) (McKinney 1972).
275 Id. § 435 (1).
276 Omo Rnv. CODE ANN. § 2915.08 (A) (7) (Page Supp. 1976).
277 See text accompanying notes 204-17 supra.
278 See note 263 supra.
279 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:8-30 (West 1973).
280 VA. CODE § 18.2-335 (Michie Supp. 1976).
281 See text accompanying note 212 supra.
282 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2915.08 (A) (7) (Page Supp. 1976).
COMMENTrSpring, 1977]
50
Akron Law Review, Vol. 10 [1977], Iss. 4, Art. 5
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss4/5
to determine whether or not it is a bona fide organization eligible to conduct
bingo.. ,,."" However, Delaware also requires applicants to designate an
active member or members who will supervise the game.28 Michigan further
requires that the organization specify on what day of the week it will conduct
bingo.285 Unless a "special license" is issued, the organization must limit its
games to that particular day. (Ohio limits charitable bingo to two five-hour
sessions within a seven-day period, 86 but does not issue licenses allowing
play only on specified days.)
Perhaps the most significant variation in license applications is found
in Illinois, where the charitable bingo statute specifies six categories of per-
sons not eligible for any license under the Act. They are (1) convicted
felons; (2) present or former professional gamblers or promoters; (3) per-
sons "not of good moral character;" (4) a firm or corporation where such
a person is active or employed; (5) an organization in which such a person
is an officer, director or employee; (6) an organization where such a person
is to help manage or operate a bingo game. 87
Although only one type of charitable bingo license is authorized by
statute in Ohio, other states, such as Illinois, New Jersey, Michigan and
New York provide for special types of licenses for limited bingo play. In
Illinois, organizations which are qualified for a regular bingo license, which
costs a $200 fee, but which do not wish to conduct the game on an ongoing
basis may instead apply for a permit to conduct bingo at no more than two
indoor or outdoor "festivals" a year for a maximum of five days each. Festi-
val license fee is $50. 28
Similar to the Illinois festival license is Michigan's "special license"
available for $50 either to licensed organizations which wish to conduct
bingo on days and at locations not specified in the regular $100 annual
license, or to unlicensed organizations which would meet regular licensing
requirements and wish to conduct bingo for more than one day. 8' On the
same basis, unlicensed organizations may obtain one-day permits for $5
and conduct their games just as those licensed organizations which hold
special or regular permits, including Michigan's maximum daily prize of$2,000 with a $500 maximum prize per game.'" Unlicensed organizations
283 DEL. CODE tit. 28, § 1131 (a) (Michie Supp. 1976).
8 4 1d. § 1131 (b).
285 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 432.104 (d) (West Supp. 1977).
286 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2915.09 (B) (4) (Page Supp. 1976).
287 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 1101 (7) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976).
2881d. § 1101 (3).
289 MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 432.107 (2) (West Supp. 1977).
29 0 Id. § 432,110 (4).
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which would meet licensing requirements may obtain for $10 a third type
of license under which they may conduct no more than twelve bingo days
of not more than 25 games each per year, provided that the prize for each
game does not exceed $10.291
New Jersey allows municipal governments to issue without fee two-
year licenses to senior citizens' associations or clubs which wish to conduct
bingo solely for amusement. Such license holders cannot require participants
to contribute anything "of value" for the opportunity to play. Only "bona
fide active" members of the specially-licensed organizations can play, and
prizes must be "nominal. ' 29 2 Likewise, New York provides for senior citi-
zens' bingo played under similar conditions, provided the organization holds
an identification number from the Bingo Control Commission.2" New York
also provides for a "limited period bingo" license to conduct bingo for not
more than seven of eight consecutive days in any one year at a festival,
carnival, or bazaar. Organizations wishing to conduct limited period bingo
must fulfill regular local licensing procedures, including a $12.50 base
license fee per "occasion,"29 ' plus the usual three percent of reported net
proceeds which New York bingo operators must pay to the clerk of the
municipality29  where the game is located for each "occasion. '296 A licensed
organization which chooses to conduct limited period bingo may not also
engage during that year in the usual six days of bingo per calendar month
allowed licensed bingo operators.297
In contrast, Ohio requires no licensing requirement for amusement -
only bingo conducted by any operator, provided all the proceeds are returned
to the players in prizes.29 8 Likewise, Ohio's so-called "festivals" provision
299
permits unlicensed charitable organizations with a tax-exempt status under
subsection 501 (c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954190 to conduct
291 Id. § 432.105 (5) (2).
292 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:8-25.1 (West Supp. 1976).
293 N.Y.GEN. MUN. § 495-a (2) (c) (McKinney 1974). To receive an identification number,
an organization must submit information including a copy of its charter and bylaws, number
of members, whether regular meetings are held and when, any banks in which accounts are
maintained, the office responsible for any bingo proceeds, a statement of organizational
purposes for the past year, and intended uses of monies derived from the game. Bingo
Control Comm'n Reg. 286.2.
294 N.Y. Bingo Control Comm'n Reg. 288.10.
295 Id. 297.3.
296 "Occasion" is a single gathering or session at which a series of up to 35 successive
bingo games is played. In limited period bingo, there can be up to 60 games per session.
N.Y. Bingo Control Comm'n Reg. 280.1 (d).
297 N.Y. Bingo Control Comm'n Reg. 280.1 (k).
298 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2915.12 (Page Supp. 1976).
299 Id. § 2915.02 (C).
300 See note 240 supra.
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gambling without state screening, excluding only craps and roulette for money
and slot machines, for a maximum of four consecutive days twice a year."'
Besides providing alternative forms of licensing for operators of bingo
games, some states also require that commercial lessors of bingo premises
as well as suppliers of bingo equipment be specially licensed. In Ohio, both
charitable and commercial lessors can charge no more than $250 per session
for renting a bingo hall. Commercial lessors may not lease their premises
to more than two charitable organizations per week." 2 They need not register
in any way with the state except that the organizations using their facilities
must attach to their license applications a copy of their rental agreement. 3 '
Other states legislating for commercial bingo and courts reviewing its
operations have looked with a jaundiced eye toward commercial lessors.
The New Jersey Supreme Court, upholding in 1956 a ruling by the Legalized
Game of Chance Control Commission that all lessors must first be screened
and registered, noted that
[t]he game [of bingo] is tolerable only when operated on a moderate
scale . . . it is harmful when conducted as a commercial enterprise or
as an end in itself, or when it grows to such a size that it is a significant
factor in the economic or social life of the community.... .0
Since 1957, New Jersey has charged the Commission by statute with
screening "approved rentors." To be approved, the New Jersey rentor or
owner of the premises must be certified as "of good moral character" and
must not have been convicted of a crime." 5 Approved rentors must pay a
one-time $100 license fee in addition to $5 for each occassion on which
the licensed premises are used for bingo. 0 Organizations licensed to conduct
bingo need not undergo further screening or pay additional fees to lease
bingo premises.
Even more stringent are New York's requirements for commercial
lessors. There, an "authorized commercial lessor" must not be a person
convicted of a crime unless he has received a pardon or certificate of good
conduct; a present or former professional gambler or gambling promoter
or one who "for other reasons is not of good moral character;" a public
officer receiving direct or indirect consideration for bingo rentals, provided
that the rental arrangement is for pecuniary profit; and finally, a firm or
301 See text accompanying note 142 supra.
302 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2915.09 (A) (3) (Page Supp. 1976).
303 See text accompanying note 282 supra.304 Daughters of Miriam Home for Aged and Infirm v. Legalized Games of Chance
Control Comm'n, 42 N.J. Super. 405, 409, 126 A.2d 892, 894 (1956).
305 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:8 - 49.6 (West 1973).
306 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:8-49.7 (West 1973).
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corporation in which one of the above persons or a person "married or
related in the first degree to such a person" holds more than a ten percent
proprietary, equitable, or credit interest, or where such a person is active or
employed.""
Base license fee is ten dollars for all commercial lessors, over a maxi-
mum one-year period, but an additional fee is charged according to the
aggregate rental fees to be charged. The additional fee ranges from $5 for
those charging an aggregate rental of from $100 to $499, to a $5,000 fee
for those whose establishments will bring in more than $100,000 over the
period, not to exceed one year, for which the local governing body is willing
to issue a license.s' In 1973, the New York legislature amended the com-
mercial lessors' provision to provide that such licenses be issued in cities of
one million population or more only when the local governing body "shall
find that there is a public need and that public advantage will be served by
the issuance of such license."30 Legislative history indicates that the addi-
tional requirement was prompted by "the proliferation (in New York City)
of commercial bingo halls and the consequent diversion of the net proceeds
of bingo from the charitable, educational, scientific, health, religious, civic
and patriotic undertakings sponsored by the authorized organzition con-
ducting bingo to and for the profit of such commercial lessors."31
Other states have simply limited lessor privileges to those who hold
regular bingo operator licenses. In California, a charitable organization may
only conduct games on property which it owns or leases also for an office
or for other organizational purposes besides conducting bingo games. 11
Florida requires that bingo games be held on property owned by the non-
profit organizations conducting the games or by the charity benefitting from
the proceeds, or on property which one of those organizations lease fulitime
for at least one year or on property owned or leased by another nonprofit
organization qualified to conduct charitable bingo. 1 That is, in Florida,
307 N.Y. GEN MUN. § 476 (9) (McKinney 1974).
308 The complete extra-fee schedule for commercial lessors, as provided in N.Y. GEN.
MUN. § 481 (1) (b) (McKinney 1974), is as follows:
aggregate rental of $100 to $499 ... $5.00
aggregate rental of $500 to $999... $25.00
aggregate rental of $1,000 to $2,499... $50.00
aggregate rental of $2,500 to $4,999... $125.00
aggregate rental of $5,000 to $9,999. .. $250.00
aggregate rental of $10,000 to $49,999 ... $500.00
aggregate rental of $50,000 to $100,000... $2,500.00
aggregate rental in excess of $100,000. .. $5,000.00
309 N.Y. GEN. MuN. § 481 (1) (b) (McKinney 1974).
310 1973 N.Y. Laws, ch. 142, § 2.
311 CAL. PENAL CODE § 326.5 (F) (West Supp. 1976).
312 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 849.093 (8) (West 1976).
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bingo premises may not be rented from a commercial lessor solely for bingo
games. Illinois simply requires that licensed bingo operators only rent prem-
ises to conduct games from a licensed operator."' Virginia makes no provi-
sions for scrutinizing lessors in its state regulations, which simply indicate
that an organization with a bingo permit may "conduct games at its principal
meeting place or any other site selected."31 However, all Virginia permit-
holders are subject to additional local regulation. Other states surveyed con-
tain no controls for commercial lessors in their statutory provisions.
A third mode of licensing employed by some states, besides that of
operators and lessors, is to license suppliers of bingo equipment. In Illinois,
a person, firm, or corporation wishing to distribute or lease supplies, such
as cards, boards, sheets, markers, and pads, must first obtain an annual
license from the Director of Revenue. Fee for a supplier's license is the
same as that for operating bingo games - $200 - and applicants are
subject to the same screening as to background and moral character as are
bingo operator candidates.315 Similarly, organizations licensed to play bingo
in Michigan must lease or purchase their equipment only from suppliers who
have been licensed by the Commissioner of State Lottery and paid a $300
annual license fee. 16 Michigan's bingo operators pay a lower license fee of
$100.-
New York has adopted stringent requirements for vendors and distri-
butors. 18 They must either have themselves been licensed to conduct bingo
games for the preceding twelve months, or have applied for a supplier's
license with the State Bingo Control Commission. Included in the suppliers'
license application must be the names and addresses of all officers, directors,
shareholders or partners and the amount of gross receipts realized from the
sale or distribution of bingo equipment to licensees during the last year. In
a manner reminiscent of its sliding-scale fee schedule for commercial lessors,
New York further requires that suppliers pay, in addition to a $25 base
license fee, a varying fee computed according to its gross sales during the
preceding calendar or fiscal year. The added fees vary from $10 for sup-
pliers who grossed from $1,000 to $4,999, to $1,000 for those who grossed
more than $100,000 in bingo supply sales. 1
313 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 1102 (8) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976).
314 VA. CODE § 18.2 - 335 (Michie Supp. 1976).
315 ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 120, § 1101 (7) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976).
316 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 432.112 (12) (3) (West Supp. 1977).
317 Id. § 432.105 (5) (1).
318 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 435 (2) (b) (McKinney 1972).3 19 Id., requiring the following fees for vendors and distributors grossing these intermediate
receipts:
gross sales of $5,000 to $19,000... $50.00
gross sales of $20,000 to $49,999 ... $200.00
gross sales of $50,000 to $100,000 ... $500.00
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Also related to regulating supplies, the New York Commission has the
power to establish a standard set of bingo cards and control how the cards
are to be reproduced and distributed to licensees.32 It has done so in the
case of "limited period bingo," specifying in its regulation, for example, that
limited period bingo cards must be in pads of 20 to 25, each card having
a serial or coding number, be in sealed cartons of 5,000 cards each, with
each carton stamped to indicate the serial numbers of cards inside. 2'
By contrast, Ohio simply requires that a charitable organization con-
ducting a bingo game must itself own all of the equipment used to conduct
a bingo game or lease it from another licensed operator. As discussed in
Part II,22 there is no statutory ceiling on the equipment rental fees that a
charitable lessor may charge, and as a result, there is potential for abuse.
Likewise, there is no state control over vendors from whom charitable or-
ganizations purchase their equipment.
C. Control Over Proceeds
With the same goal which state legislatures have hoped to achieve by
licensing bingo operators, suppliers and commercial lessors - that is, maxi-
mizing the odds that only charitable purposes will reap the profits - law-
makers have typically enacted other safeguards to keep bingo receipts out
of the hands of commercial enterprises.' Common provisions in Ohio and
other states surveyed include ceilings on maximum daily prizes, or pots;
careful definition of what expenses may be deducted for services and pro-
motional activities; restrictions upon authorized charitable purposes; and
requirements for financial record-keeping." '
In an apparent attempt to reserve a maximum amount of the proceeds
for charity and to equalize the competition among small and large-scale
bingo operations, the legislatures of most surveyed states have adopted ceil-
320 N.Y. ExEc. LAWS § 435 (2) (c) (McKinney, 1972).
321 N.Y. Bingo Control Comm. Reg. 296.45.
822 See text accompanying notes 164-67 supra.
23 A second justification for stringent controls, as discussed in note 260 supra, is the fear
that organized crime may take over charitable bingo. Whether this fear has become a reality
in Ohio since charitable bingo was instituted is difficult to determine. However, Toledo
Police Chief Corrin J. McGrath has estimated that in 1975, before the first charitable
bingo statute was implemented, 22 of Toledo's 50 charitable bingo games were conducted
by crime figures and their associates. He charged that of $3.28 million grossed by the city's
largest game, only $25,000 went to charity. Akron Beacon Journal, Jan. 17, 1976, at B-1.
324 When Ohio legislative committees first considered proposed bingo legislation, resulting
in Amended Senate Bill 398, there was some pressure by lobbyists to adopt virtually re-
striction-free, large-pot bingo. The Northeast Ohio Players Association, for example,
suggested to the House Judiciary Committee that one-half the gross receipts of each game go
for prizes, one-sixth for charity, and that all restrictions for paying workers, regulating
hours of operation, and paying for advertising and renting halls be removed. Akron Beacon
Journal, Mar. 31, 1976, at D-1.
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ings on prize money to be paid per day or multi-game session of bingo, per
game, or both. Ohio has no per-game maximum prize provisions and allows
a $3,500 maximum to be awarded in prizes per bingo session 325-the largest
per-session maximum allowed in any state surveyed. Because two sessions
may be conducted per seven-day period, 26 $7,000 in prizes may be awarded
by one organization in a week.
Of the nine other states surveyed, seven regulate both the daily and
per-game prizes. Nearest to Ohio's $3,500 pot is Illinois, with a $2,250
daily maximum with a $500 ceiling on each game.3" ' However, Illinois only
allows one day of bingo play by an organization per seven-day week.'2
Trailing in prizes are Michigan with a $2,000 daily and $500 per-game
maximum;3' Kansas, $1,750 daily maximum"'0 two days a week 31 and $50
per regular game;"'2 New York,"' New Jersey,3 4 and Delaware"3 5 all al-
lowing $1,000 daily maximums including $250 per single game. Florida
allows only $25 per game and $100 a day in prizes. 6 California allows a
maximum of $250 per game, with no set daily maximum,3 and Virginia
has legislated no prize maximum.
Besides regulating the amount of money which can be paid out in
prize money, charitable bingo statutes typically enumerate what other ex-
penses may be deducted from the gross receipts before proceeds are turned
over to charity. Ohio's provision is specific. Receipts may only be spent
for prizes, charitable purposes listed in the licensee's application, purchasing
or leasing bingo cards and "other equipment" used to conduct the game,
hiring security personnel, advertising the game, and renting the premises." 8
Like other states surveyed, Ohio specifically prohibits using proceeds to
pay operators,3 although no provision is made that operators be active
325 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2915.09 (B) (5) (Page Supp. 1976).3 26 Id. § 2915.09 (B) (4).
3 2 7 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 1102 (4) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976).32 8 Id.
329 MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 432.110 (4) (West Supp. 1977).
33 0 KAN. STAT. § 79-4706 (d) (1976 Supp.).
331 Id., § 79-4706 (h).
332 Id. §§ 79-4706 (e), (f) create regular and jackpot games in Kansas, with $50 and $500
maximum pots, respectively. Of the 25 games allowed in a day of bingo, a maximum
of five may be billed as jackpot games.
333 N.Y. GEN. MUt. § 481 (a) (McKinney 1974).
334 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:8-27 (West 1973).
335 DEL. CODE tit. 28, § 1132 (b) (Michie 1975).
336 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 849.093 (5) (West 1976).
337 CAL. PENAL CODE § 326.5 (m) (West Supp. 1976).
338 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2915.09 (A) (2) (Page Supp. 1976).
339 Id. § 2915.09 (B) (1); § 2915.01 (U).
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members of the licensee organization, as statutes in other surveyed states
require. Ohio has also incorporated broad language banning consulting fees
for "any services performed in relation to the bingo game." ' This provision,
in conjunction with the language enumerating proper expenses,"' would
appear to disallow in Ohio some services, such as accounting and bookkeep-
ing, which are permitted in other states.' The only individuals statutorily
authorized to be paid for services in Ohio are security personnel, who are
carefully defined to include only sheriffs and marshals, and their deputies,
township constables, members of local police departments, or those who have
completed a state peace officer's training course.'
It also does not appear, based on the same statutory provisions, that
attorney's fees may be paid out of gross receipts from charitable bingo games.
The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, considering a
challenge to a ruling by the New Jersey Legalized Games of Chance Control
Commission that attorney's fees could not be paid from bingo receipts,
upheld the Commission and noted:
The right to pay such fees and costs may not be implied where the
Legislature has specifically designated the only persons who may be
paid and the only services which may be paid for.'"
The court went on to note that the ruling did not deprive the bingo
licensee from pursuing an appeal of a Commission ruling or exercising its
right to counsel because other funds from the licensee's ongoing treasury
could be used."4 5
It is less clear whether consulting fees for advertising are allowed by
Ohio's statute, since advertising expenses, unlike bookkeeping or legal con-
sultation, are specifically allowed. Other states, such as Delaware, New Jer-
sey, New York, and Virginia, specifically restrict advertising of charitable
bingo games. New Jersey and New York restrictions are nearly identical
in forbidding advertisement of the location, time, or prizes offered in any
bingo game by means of newspapers, radio, television, sound trucks, bill-
boards, posters, or handbills. Only signs on licensed first-aid rescue squad
340 Id. § 2915.09 (B) (2).
341 Id. § 2915.09 (A) (2).
342 Both New Jersey and New York allow reasonable expenditures for bookkeepers or
accountants, pursuant to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:8-34 (West Supp. 1976) and N.Y. Bingo
Control Commission Reg. 296.7. The Commission considers, in the foregoing rule, the follow-
ing fees for such services to be reasonable: $5 per occasion for preparing a financial statement
of bingo operations; $15 per month to prepare the statutorily-required bookkeeping system;
$5 per month for supervising the bookkeeping system without making entries.
'43 OIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2915.01 (Y) (Page Supp. 1976).
344 Conley's Anemia Blood and Research Foundation v. Legalized Games of Chance Control
Comm'n, 78 N.J. Super. 128, 142, 187 A.2d 731, 738 (1965).
345 Id. at 143, 187 A.2d at 739.
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or volunteer fire vehicles are allowed, as well as a sixty-square foot sign
on the premises." 6  Delaware law contains the same prohibitions,
except that no exception is made for signs on emergency vehicles, and the
on-premises display sign may not exceed twelve square feet.347 In a restric-
tion apparently motivated more by aesthetic than economic considerations,
Virginia prohibits only exterior advertising signs on the premises where
games are conducted." '
Ohio's decision to allow unrestricted advertising expense was not
reached without opposition. The original version of Senate Bill 398 had
outlawed advertising. The bill's sponsor, Senator Charles L. Butts, justified
his advertising ban on three grounds: (1) maximum proceeds should go to
charity rather than promotional expenses; (2) heavy advertising of rival
games would foster undesirable competition among sponsoring organiza-
tions; and (3) an advertising budget would allow friends of bingo operators
to "skim" off bingo receipts.349
Two states, Kansas and Illinois, not only authorize but require still
another expense to be deducted from gross receipts: the percentage to be
returned to the state as revenue. In Illinois, operators must return ten percent
of their gross receipts to the state, to be equally divided between the Mental
Health Fund and the Common School Fund.35 ° In Kansas, two percent of
the gross receipts are forwarded annually to the Director of Taxation, who
returns them to the cities and counties where they originated to help defray
local enforcement costs of the state bingo law.3"'
Finally, unlike their sister states with rigid restrictions on where bingo
receipts may be directed, both Michigan and Delaware have drafted broad
catch-all language into their bingo statutes, which might justify any number
of additional unforeseen expenses by bingo licensees. Michigan allows the
Commissioner of State Lottery to provide by rule for "other reasonable ex-
penses incurred by the licensee, not inconsistent with the Act." '352 Michigan
also allows for janitorial services.353 Likewise, Delaware broadly allows ex-
penditures for "items of reasonable amount for merchandise furnished or
services rendered which is reasonably necessary for the conduct of the
game." 35 4
346See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:8-36 (West 1973); N.Y. GEN. MuN. § 490 (McKinney 1974).
347 DEL. CODE tit. 28, § 1139 (i) (Michie 1975).
3 48 VA. CODE § 18.2-335 (Michie Supp. 1976).
349 Akron Beacon Journal, Feb. 18, 1976, at B-1, B-3.
350 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 1103 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976).
351 KAN. STAT. § 79-4704 (1976 Supp.).
352 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 432.109 (F) (West Supp. 1977).
353 d,
354 DEL. CODE tit. 28, § 1139 (f) (Michie 1975).
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The final purpose for which charitable bingo expenditures are authorized
is, of course, the allocation for the charity itself. None of the states surveyed,
including Ohio, mandate that any minimum percentage of the gross receipts
go to charity. The percentage of receipts which has found its way into the
coffers of the charity for which funds are supposedly being solicited has in
some cases been surprisingly low. 55
Ohio's current method of determining authorized charitable purposes
for which funds may be directed has already been discussed extensively. 5
Basically, four categories of charitable organizations may receive bingo
funds in Ohio: (1) organizations which hold tax exempt status under sub-
section 501 (c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code or are governmental
units, and meet the description of private foundations contained in sub-
sections 509 (a) (1), 509 (a) (2), or 509 (a) (3) of the Internal Revenue
Code; (2) veteran's organizations, for specified charitable purposes, schol-
arships, nonprofit youth activities, promotion of patriotism or disaster re-
lief; (3) fraternal organizations for religious, charitable, scientific, literary
or educational purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to children or
animals where such contributions would qualify as charitable income tax
deductions under subsection 170 of the Internal Revenue Code;357 and (4)
volunteer firemen's organizations. By contrast, four states, Delaware, Kan-
sas, Michigan, and New York, specify that bingo receipts remaining after
authorized fees and expenses must go to lawful purposes of the sponsoring
organizations, or licensees. 8 '
The New York Bingo Control Commission, however, specifies further
four categories of possible lawful purposes, including lessening "burdens
borne by government" and initiating public works or maintaining public
structures, in addition to the customary goals of benefitting the needy through
religion, education and physical well-being. 5 The New York definition
goes on to note that the broad language of its purposes is not intended to
authorize expenditure of funds for acquiring, maintaining, or improving
portions of buildings which are not specifically related to the enumerated
355 Of $183,000 raised in bingo games over three months by the Hi-Fi Club, to benefit United
Cerebral Palsy Association of Stark County, Ohio, a reported four percent actually went to
the authorized charitable purpose. Akron Beacon Journal, Apr. 8, 1977, at 1. Similarly,
Toledo Police Chief Corrin J. McGrath has stated of the $2.38 million grossed by that
city's largest game in 1975, $25,000, or slightly more than one percent, went to the
charity for which it was organized. Akron Beacon Journal, Jan. 17, 1976, at B-1.
356 See text accompanying notes 172-87 supra.
357 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2915.01 (Z) (Page Supp. 1976).
358 See DEL. CONsT. art. 2, § 17 (A) (Michie 1975); KAN. STAT. § 79-4706 (a) (1976
Supp.); MicH CoMp. LAws ANN. § 432.109 (9) (West Supp. 1977); N.Y. Bingo Control
Comm'n Reg. 280.1 (h).
359 N.Y. Bingo Control Comm'n Reg. 280.1 (h) (2), (3).
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lawful purposes.3 60 A similar definition of "authorized purpose" has been
adopted by the New Jersey Legalized Games of Chance Control Commis-
sion. 61 California relies on federal and state revenue standards for tax-
exempt charitable giving,"' and Florida, with perhaps the broadest language
of all, simply specifies that bingo proceeds be directed to "charitable, civic,
community, benevolent, religious or scholastic works or similar activities.3 63
D. Record-Keeping
The only indication of whether expenditures including charitable do-
nations have been properly directed is found in records maintained by bingo
operators. Three states - Florida, Virginia, and California - specify no
formal record-keeping procedures in their bingo statutes. Of those surveyed
states which do, only Ohio requires merely that ongoing records be main-
tained for a set period of time and made subject to state or local inspections.
Other states additionally require that ongoing records must be filed with
the state or local authorites at regular intervals or a specified number of
days after each bingo game.
Ohio's provision. 4 simply requires that records of each bingo session must
be maintained for three years from the date of the session and must include
an itemized list of gross receipts, as well as itemized lists of all expenses,
including names and addresses of persons winning prizes over $100 and
the name of each person such as suppliers and lessors to whom expenses
are paid, with a receipt attached. A list of charitable recipients must also
be maintained, as well as a count on the number of persons attending the
session.
There is no requirement in Ohio that the bingo session records be filed
regularly with the state. Rather, the Attorney General and local law enforce-
ment officials are authorized to examine the licensee's accounts and records
to determine whether a violation of the charitable bingo statute has
occurred."6 5
Besides being subject to state or local inspection, records of bingo
games in New York, New Jersey, and Delaware must be filed quickly after
each game. In Delaware a report similar to Ohio's ongoing records must
be filed with the Bingo Control Commission within 15 days after the con-
clusion of any game. 66 In New Jersey, the deadline is also 15 days to file
360Id. 280.1 (h) (4).
361 N.J. ADmIN. CODE Rule 47-1.1.
362 See note 226 supra.
S6SFLA. STAT. ANN. § 849.093 (1) (West 1976).
3640mo REv. CODE ANN. § 2915.10 (A) (Page Supp. 1976).
a65 Id. § 2915.10 (B) (Page Supp. 1976).
366 DEL. CODE tit. 28, § 1140 (Michie 1975).
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a statement with the clerk of the municipality where the game's operator
is licensed.367
New York's filing requirements 68 are extensive. Within seven days
after each bingo occasion, operators must file a financial statement with the
state Bingo Control Commission, and a copy must be filed with the clerk
of the municipality where the operator is licensed. If no game is held on
a date when an operator is authorized to conduct one, a report to that effect
must still be filed. Failing to file or filing incorrectly can result in the sus-
pension of a license and refusal to issue further licenses. New York's com-
mission further provides in its regulations that because noncharitable ex-
penditures from bingo funds are to be discouraged, and such expenses taken
where possible from an organization's general fund, the general fund books
must be open to inspection before noncharitable purposes can be met with
bingo funds. A special bingo account is also required by the commission,
with deposits made "intact" and no later than the next business day follow-
ing a game.
In Illinois and Kansas, annual financial reports by bingo operators
must accompany statements filed with state revenue departments to calculate
the amount of gross receipts payable in state taxes each year.8 6 Ten percent
of the gross receipts go to the state in Illinois, and two percent in Kansas. As
in Ohio, Illinois operators must keep records on file for three years, during
which time they are subject to state inspection."' Interestingly, Kansas, while
requiring annual reports, does not provide by statute for spot inspections
of financial records by state officials.
Michigan requires operators to maintain records for a one-year period,
during which time they are open to inspection. Also, the Commissioner of
State Lottery is authorized to request an audit of a licensee's bingo-related
records by the state auditor general or a certified public accounting firm.
In addition, annual reports are required to be filed with the commissioner."'
IV. SUGGESTED LEGISLATIVE STRATEGIES
INTRODUCTION
An examination of Ohio's history in bingo regulation and its current
law regulating charitable bingo compared to that of other states reveals
five fundamental problem areas to date unsolved by the General Assembly.
367 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:8-37 (West Supp. 1976).
368 N.Y. Bingo Control Comm'n Regs. 297.1-.17.
369 See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 1103 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976).
370 Id. § 1104.
371 MicH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 432.114 (West Supp. 1977).
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Undercutting the intent of the current law by precluding its effective
enforcement are these deficiencies: (1) absence of an efficient administra-
tive system for reviewing license applications; (2) absence of effective state
control over commercial lessors, equipment suppliers and game operators;(3) absence of a broad, flexible statutory definition of qualified charitable
organizations which can conduct bingo games and receive their proceeds;(4) absence of any licensing and reporting requirement for amusement
bingo and festivals, as well as state constitutional problems with their exist-
ence; and finally, (5) absence of regular reporting requirements for license-
holders.
In the following five-part section, each problem area is approached
and proposals offered for its resolution. In brief, the writers propose (1)
that a separate Office for Bingo Control be created within the State Lottery
Commission to issue licenses and promulgate rules; (2) that commercial
lessors, equipment sales operations and game operators be licensed, and
additional enforcement costs financed through a percentage of gross receipts;(3) that qualified charitable organizations be broadly defined in terms of
tax status and bona fide character with expansion of specific charitable
categories left up to the rule-making authority of the Office for Bingo
Control, and licensed organizations use bingo proceeds for their own charit-
able purposes; (4) that amusement bingo and festival operations be licensed
and regulated if they are found to be constitutional; and finally, (5) that
license-holders be required to report regularly as to financial receipts and
expenditures to the Office.
A. Office of Bingo Control
When looking at the current bingo statutes, their immediate predeces-
sors, and suggested replacements,"' one notes that the legislature has con-
tinually increased the number and kinds of charitable organizations eligible
for bingo licenses. The current bill being considered by the Ohio House,
Substitute House Bill 72, would extend privileges to veterans' organizations
which are not chartered by Congress if they are posts of a national organi-
zation and have been in continuous existence in Ohio for twenty years"' and
to youth athletic organizations."' , Coupled with the existing total exemption
from regulation for amusement-only bingo games,"' these expansions indi-
cate that the legislature is primarily concerned not with the identity of those
3 72 The General Assembly had four bills in committee as of April 1, 1977, i.e., H.B. 72,
H.B. 83, H.B. 143, and S.B. 104, of which H.B. 72 is now being considered by the House
Governmental Affairs Committee.3 78H.B. 72, § 2915.01 (K).
374H.B. 72, § 2915.01 (BB).
75 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2915.12 (Page Supp. 1976).
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who conduct bingo but with assuring that proceed-producing operations
are conducted by bona fide charitable organizations which contribute funds
to appropriate charitable purposes.
With this in mind, the writers propose that the General Assembly es-
tablish an Office for Bingo Control which would operate under the State
Lottery Commission. This independent office would administer the bingo
law and monitor the purposes for which proceeds are utilized. All bingo. 7
or legalized gaming377 in the state would be subject to the scrutiny of the
office; irregularities would be discovered by periodic monitoring and rem-
edied by means of license revocation or suspension and criminal sanctions
where warranted.
The State Lottery Commission is now composed of five members ap-
pointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate. Only
three members may be from the same political party. Removal is by the
Governor for malfeasance or nonfeasance in office, with public hearing
provided upon request, and the Governor's charges and findings thereon
must be filed with the Secretary of State. 7 8 The Commission is statutorily
charged with the power to promulgate rules and conditions for the admin-
istration of the state lottery. Monthly meetings with the Director of the
Lottery are required, and a written record of proceedings is kept. This record
is sent to the Governor, the President Pro Tempore and the Minority Leader
of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. A monthly
report of revenues and expenses is required. An annual financial report, to-
gether with recommendations for necessary legislation, must be submitted
to the Governor and the General Assembly. The Commission is also charged
with the duty of continuously examining the lottery to identify defects or
abuses, and is authorized to commission comparative studies of state-run
lotteries. 79
In order to conduct studies and investigations, the Commission is em-
powered to hold public hearings to which interested parties are given actual
or constructive notice. The Commission is authorized to take testimony
under oath, to issue subpoenas compelling the attendance of witnesses and
the production of documents and accounts, and to enforce subpoenas by
376 Both charitable bingo and free bingo, assuming the General Assembly continued to
elect to allow the latter, would be subject to licensing and regulation, although under
schemes which would differ in relation to the distinctions inherent in proceed-producing and
not-for-profit games.
377 Festivals would be legal only if the sponsoring organization obtained a permit therefor.
The strong lobbying for festivals makes it unlikely that they will be made illegal.
378 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 3770.01 (Page Supp. 1976). A ten thousand dollar bond is
also required of each appointee. Terms are for four years, and are staggered.
379 Orno REV. CODE ANN. § 3770.03 (G) (Page Supp. 1976).
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an action brought by the local county prosecuting attorney in the Court of
Common Pleas.3 °
The authors submit that this Commission, already formed and opera-
ting, is the proper regulatory body for bingo. The experience in administer-
ing a legalized lottery, subject to some of the same dangers of abuse as
legalized bingo, should aid in smooth administration of the bingo scheme.
The Commission's powers would need to be expanded. An enabling clause
for promulgating rules and conditions under which bingo may be conducted
should be added to present section 3770.03 of the Ohio Revised Code. Rules
would be developed from the statutory requirements for licensing and con-
ducting games. 81 Such rule-making power would be exercised pursuant to
the Ohio Administrative Procedure Act. Aside from the statutory standards
for licensing, the Commission would be required to make rules to contribute
to the efficient and economical operation and administration of bingo, con-
sonant with the public interest. An annual report and accounting to the
Governor and Assembly would include a separate section relating to bingo
administration. Suggestions for legislation would be solicited in this area
as well.
Such a scheme would assure that the responsible executives and legis-
lators would be apprised of the situation regarding bingo. The expertise of
an Office designed to monitor the bingo system and suggest necessary
corrective measures would be critical to the reasoned development of the
bingo law. Before recommendations for legislation were made, investigations
and hearings, including studies of legislation from other states which has
or has not been effective in solving the problem being dealt with, would
be conducted. Thus, some measure of thoughtful consideration of effects
would be assured before action was taken. Presumably, the action, less sub-ject to political and interest group pressure, would be more realistic and
would withstand the test of time better than that instituted on an ad hoc
basis by the General Assembly.
For those difficulties which are not of widespread significance and
which do not require a policy decision of sufficient magnitude to warrant
legislative action, the Commission's rule-making power would offer the
solution. Thus, should it become necessary to enumerate purposes to which
380 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3770.04 (Page Supp. 1976).
381 Cf. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3770.03 (G) (Page Supp. 1976). By analogy to the State
Racing Commission, which supervises the conduct of thoroughbred, quarterhorse, and harn-
ess horse racing meetings and the parimutuel betting system, the Office of Bingo Control
could be authorized to "prescribe the rules, regulations, and conditions under which [bingo]
can be conducted, and may issue, deny, suspend, diminish, or revoke permits to conduct[bingo] ... as is in the public interest for purposes of maintaining proper control over [bingo
operations].. . ." Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3769.03 (Page Supp. 1976).
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proceeds could or could not be applied, for instance, building a recreation
room for an organization, the Commission would be empowered to do so.
Thereby, questions regarding details could be speedily resolved. If it were
discovered that certain "educational" organizations were not bona fide
charities, a requirement of a regular course of study could be added by rule
if such an element were found to be a factor distinguishing appropriate or-
ganizations from inappropriate ones. In addition, should it be found neces-
sary to establish licensing fees for suppliers based upon their volume of
sales, 2 a schedule could be adopted after study and hearings indicated its
proper composition. The authors do not contemplate extensive need for
rule-making; however, the experience of other states has indicated that the
rule-making power, used with discretion, is often the most effective way of
combatting problems which arise during the administration of bingo regu-
latory schemes."' To require action by the full General Assembly under
such circumstances would be inefficient and possibly ineffective.
The Governor should be authorized to appoint a director of the Office
of Bingo Control, much as he is now authorized to appoint a state lottery
director. 8 ' This director would be charged with managing the licensing,
regulatory, and investigatory functions of the Office. In effect, the director
would be the executive arm of the Commission relative to the bingo law,
and would be responsible for keeping the office records and enforcing com-
pliance with the Commission's rules and orders. The Commission itself would
be available to aggrieved license applicants or licensees as the administrative
appellate body. 85
The director would be authorized to employ three assistants: one re-
sponsible for issuing individual licenses to operators, lessors and suppliers;"'8
a second charged with issuing and renewing permits to conduct games to
charitable organizations; and the third authorized to compile and cross-
reference all statistics relating to the expenditure of proceeds, the volume
of business done by each supplier, lessor, and operator, and other statistics
deemed necessary to effective supervision, and to receive and investigate
complaints regarding all licensees and permit holders. If, and only if, it were
deemed necessary by the Commission, additional staff for processing license
and renewal applications, supervising licensees, and investigating complaints
or irregular practices could be retained by the Office.
It is submitted that the appointment of assistants to consider and act
382 See text accompanying note 319 supra.
383 See text accompanying notes 272-78 supra.
384 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3770.02 (Page Supp. 1976).
385 Cf. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4301.03 (Page 1973) (Liquor Control Commission).
386 See text accompanying notes 404-08 infra.
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upon special license applications will permit more knowledgeable and con-
sidered decisions to be made respecting issuance and renewal. Each assistant
would be better equipped to review the financial reporting forms applicable
to the licensees he supervises and to detect irregularities therein. Merely
having personnel commissioned so to act should serve as a deterrent to licen-
sees. Smoother administration, wrought from familiarity with the field and
with the licensees and applicants he is designated to serve, should result. The
establishment of an office to receive and investigate complaints should aid in
checking abuses from running crooked games to "skimming" off the top,
which will in turn protect participants and serve the public goal of distribut-
ing proceeds for charitable purposes. 8
The rule-making power of the Commission could be limited to promul-
gating regulations concerning:
(1) The qualifications for individual licensees of good character, non-
criminal background, and the like, as defined in the statutory licensing
section;8ss
(2) The standards of eligibility for charitable organizations, including
consideration of such factors as income needed and expected from
operating bingo, other sources of income, annual expenditures, anti-
cipated uses of bingo income, reputation for community and charit-
able nature;
(3) The information to be provided on license applications and ses-
sion and annual financial reports, together with information and/or
books to which the Commission can exercise access rights;8 9
(4) The reasonable means and expense of advertising"' and remu-
nerating accountants; 91
(5) Permissible allocations of proceeds, including, but not limited to,
expenditures for maintaining, remodeling, or building facilities for bingo,
387 For a comparable agency duty already established in Ohio, compare the Ohio State
Ethics Commission, created in Chapter 102 of the Ohio Revised Code. Section 102.06 outlines
the commission's power to receive and investigate formal complaints and informal charges.
388 See text accompanying notes 404-08, 425 infra.
38 9 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2915.08 (A), 2915.10 (A), 2915.10 (B) (Page Supp.
1976).
39 Cf. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4301.03 (E) (Page 1973), (which authorizes the Liquor
Control Commission to promulgate rules regarding advertising); § 119.061 (Page 1969)(expressly limiting the rule-making powers of any agency so that "no agency may make
rules which would limit or restrict the right of any person to advertise.") Thus, any regu-lations would have to be carefully drafted so as to provide means of supervision, which
would probably be relatively effective in curtailing abuse of the ability to advertise by
spending large amounts of proceeds thereon, without restricting the right to advertise
per se.
391 For a discussion of rules relative to compensation of accountants in New Jersey and
New York, see note 342 supra.
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and organizations eligible to receive donations;.92
(6) Allowable games and schemes of chance to be played at festivals;.9
(7) Amounts for licensing and renewal fees which cover the cost of
administration. 94
The writers would suggest that the General Assembly continue to make
basic decisions as to what constitutes allowable expenses by charitable bingo
conductors. 95
B. Licensing Lessors, Suppliers, and Game Operators
It is apparent that Ohio, in choosing only to license sponsoring or-
3 9 2 See H.B. No. 72, § 2915.01 (Z), § 2915.09 (A) (2), 112th General Assembly (1977-
78), (which amendments are now being considered by the House Governmental Affairs
Committee). Section 2915.01 (Z), as amended, would permit proceeds to be "used by
a charitable organization for any charitable activity conducted by the organization." The
authors submit that this standard implicity broadens the charitable purpose definition of
"any beneficial or salutary purpose." See Ohio Children's Soc'y Inc. v. Porterfield, 26 Ohio
St. 2d 30, 268 N.E.2d 585 (1971); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Comm'r, 5 Ohio St. 2d
117, 214 N.E.2d 222 (1966). Should this be true, regulations could be promulgated to
define when donations were serving charity. For instance, if spent for an activity incidental
to a recognized charitable purpose, e.g., broadcasting religious messages by a church, (Mau-
mee Valley Broadcasting Assn. v. Porterfield, 29 Ohio St. 2d 95, 279 N.E.2d 863 (1972)
(tax exemption held permissible)) or printing church and community publications (Zindor
v. Otterbein Press, 138 Ohio St. 287, 34 N.E.2d 748 (1941) (insufficient charitable purpose
because of quasi-commercial nature)) rules could be established as guidelines to determine
whether or not charity received the proceeds. In Galvin v. Masonic Toledo Trust, 34 Ohio
St. 2d 157, 296 N.E.2d 542 (1973), the court determined that if the statutory rule for
exemption permitted activities incidental to charitable purposes (e.g., commercial leasing),
a charity could safely engage in such activities. Proper incidental activities could be defined
by rule to minimize any vagueness in the standard. See Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5709.121
(Page Supp. 1976).
393 As previously discussed, note 142 supra, only roulette for money, craps for money, and
slot machines are forbidden at festivals. Omo Rv. CODE ANN. § 2915.02 (C) (Page
Supp. 1976). The writers submit that a comprehensive listing of games which are permissible
would prevent the kinds of abuses now possible, (e.g., playing games similar in all but one
respect to those prohibited, thereby circumventing the statutory purpose). This suggestion
is analogous to the manner in which the bingo definition loophole, which resulted in
variations such as "zingo" being legally permissible for nonlicensed organizations to conduct,
was eventually closed. Charitable organizations could play only bingo as defined in section
2915.01 (S) (1), and all similar games were made illegal.
94 See KAN. STAT. § 79-4704 (Supp. 1976); OmO REV. CODE ANN. § 3769.08 (Page
Supp. 1976).
395 The following allowable expenses are recommended:
(1) equipment rental from a licensed organization, at a rate not exceeding fifty dollars
per session (or less or more as the legislature determines is a sufficient, reasonable
rate);
(2) paying prizes not to exceed thirty-five hundred dollars per session, nor one-hundred
and fifty dollars per game;
(3) purchasing bingo cards from a licensed supplier at a reasonable rate;
(4) hiring security personnel;
(5) advertising the game according to rules adopted by the commission;
(6) renting premises for reasonable rates not to exceed two hundred and fifty dollars
per session;
(7) compensating a certified public accountant at reasonable rates, set by the Commission
if necessary, for record-keeping services.
COMMENTSpring, 1977]
68
Akron Law Review, Vol. 10 [1977], Iss. 4, Art. 5
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss4/5
ganizations in its charitable bingo legislation, has abdicated its responsibility
for effective regulation in three major areas of potential abuse. Unlicensed
and therefore only indirectly regulated under the Ohio law are (1) com-
mercial lessors of bingo halls; (2) commercial retailers and distributors of
bingo supplies; and (3) individuals who personally operate the games.
New York, with some 20 years' experience in bingo control,986 has
found commercial lessor and supplier licensing a necessity for effective
regulation." ' Likewise, New Jersey has found lessor control a necessity.
Tight commercial controls are exercised in conjunction with an underlying
philosophy that a maximum percentage of gross receipts should go to
charity and that the potential for that allocation is greater when commercial
interests are stifled or regulated." 8
Ohio's legislative philosophy in this area appears not to be a desire
to remove commercial interests entirely, as in Illinois where commercial
lessors are outlawed."9 Rather, Ohio has accepted the existence of com-
mercial lessors and attempted to regulate them by statute. ' Commercial
suppliers of bingo equipment, however, go unregulated in any way in the
area of equipment sales.
As discussed earlier, °1 commercial lessors in Ohio must charge rea-
sonable rent compared to the rate for premises similar in location, size
and quality, and the rent cannot exceed $250 per bingo session. Commercial
lessors are also prohibited from providing operators, security personnel,
concessions or concession operators, bingo equipment, or other type of
service or equipment, and cannot lease their hall to more than two charitable
organizations per week. Nothing in the law, however, prohibits the com-
mercial lessor from striking up arrangements with also-unlicensed suppliers
to provide a better price on bingo cards to those who rent his hall, nor
does the law prohibit the supplier from being a business associate of the
lessor or perhaps a member of his family.
At first glance, it appears that the Ohio law provides that bingo
396 New York's bingo legislation was passed in 1957 after a threat in 1955 by the New
York City Police Commissioner that bingo games would be considered a violation of the
state's gambling laws until the section prohibiting bingo was repealed. See J. Goldstein,
Police Discretion not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low Visibility in the Administration
of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543 n.95 (1960).
397 See N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 435 2(b) (McKinney 1972).39 S See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:8-26 (West 1973), interpreted in Daughters of Miriam Homefor Aged and Infirm v. Legalized Games of Chance Comm'n, 42 N.J. Super. 405, 126 A.2d
892 (1956).
399 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 1102 (8) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976).
400 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2915.09 (A) (3) (Page Supp. 1976).
40 See text accompanying note 176 supra.
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equipment be obtained only from other licensed charitable organizations.
However, what the statute actually requires is that the charitable organiza-
tion conducting the game own or lease its equipment from other licensees.
There is no restriction upon where a charitable organization must purchase
its equipment if it wishes to own, rather than lease, it.
Equipment, undefined in the statute, apparently applies to that whole
range of paraphernalia, i.e., cards, covers, the receptacle from which the
balls are drawn, which are necessary to run a bingo game. At one point,
the statute refers to "bingo cards and other equipment." ' 2 When these
items are purchased, there is no provision for controlling at the supply
source whether the cards are printed fairly, as to distribution of numbers,
letters and symbols, or whether the balls in the receptacle are properly
weighted. Neither is there any provision in the Ohio law for patrolling
these mechanical operations on the premises. Nor is there any provision that
the cost of supplies must be reasonable.
Other provisions in the charitable bingo statute would indicate that
there is legislative concern in Ohio, as in New York and New Jersey, that
a maximum percentage of the proceeds actually find its way to charity.
The law is specific, for example, in enumerating which noncharitable ex-
penses may be deducted from gross receipts." " The word bingo itself has
been redefined to absurdity in an attempt to include a broad range of
similar games which share bingo regulations. It would appear consistent
with legislative policy, then, to police more effectively two areas, leasing
and supplies, where there is potential for monopolizing supply sources,
increasing noncharitable expenses, or even throwing the pots to game in-
siders who hold rigged cards.
Licensing suppliers and lessors would reduce the potential for abuse.
The process could be handled annually through the Office of Bingo Control,
which could set standards for issuance. By rule it could be established
that applicants with a previous record of gambling offenses could not hold
either supplier or lessor licenses, and applications could provide further
screening. Lessor candidates, for example, might be asked for a list of
premises they make available for bingo lessees. ' They might also be asked
to list any firms in which they or their family members have an interest
and which furnish any type of bingo equipment. Cost of a lessor license
might be a flat fee, not to exceed the cost of a charitable organization's
402 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2915.09 (A) (2) (Page Supp. 1976).
403 Id.
404 Although Ohio law limits to two organizations the number of lessees for a single com-
mercial premises, there is no limit on how many bingo halls one lessor might choose to
rent out. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2915.09 (A) (3) (Page Supp. 1976).
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bingo permit, or it might be on a sliding scale, as in New York,"5 depending
on how much annual gross rental is realized from bingo hall rentals. By
licensing and regulating lessors, criminal sanctions as well as suspension
or revocation of licenses could result from violations. By making it a
violation to rent a hall to an unlicensed organization, the state would
have one more way of assuring that bingo games are conducted only by
licensees.
Suppliers could be similarly regulated by Commission rule and ap-
plication screening. The state, through applications, could maintain an
information bank on their gross annual sales, their customers, and their
prices, and refuse to grant licenses where there is an interlocking ownership
between supply firms and commercial lessor operations or where a previous
gambling offender holds an interest in the supply firm. Furthermore, the
supplies themselves could be controlled by requiring that all licensed sup-
pliers produce cards, for example, in uniform format with their license
number or other identifying mark on each card. A bingo player who
suspected cheating in the game itself would then have a supplier number
or mark to report to the Office when he registered a complaint.
Suppliers, like lessors, could face license suspension or revocation if they
sold supplies to organizations which are not licensed. The amount of the
license fee, as for commercial lessors, could be made a flat fee not to exceed
that of permit holders or could depend on the firm's annual gross sales.
A third area which bears watching and therefore licensing is that of
the individuals who operate the game. Ohio, unlike most other states
surveyed, does not require that the operator be a member of the sponsoring
organization. It is simply stipulated that he serve without remuneration.
The requirement of active membership for a specified time period, perhaps
a year, would seem to prevent the sort of abuse where an expert operator
volunteers his services but unbeknownst to the sponsoring organization,
skillfully throws the games to his friends planted in the audience, who
share the pot with him.
As Ohio law stands now, "operators" broadly includes those who collect
money, hand out bingo cards and covers, select the combinations of letters
and numbers from the receptacle, distribute prizes and serve refreshments. 4 6
It would not seem unreasonable to require active membership for all those
"operators" who are involved in the game process. It would not seem
necessary for those who merely serve refreshments.
405 See text accompanying note 308 supra.
406 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2915.01 (U) (Page Supp. 1976).
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An additional safeguard would be to require individual operator lic-
enses for those who collect the money, hand out the cards and draw the
letters and numbers from the receptacle. The fee could be minimal, perhaps
$5 per person, but would serve as a screening device to prevent former
gambling offenders from running the game. Licensed operators could be
issued identification badges by the state, so that participants could readily
ascertain when unlicensed operators were involved in the game's outcome.
If individual operator licensure appears politically unfeasible for legis-
lative passage, an alternative would be to require that each permit candidate
submit a list of operators for screening, who would be solely in charge of
running its games. Badges might also be issued to operators under the
permit system.
Although additional licensing revenue would be generated by requiring
licenses for lessors, suppliers and individual operators, it would be naive
to assume that by licensing more participants in the bingo system at current
rates, revenue would be generated beyond the costs of administering the
more extensive program. The first question is whether attempting to raise
funds to help defray the cost of local enforcement, as in Kansas, ' would
be desirable, or whether it would be a beneficial public policy goal to
divert some quantum of bingo funds to serve designated public purposes,
as in Illinois.1°8
As indicated, it would appear to be Ohio's legislative philosophy that a
maximum percentage of gross receipts should go to charity. Particular
legislative attention has been focused on which charities should benefit
from the funds. To divert funds from these private charitable purposes
into public school or mental health programs, as in Illinois, would seem
to subvert the local legislative purpose and, even if a worthy goal, would
probably not be feasible for legislative passage. On the other hand, a funds
diversion for local enforcement would appear to be not only a worthy but
a popular goal which should be pursued by the legislature. Better enforce-
ment would bolster the legislative purpose of the bingo law by helping to
assure that the monies intended for charity actually went to charity.
Assuming that using bingo revenues for enforcement were found ap-
propriate, two alternative sources of revenue would be available. One would
be to raise the cost of licensure beyond the cost of administering the licensing
program itself. The other alternative would be to levy a tax on the gross
receipts of bingo games.
407 KA. STAT. § 79-4703 (1976 Supp.).
408 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 1101 (7) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976).
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Ohio's license fee of $50 is relatively low. Although Kansas charges
a miniscule $25 for the privilege of conducting charitable bingo games,'4 0 9
Illinois' fee is $20010 and Michigan's $100. '11 In New York, cost of licensing
can be far higher for commercial lessors and suppliers with high annual
gross rentals and sales. '12 Although an across-the-board increase in license
fees for permit holders and other possible licensees might be triggered to
cover increased costs of administration, it does not appear that any under-
lying purpose of the current law would be served by charging higher license
fees to commercial participants than to charitable ones. Ohio legislators have
not sought to penalize commercial participants through any current provision
in the law except arguably by precluding their furnishing supplies and per-
sonnel and by limiting them to renting one premises to two licensees per
week. "1 ' Commercial sales of bingo equipment go virtually unregulated.
Therefore, there would not appear to be justification, at least on the basis
of existing law, for charging commercial participants higher license fees
simply because of their commercial identity.
A higher fee for all licensees, to benefit local enforcement, could bejustified on the general rationale that better enforcement would mean better
implementation of the law's intent, i.e., assuring more proceeds for charity.
However, a flat fee raise would have the disadvantage of affecting equally
those licensees who generate a modest bingo income and those with larger
pots, larger crowds, and larger profits.
For that reason, taking a percentage of the gross receipts, as is the
practice in Kansas and Illinois, 1 ' would appear to be the more equitable
revenue-raising device. Besides apportioning the burden fairly among licen-
sees, the receipts would tend to return more enforcement funds to those
communities with bigger enforcement problems. By contrast, a flat license
fee raise would return as much revenue to a community with, for example,
15 small games as the one with 15 highly competitive, large-pot games with
many players and therefore a higher potential for player complaints which
must be investigated.
409 KAN. STAT. § 79-4703 (1976 Supp.).
410 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 1101 (7) (Smith-Hurd 1976).
411 MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 432.105 (1) (West Supp. 1977).
412 See text accompanying notes 308-10, 318-19 supra.
413 However, one lessor can rent an unlimited number of premises, and it would be reason-
able to assume that the two-lessee-per premises provision in OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2915.09(A) (3) (Page Supp. 1976) seeks to prevent the commercial construction of halls for bingo
purposes only, thereby equalizing the commercial lessor and the charitable lessor, who
presumably uses his premises for other charitable purposes as well.
414 See text accompanying notes 350-51 supra.
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C. Permits For Charitable Organizations
The initial requirement for licensing under the present Ohio law is
the determination of whether or not an organization is charitable. The
General Assembly has already defined a number of kinds of organizations
which satisfy the "charitable" requirement, primarily requiring that a 501
(c) exemption of a specified kind be attained before licensing. As previously
discussed, 1 ' individual state policy must determine which charitable organi-
zations will be permitted to play bingo. Yet, other states protect themselves
from having to grant licenses or permits to organizations which have simply
attained the applicable federal tax exempt status by placing an additional
qualification of "bona fide" upon the charity. '16 This criterion enables the
licensing body to examine the history of the organization, investigate
whether or not its sole projected source of income will be from bingo, and
whether or not its "charitable purposes" have any intimate connection with
the organization itself or are merely "adopted" to justify operating a bingo
game. When these factors and standards are further incorporated into the
statute itself as considerations by which the determination of eligibility can
be reached, the opportunities for both administrative and organizational
abuses are limited. Furthermore, these factors can be used to guide the
fashioning of more specific rules by the Commission, should they be neces-
sary, thereby creating relatively objective standards against which an ap-
plication can be measured. Bona fide charities, presumably the ones which
the General Assembly intends to be licensed, would be protected by these
standards against the arbitrary use of unguided discretion in the issuance
of licenses.
Accepting those categories of eligible organizations now statutorily
defined in section 2915.01 (H) through (Q) of the Ohio Revised Code, the
authors submit that the Commission would be better able to make the de-
termination that a new kind of organization falls within the statutory purpose
than is the General Assembly, which must amend the law each time a strong
lobby persuades legislators that an additional category of organizations
should be granted eligibility. Thus, the definition of charitable organizations
should simply be drafted to encompass those bona fide charities, tax exempt
under the relevant 501 (c) provision," 7 which include religious, educational,
volunteer firemen's, senior citizens', and other specific organizations. How-
ever, the eligibility need not be limited to the named types of groups, but
415 See text accompanying notes 219-60 supra.
416 See text accompanying notes 231-33 supra.
417 Ohio could retain the categories now accepted: I.R.C. §§ 501 (c) (3), 501 (c) (4),
501 (c) (8), 501 (c) (10), and 501 (c) (19). Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2915.01 (H)
(Page Supp. 1976).
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could be expanded by duly promulgated rule to encompass other properly
tax exempt organizations which meet certain standards of community service
or beneficial purpose. The flexibility to be gained thereby will eliminate the
constant recourse to the legislature for special legislation enabling a certain
organization to qualify for licensing. ' Instead, qualification will be left to
the Commission, which by rule can set the necessary guidelines to be met
before and after licensing. Any challenge that the Commission exceeded its
statutory authority in licensing certain types of organizations could be ad-
judicated by the courts under settled procedures. 1 '
When the legislature defines the types of charities eligible for licensing,
it should do so in conjunction with determining the purposes to which pro-
ceeds may be lawfully devoted. The eligible types of organizations should
be permitted, or basically required, to spend proceeds on the charitable pur-
poses which they serve. Thus, although the legislation can prohibit fraternal
organizations from refurbishing their meeting rooms should it so desire,
those organizations would be required to use the proceeds to support a needy
institution which it had been contributing to as an organizational purpose.
The purpose behind this restriction is to keep control over the way in which
funds are used so as to assure that the legislative purpose is achieved. All
records and financial reports would indicate the manner in which proceeds
were used, whereas currently the records can indicate that organization Y
received proceeds, but no indication of ultimate use survives. On the
other hand, requiring bingo operations to spend and account for their own
proceeds provides maximum monitoring of funds. That is, Organization Y, if
unlicensed, is untouched by the threat of license revocation or suspension and
hence has no incentive for using the funds it receives from the licensee for
a bona fide charitable purpose.
By requiring each organization to qualify for licensing by being an
organization which directly achieves charitable purposes with the proceeds,
an additional safeguard for meeting the legislative policy is created. The
expenditures of each licensee will be subject to review by the Office of Bingo
Control and local law enforcement authorities. License renewal would de-
pend upon having met the statutory and regulatory standards. It is suggested
that the statutory standard of charitable purpose should reflect the common
law definition of charity serving a beneficial physical, social, spiritual, or
418 For example, Little Leagues, YMCA's, and others could demonstrate their adherence
to statutory purposes and prove the proper tax exemption to the Office. The Com-
mission could then delineate standards by which to measure eligibility of these organizations
and grant licenses to play bingo as regulated and use proceeds for statutorily permissible
purposes.
419 See Oino REV. CODE ANN. § 119.01 et seq. (Page 1969).
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educational purpose in the society. ' Absolute prohibitions against spending
receipts for paying operators and consultants should be retained in the
statute. In addition, any other policy determinations of undesirable uses, such
as maintaining facilities not exclusively or incidentally for charitable pur-
poses,"' should be codified by the legislature. Interpretative rules could then
be left to the Commission to formulate. If abuses are detected, such as build-
ing halls for noncharitable purposes, rules squelching such practices could
be formulated. Then guidelines as to acceptable purposes would exist. No
charitable organization could lose its license for wrongful allocation unless
the expenditures clearly violated a statute or rule. Renewals could be con-
ditioned on not spending proceeds in a way the Commission determined
to be objectionable;,22 such a finding should then be incorporated as a regu-
lation from which all charities could take guidance. The twin goals of ful-
filling public policy as embodied in the Constitutional Amendment and the
legislative regulatory scheme and of treating all applicants and licensees
fairly would be the guidelines to which the office would be held.
The license application would require, by statute, specific information
which the licensee would be placed under a continuing duty to update, since
licenses would be conditioned on meeting the applicant's representations.
The information would include:
(1) name and post office address;
(2) statement that the applicant is a charitable organization which
has been in existence for the requisite statutory period; in general, two
years;
(3) the location at which the bingo game will be operated, whether
or not such location is owned or leased, and a copy of the rental agree-
ment if leased (lessor's permit number);
(4) statement of previous history, record, and association sufficient
to establish the applicant's charitable status, and a copy of the Internal
Revenue Service determination letter of appropriate 501 (c) status;
(5) statement whether any previous licensing action, including denial
or revocation, has occurred;
(6) statement of the charitable purposes for which the proceeds will
be used, ' including the names, addresses, and key personnel of (un-
related) organizations to which proceeds shall be donated;
420 See Ohio Children's Soc'y, Inc. v. Porterfield, 26 Ohio St. 2d 30, 268 N.E.2d 585 (1971).
421 See OHo Rav. CODE ANN. §§ 5709.07, 5709.12, 5709.121 (Page 1973).
422 See Oio REv. CODE ANN. § 3769.06 (Page Supp. 1976).
423 Cf. Omo Rav. CODE ANN. § 2915.08 (A) (1)-(6) (Page Supp. 1976), which specifies
items which a license application must contain.
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(7) list of the operators who will work the sessions, 2 ' and the organi-
zation official responsible for all such workers, including permit num-
ber or statement of application;
(8) statement of the applicant's ownership of bingo equipment, the
cost thereof, and any lessees of such equipment, or the lessor's name
and address, including a copy of the rental agreement;
(9) names of the licensed suppliers of bingo paraphernalia;
(10) name of accountant, together with indication of his proper cer-
tification;
(11) the total annual income of the organization for the last two years,
indicating the amount received from sources other than bingo, festivals,
or other non-related business ventures of the organization;
(12) dates on which bingo sessions will be run, with times of opera-
tion, each week;
(13) for first time applicants, an estimate of the number of players
and gross receipts expected each session; for renewal applicants, the
average number of participants, gross receipts and returned charitable
proceeds per session;
(14) the names of the directors, officers, and other officials in the
organization;
(15) other necessary and reasonable information which the Office by
rule may require.
Licenses issued would be made conditional upon conducting the ses-
sions at the location within the application, purchasing and renting all neces-
sary materials from suppliers and lessors indicated, operating only at those
days and times the Office prescribes (usually those included in the applica-
tion), the named operators conducting the game, and spending the money
as indicated. Variances could be sought for good reason, and would not be re-
fused without cause. If necessary, a hearing to establish the rationale for
change could be requested by the licensee. Renewal would be conditioned
upon adherence to the conditions, regulations, and statutes. An annual audit
of required reports would also be conducted by the renewal officer, in con-
junction with the complaint officer if necessary. Failure to renew or the
decision to deny a license would be for good cause only, the parameters
of which would be found in the statute and rules and regulations.42 The
424 See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3770.05 (Page Supp. 1976), where a sales agent cannot be
solely in the business of selling lottery tickets.
425 Cf. Oino REV. CODE ANN. § 3770.05 (C) (Page Supp. 1976), wherein the Director
of the State Lottery Commission can refuse, suspend, or revoke the agent license of a
corporation if a director, officer or controlling shareholder has been convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude, fraud, or misrepresentation in any connection, violating any rule,
regulation, or order of the Commission, or engaging in gambling as a significant source of
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Administrative Procedure Act would continue to govern all such determi-
nations and appeals therefrom.
Those organizations already licensed would be assigned a number
from one to twelve. This number would indicate the month in which re-
newal would be sought. New licensees would receive the number correspond-
ing to the month in which their license is issued. 2' By distributing the work-
load on renewal applications, the smallest number of state employees would
be required, and the work should be relatively constant throughout the year,
reducing waste and inefficiency. At the same time, more thorough exami-
nation of renewal applicants and annual reports would result. Thus, maxi-
mum supervision and monitoring would occur, with the probable conse-
quence of better regulated, bona fide bingo operations.
In order to prevent the problems which currently arise because of ad-
ministrative failure to act on license and renewal applications, a maximum
deadline for action should be set, as with Virginia's thirty-day limitation,
after which issuance is automatic.2 7 The authors submit that in light of the
renewals being due within the month originally issued, a thirty day deadline
for action on renewals should be established. Should the General Assembly
think it wise to set a higher maximum time limit on initial applications, in
order to give sufficient time for preliminary investigation of the applicant
agency, a sixty day limit seems desirable. The two month period should be
adequate, considering the cross-reference system to be established and the
assistant in charge of investigating suspicious circumstances in tandem with
the assistant responsible for licensing organizations. Furthermore, this short
period should not be unduly burdensome to applicants, who are assured
action within a relatively short time. The balance seems to serve the public
interest in licensing only proper applicants as well as the interest in providing
a source of revenue to apply to charitable purposes without penalizing an
ongoing organization with unexcusably dilatory action.
Should the Office need more time in which to complete an investigation,
an extension of up to twenty days could be granted by the Commission after
a hearing in which the director and his assistant established to the Com-
mission's satisfaction that they had been diligently acting upon the applica-
tion. In addition, the Office must present good reason for needing the addi-
tional time to complete an investigation, detailing the basis for instituting
income. In addition, if any of these persons appear to be of experience, character, or
general fitness such that granting a license would be inconsistent with the public interest,
convenience, or trust, the Director may refuse the organization a license.
426 Compare the lottery sales agent licenses, which must be renewed each year within ten
days of the anniversary of issuance. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 3770.05 (Page Supp. 1976).
427 VA. CODE § 18.2-335 (2) (iv) (Michie 1975).
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such an in-depth study and the cause for suspecting that the organization
will prove to be ineligible for licensing. It should be less difficult to obtain
an extension of time in renewal proceedings, since the thirty day deadline
might prove inadequate to permit a detailed audit of suspect accounts. In
the case of a renewal, however, failure to act within the month will result in
provisional permission to continue operations, pending final disposition.
Should the Commission deem it warranted, local law enforcement officials
could be notified of the status of the organization's license, in order that
closer supervision would occur until final action was taken. Again, the pur-
pose of enabling thorough supervision and control over charitable bingo will
be served without causing undue hardship to an organization subject to
vigorous examination.
If a license or renewal is denied, a statement of the reasons therefor
shall be sent to the applicant. Appeal to the Commission can be made in
accord with The Administrative Procedure Act. The record therefrom may
be used as a basis for appeal to the courts of common pleas. Similarly, no
license may be suspended or revoked on the recommendation of the Office
without a full hearing before the Commission, " 8 again with the right of
appeal to the courts. Depending upon the circumstances, primarily the seri-
ousness of the misconduct alleged, the probability of final disposition for or
against the licensee, and the degree of harm to be suffered by the licensee
or the public, the Commission or court may stay the imposition of non-
renewal, suspension, or revocation until such decision is final. Again, the
provisions of Ohio's Administrative Procedure Act should control.
D. Amusement Bingo and Festivals
That amusement bingo and festivals have been a source of enforcement
problems in Ohio has been illustrated. ' However, before proposing solu-
tions through legislation or rule-making, a more fundamental issue must be
raised: do current statutory provisions permitting and regulating amusement
bingo and festivals violate the state constitution?
There are only two exemptions from the Ohio Constitution's absolute
prohibition against lotteries. They are the state lottery and bingo in which
the proceeds are applied to charitable purposes."3 0 Nonetheless, the current
charitable bingo law indicates that its restrictions do not apply to schemes
428 Cf. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3770.02 (Page Supp. 1976), which provides in part:
The director shall license lottery sales agents pursuant to section 3770.05 of the Revised
Code, and when necessary recommend to the commission the suspension or revocation
of any license so issued. The commission may on its own initiative revoke or suspend
the license of any lottery sales agent when such action is deemed necessary.4 29 See text accompanying notes 201-03 supra.43 0 OHIO CONsT. art. XV, § 6.
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of chance and games of chance conducted by certain charitable organiza-
tions at their festivals. The statute then goes on to stipulate that festivals
cannot be conducted for more than four consecutive days or more than twice
a year.4"' Similarly, amusement only bingo is exempted by statute from crim-
inal gambling sanctions.""
It would appear from Ohio case law that schemes of chance are for-
bidden by the state constitution, no matter who conducts them. The opera-
tive definition of lottery promulgated in Stevens v. Cincinnati Times-Star
Co.," ' which is the narrowest definition Ohio courts have formulated,
3"
clearly states that all schemes held out to the public in which chance deter-
mined the winner are lotteries for constitutional purposes. Thus, those activi-
ties classified in the charitable bingo law as schemes of chance - pools,
numbers games or "other schemes" '35 - include the elements necessary to
make them lotteries. That is, they are held out to the public, and chance
determines the winner. For the state to recognize and regulate such schemes
at a festival or elsewhere would appear to be patently unconstitutional. There-
fore, no organization, whether charitable or not, should be authorized by
statute to conduct schemes of chance other than bingo.
The status of games of chance, also included in the festival provision,
is unclear. The earlier courts' refusal to reach constitutional determinations
as to whether gaming devices in which the elements of consideration, chance,
and prize were present were prohibited lotteries might seem to make it
allowable to play such games. One Summit County Court of Common Pleas
has recently so held. ' Thus, if festival games of chance are lawful, the
writers submit that they should be subject to regulatory schemes to prevent
what amounts to criminal gambling.
Amusement only bingo is also subject to grave constitutional doubts,
since only charitable bingo is explicitly exempted from the state constitu-
tional prohibition against lotteries. Only if one of the requisite elements of
a lottery, i.e., consideration, chance, or prize, is removed can free bingo be
permissible. Under the current language of the statute, free bingo is either
bingo in which all the money is returned in prizes or in which no money at
431 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2915.02 (C) (Page Supp. 1976).
432 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2915.12 (Page Supp. 1976).
433 72 Ohio St. 112, 73 N.E. 1058 (1905).
434 See text accompanying notes 21-23 supra.
435 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2915.01 (C) (Page Supp. 1976).
436 State ex rel Gabalac v. The New Universal Congregation of Living Souls, No. 76-9-1960
(C.P. Summit County filed Sept. 1976), now pending appeal in the Ninth District Court of
Appeals.
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all is taken. ' It is submitted that only if no consideration to play is taken
at all, can free bingo meet constitutional standards. If gross receipts of any
kind remain and they are not allocated for charity, then the questionable
constitutionality remains. Should it be argued, however, that the considera-
tion received is purposely limited to collecting enough money to provide
prizes up to the statutory ceiling, pay the statutory two hundred and fifty
dollar rent, compensate security personnel, and meet other allowable ex-
penditures of charitable organizations with no proceeds remaining, then
the authors suggest that the operation still be subject to licensing require-
ments and to reporting allocation of gross receipts. However, it should be
noted that amusement only operations should be conducted only by eligible
charitable organizations to meet constitutional standards, unless the requisi-
tes of consideration and/or prize are not present.
If the General Assembly should determine that amusement bingo is
constitutional3 " or if a constitutional amendment should add amusement
bingo as an additional exception to the ban on lotteries, then amusement
bingo would be amenable to regulation and all operations should be licensed
by the Office of Bingo Control. Records and session reports should indicate
that all gross receipts were returned as prizes. The burden of proving com-
pliance should be placed upon the operation itself in order to retain its
license. " 9 Additional rules that no operators or consultants could be paid at
all, even from separate monies unconnected with bingo, should be enforced
to eliminate the possibility of circumventing the law which prohibits paying
any operator. Similarly, restrictions on building and equipment rentals should
apply.
Likewise, if the constitutional problems with the festival provision were
resolved and regulation therefore became lawful, then the writers would
advocate that festival operators be required to apply for special permits to
conduct games of chance on four specified dates. " 9 These permits would
be issued only upon the applicant's establishing his 501 (c) (3) status. Lo-
cation could be restricted to the grounds of the permit holder or to grounds
437 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2915.12 (Page Supp. 1976). Despite the disjunctive language,
at least one prosecuting attorney, in the City of Toledo's Law Department, has interpreted
the statute to require that no money at all be paid by participants (except perhaps to anteinto games), thus eliminating the element of consideration. Letter from Sheldon Rosen,
Assistant Law Director, City of Toledo, to Richard A. Cohen, Esq., Dec. 2, 1976.
438 A conclusion with which the authors disagree, except under specified circumstances.
If deemed unconstitutional, amusement bingo should be outlawed and enjoined throughout
the state.
4
3
9 This is similar to the requirements the city of Toledo places upon its free bingo operators.Letter from Sheldon Rosen, Assistant Law Director City of Toledo, to Richard A. Cohen,
Esq., Dec. 2, 1976.
440 Compare MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 432.107 (2) (West Supp. 1977).
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leased at a reasonable sum from a charitable organization in the vicinity.
Equipment could be restricted so that only other charitable organizations
could lease it out. Proceeds could not be used to pay operators or conces-
sionaires; neither could the organization use separate monies to compensate
these individuals. Accounting of all gross receipts, expenses, prizes awarded,
and proceeds used for specific charitable purposes would have to be supplied
to the Office. Failure to comply would result in fines or other criminal penal-
ties. No further permit would be issued to non-complying organizations.
It should be clearly set out in the relevant statutes that not only may
proceeds not be used to pay operators, or consultants, or to purchase, up
to the limit, equipment"' and space rentals, but also that no other monies
may be used for these purposes. Payment where the statute prohibits it
would be grounds for license revocation. In addition, criminal penalties
should be established to punish those operators, consultants, suppliers, and
lessors who receive compensation, or payment above statutory limits.
E. Reporting Requirements
A final area in which Ohio law should be changed to provide more
effective enforcement of the charitable bingo statute is in the reporting re-
quirements for charitable organizations operating the games. Currently, the
statute requires only that organizations "maintain" for at least three years
a record of each session's gross receipts, expenses, prizes, charitable recipi-
ents, and number of persons who participated in the session.""3 There is no
requirement that the reports ever be filed with regulatory officials on a cur-
rent or an annual basis. It is simply stipulated that the Attorney General or
any local law enforcement agency may examine the records for possible vio-
lations of the bingo statute.' Most other states surveyed require either an
annual report in conjunction with tabulation of revenues owed the state or
a report filed with the state and/or local officials within one to two weeks
each session, or both." 5
Ohio would benefit by adopting such regular reporting requirements.
If, as suggested, a percentage of gross receipts were taxed to help defray
local enforcement costs, an annual report of gross receipts and expenses
could be filed with the revenue tabulation. The information now required
to be maintained should be included, as well as any additional information
441 As with building rentals, the cost of equipment rental should be limited by statute to
a reasonable figure which will compensate the lessor charitable licensee adequately. Such
a fee could be set at fifty dollars a session, although investigation might disclose a more
reasonable figure for the General Assembly to set.
443 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2915.10 (A) (1-5) (Page Supp. 1976).
,4 ld. § 2915.10 (B).
44
5 See text accompanying notes 364-71 supra.
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the Office of Bingo Control might by rule require. If no enforcement-revenue
system were adopted by the legislature, the annual report could be filed by
permit holders with their applications for license renewal.
Perhaps even more important to enforcement officials would be a dual
requirement of current session reports to be filed with both local and state
enforcers within seven days of each game. If current reports were filed rou-
tinely, then it would be possible for the local prosecutor's office, for example,
to have a running record of funds disbursements for a questionable opera-
tion before making a formal request to inspect the books. In other words,
the automatic availability of session records would give the prosecutor valu-
able lead time in investigating an operation before making his investigation
formally known to the operators.
Still another statutory provision, allowing enforcement officials to in-
spect the bingo premises as well as the books on demand, is important in
giving enforcers unquestioned authority either to investigate complaints that
the game is being conducted unfairly or simply to spot-check operations
periodically for their mechanical propriety. It might be argued that such
authority is implied from the present law, through the authority to inspect
books and records, " '6 but in other statutes it is specified. Ohio's parimutuel
betting statute, for example, provides that premises may be inspected."'
Specific provision for inspecting bingo premises is also found in the laws of
Delaware, Michigan, and New Jersey. ' Likewise, if reporting requirements
are to be taken seriously, it would seem realistic for Ohio to follow New
York and New Jersey's lead" '9 in allowing by statute the reasonable remun-
eration of bookkeepers or accountants, with the Office of Bingo Control
having an option to set the range of what reasonable fees might be. As the
Ohio statute stands now, it appears that bookkeepers or accountants, since
their services are not enumerated as permissible, cannot be paid from gross
receipts of bingo games.
CONCLUSION
Bingo is trapped in its history. The constitutional morass has contributed
to this condition, as has the lingering concept of gambling as immoral and
criminally corrupt. The result of this trap has been the legislature's inability
to create a comprehensive regulatory scheme as well as an enforceable
criminal law. Instead, ad hoc amendments to a muddled body of administra-
446 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2915.10 (B) (Page Supp. 1976).
447 Oro REV. CODE ANN. § 3769 (Page 1971). Substitute House Bill 72 proposes inspections
of books, records, and premises of bingo operations.
448 See DEL. CODE tit. 28, § 1138 (b) (Michie 1975); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 432.114
(West Supp. 1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:8-30 (West 1973).
449 See note 342 supra,
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tive, regulatory, and criminal law have been offered to solve problems which
have decade-old roots and which resist ad hoc solutions.
The primary legislative goal in Ohio now must be to create a regulatory
scheme which can be administered throughout the state and which will pro-
vide for enforcement of clearly articulated and reasonable standards of con-
duct in operating bingo and allocating proceeds therefrom.
To that end, the writers have advocated that a separate Office of Bingo
Control be instituted not only to issue licenses and monitor bingo operations
but also to promulgate rules to meet the daily regulation and enforcement
problems posed by any form of legalized gambling. In this way, it is hoped
that many problems at last can be stemmed at the administrative level, and
that the state legislature, now drafting its third charitable bingo law in less
than two years, will be relieved of what has become an ongoing task of
statutory revision.
As part of this regulatory scheme, the writers urge greater state control
over the total bingo system by licensing commercial lessors, suppliers and
bingo operators, as well as allowing bingo proceeds to be diverted only to
the lawful charitable purposes of those charitable organizations which are
licensed to conduct bingo. Regular annual financial reports, as well as cur-
rent session reports, should be required of bingo operations.
Finally, it is urged that before further regulatory plans are devised for
controversial amusement bingo and festival provisions, the legislature take
a hard look at whether state recognition and regulation of these activities
violate the state constitution's anti-lottery provision. If regulation is indeed
constitutional and these activities are to continue with the legislature's bless-
ing, then licensing and reporting requirements no less stringent than those
for charitable bingo must be implemented.
Only by assuring that festivals and amusement bingo are not abused
as loopholes to circumvent charitable bingo regulations and by more tightly
regulating those operations which hold charitable bingo licenses can the
intent of the charitable bingo statute be realized. Only then will bona fide
charities be assured of maximum benefit from the games which are operated
in their name.
PATRICIA RAVENSCRAFT
ELIZABETH REILLY
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